

THE NEW INTERNATIONALISM

by CLARK FOREMAN

(*Social Action Books*)

This book is a discussion of internationalism and its growth in the modern world. It describes the new system of State-trading and examines the consequence of its development.

CRISIS GOVERNMENT

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FOREWORD

A BOOK with such a title as this is not improperly introduced by a note on genesis and gestation. Writing in 1926 on the Poincaré Ministry of National Union which came to power in France, I used the phrase "crisis government" to describe the arrangement under which the French Parliament had temporarily abdicated its ubiquitous administrative and legislative supremacy. That was by no means the first post-war instance of representative institutions resorting to an emergency expedient to meet an emergency situation. As time went on, it became clear that the term was a brief and accurate description of the ensemble of post-war political manifestations, both democratic and dictatorial.

During the summer of 1931, I stayed for some weeks in Hungary, one of the more rickety of the children of the Peace Conference, and then living under a cabinet dictatorship only slightly disguised by constitutional forms. To the west, in the capital of the ancient Hapsburg Empire, the failure of the Austrian banks had made necessary stringent executive control which had more popular support, or at least tolerated greater dissent than seemed to be manifest in Budapest. To the south, the King of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—the only really powerful monarch left in Europe—had been attempting to govern his unruly racial groups. He was even then contemplating the grant of a new constitution

which would do lip service to the representative principle but which would make it dangerous for any opposition effectively to use its voice. To the north, in Czechoslovakia, representative institutions, despite great difficulties, had to their credit substantial achievements. Contiguous to Czechoslovakia, Poland, perhaps the most remarkable creation of the Peace Conference, had a government which was parliamentary in form but the cabinet chiefs of the country were the supine tools of Marshal Pilsudski.

While I was in Warsaw there came news of the British Cabinet crisis, of the resignation of the MacDonald Labour Government, the formation of a national government and its assumption of control of the purse—the historic function of the British House of Commons. In Berlin a Chancellor of slight stature, and mild manner, was sponsoring a series of emergency ordinances which put the economic life of Germany under complete control. Wages and prices were being drastically reduced; imports, exports and foreign exchange transactions were regulated and every group in the community was being forced by executive fiat to consent to greater and greater sacrifices. A Reichstag freely elected and freely voting could put Dr. Brüning out at any moment. But so acute was the emergency and so indispensable was the Brüning Cabinet that the Reichstag did not dare to act. That kind of crisis government differed vastly from crisis governments to the east and south of Germany.

From America there came news of the increasing ravages of the greatest business and industrial depression in our history. There was a crisis but no government. European statesmen were then en route to Geneva where the world crisis was to be talked about but where nothing was to be done. France was intending to prevent the consummation of the Austro-German Customs Union if the banns were not forbidden by the permanent Court of International Justice—an interdiction which was daily expected. Many European statesmen hoped for the

postponement of the Disarmament Conference scheduled to meet in February but, while their hearts were willing, their voices were private. No one dared be the first to make the public suggestion. It was to remain for the Foreign Minister of the state which had, if not the most successful, at least the best advertised dictatorship, to propose an arms truce for one year—a pledge not to increase armament programs already announced. Thus Italy's government was to make what at that time seemed an important contribution to international appeasement.

I told my colleague, Professor James T. Shotwell with whom I was travelling, that I thought I would discuss some of these phenomena in a little book which I would call "Crisis Government." Many of the phenomena had been separately dealt with in considerable detail. I did not propose to repeat such efforts, but I thought it might be possible, in considering together comparable and differing forms of extraordinary government, to hope for a different point of view or a new emphasis.

Invited to deliver three lectures at the University of Virginia in May 1932 on the Page-Barbour Foundation, I gave them the title "Crisis Government." Since the situation in Europe was constantly changing and an American election was impending there seemed to be no great hurry to put the lectures in print. During the summer of 1933, when the courageous measures taken by a real government in Washington were well advanced, when Hitler's regime offered an example of a new kind of despotism, when the London Economic Conference had been an egregious failure and the collapse of the Disarmament Conference seemed certain, I began to revise the lectures for publication. Then the accident of Governor Smith's having appointed me, ten years ago, on a Commission to deal with New York City's clothing industries and their labour difficulties, led General Hugh S. Johnson to invite me to Washington so

that, as a Deputy Administrator of the National Industrial Recovery Act, I could handle some of these codes. But I took over other codes as well and remained a Deputy Administrator for six months, instead of the six weeks which had been contemplated.

Meanwhile the sweep of events has made out of date much that could and would have been said in the summer of 1933. If the pulse of liberty had been racing at the end of the War, was sluggish in 1931 and faint in 1933, its beats have now, in many areas, definitely ceased. As I revise these proofs history seems to be repeating itself or distorting itself, or (in the United States) just beginning.

In France, after eight years, another crisis government is required and extraordinary powers are given the executive. During the first weeks of 1934 it seemed possible that the Austrian plum was ripe and that Hitler was ready to pick it ; that the union of Teutonic peoples, which in 1931 was desired for economic reasons and prevented by France, because of political fears, would be brought about by Nazification. But Austria endured a brief Civil War and then abolished the Republic and set up a corporative state in thrall to Italian Fascism. It was not that Dollfuss loved Italy more than Germany but that he feared Mussolini less than Hitler. Whether this arrangement will give Austria sufficient economic advantages remains to be seen. It may be that Mussolini is no more than a temporary tutor, and that Hitler is to be the guardian. A new constitution, hastily prepared, declares that the laws "emanate from God Almighty" and sets up a Council of State, a Council of Culture, an Economic Council, a Council of Provinces and a Federal Chamber. But these bodies, which are not to be based on popular election, can have no control over the government, which will be appointed or dismissed by the President. A plebiscite can take place only if the government desires it.

For the French a Hapsburg restoration would be a much less objectionable *pis aller* and this has become more likely because of Dollfuss's extinction of the Social Democrats and the proscription of the National Socialistic movement. Twice in 1921 Karl attempted to recapture the Hungarian throne. That will be defended against Otto by General Gombos, who is violently anti-Hapsburg. But in Austria the new regime has clearly lessened the opposition to a restoration. While this situation developed two more minor Hitlers emerged—in Latvia and Bulgaria.

Spain has just had another Cabinet crisis and lives under an emergency regime which really is martial law even though it is not so described. An election in Italy results in an overwhelming approval of a list of the four hundred parliamentary candidates who were proposed by the Fascist Grand Council. Approximately ninety per cent. of the voters went to the polls. The negative votes were insignificant and in some smaller centers were nonexistent. But the Chamber which has been chosen may be known as the "suicide chamber" because Mussolini has declared that it will be compelled to decree its own extinction in favor of a new corporative form of government. He has made the same declaration before but this time he may mean it.

The congressional restoration of the bonus to the veterans over President Roosevelt's veto has implications which go far beyond the millions (paltry in comparison with the billions we are spending) of additional largesse for certain beneficiaries and of merited compensation for others. By its action Congress may have indicated that the Rooseveltian honeymoon is over but even if it is, the honeymoon has lasted longer than most political (or other) honeymoons do.

Germany and Japan have left the League and who is so poor as to do this organization reverence? The new order in diplomacy—by conference rather than by

correspondence—has failed, but as much because of the ineptness of the conferees as because of fault of method. Nationalism, increasingly resurgent since the War, is omnipresent and omnipotent. The ghosts of a few years ago are now ominous realities. Under these circumstances my title might well be "Crisis Government—1934 Model," for the engineers are already at work designing the lines of the new model. Despite the fact, however, that institutions are in flux there are some things that may be said and many of them, I maintain, may, despite the rapid sweep of events, be pertinent even after the new model is on sale.

L. R.

Washington
May, 1934.

A WORLD
“SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY”

JUST before the change of administration in Washington on March 4, 1933, there were published two massive volumes—*Recent Social Trends*—which, with supporting monographs, had been prepared at a cost of half a million dollars under the direction of a commission appointed by Herbert Hoover. In these volumes tendencies and trends are dealt with for the most part as if they had not been accelerated or retarded by a war which from 1914 to 1918 rocked the world and left a legacy of peace treaties—or, in other words, a legacy of seeds of another war.

Only the writers of the “Trends” section on economic organization appeared to think that the War was of any importance. They properly believed that the conflict “has been a dominant influence on the economic life of the United States since 1914”; but elsewhere in the volume the War is mentioned only in speculating whether post-war periods mean an increase or decrease of the criminal laws that legislatures pass and in showing the always rising percentages of governmental revenues that go to pay military defenders of the past or future. For the rest, social trends have apparently proceeded or halted without being influenced by the convulsion which began twenty years ago and which still proliferates itself in an economic convulsion of unprecedented

scope and intensity and in a series of regional political convulsions that unhappily seem likely to coalesce. So far as the Hoover volumes are concerned the forces unleashed in 1914 have apparently had scant consequences in respect of habits of living, the use of leisure, or family and social relationships.

These obliviousnesses cannot be discussed here. Sir Henry Maine once remarked on the profitless nature of what he called Hypothetics—speculation on what might have happened but did not. The asseveration of the reverse may sometimes be worth while. It is proper, therefore, to say that without the War, crisis government would not be the phenomenon that it now is; for in 1914, governments everywhere were becoming more, not less representative, more popular and less intolerant. The political consequences of the War and its economic aftermath have been tremendous. They have profoundly affected relationships between rulers and ruled; and those who cry out that representative institutions have been outgrown have not the faint wilderness voices that they had twenty years ago.

It is not necessary to stress the fact that the relationships of rulers and ruled are of high importance. To be sure, in the past governments have refrained from interfering with many of our normal activities. Save under the most totalitarian regimes there has been an ambit of economic and legal freedom within which men have not come into conflict, or indeed into contact, with the state. But these normal relationships, or lack of relationships, are becoming less numerous. What we have thought of as abnormality is coming to be normality as economic life gets more complex and governments are being forced more and more to reach out into fields which hitherto they have left untouched. The ambit of freedom is rapidly narrowing.

Even before the American government officially recognized that there was an economic crisis (and did Mr.

Hoover ever speak frankly?) it kept our banks from failing and held our railroads out of receiverships. It speculated on the grain exchanges in a vain hope that the price of agricultural commodities would be kept up. It subsidized manufacturers, loaned money to farmers, and gave money to war veterans. In short, the government was engaged in propping up a somewhat shaky capitalistic society. Those then in White Houses might say that this interference was "rugged American individualism." Perhaps they were not throwing stones, but they were at least throwing sops to Cerberus; and in this case the god was the uncritical reverence which so many living politicians have for obsolete dogmas—that is, for commands which the illustrious dead have given but which they themselves would be much too intelligent to believe or even repeat if they were still alive.

When political society was simple and the state performed few more than police functions, unanticipated events and sudden decisions by governments could work havoc and cause widespread and prolonged suffering among the mass of those who lived under the governments. In former days the havoc usually resulted from war. Nowadays havoc is still worked in that fashion, but harm can be more frequent and more devastating when it comes by reason of the improper interference of government in economic processes or the failure of government promptly and intelligently to interfere when economic processes have got out of hand and need control. The problems involved in these relationships between rulers and ruled are always discussed, but they become passionately discussed when situations are calamitous. "Whenever great intellectual cultivation has been combined with that suffering which is inseparable from extensive changes in the condition of the people," wrote Lord Acton, "men of speculative or imaginative genius have sought in the contemplation of an ideal society a remedy, or at least a consolation from evils which they

were practically unable to remove.”¹ The thought now does not extend to ideal societies but—perhaps it is capable of no more—stops with the real dictatorships. In periods of calm, however, few concern themselves with the dissection of existing orders. Interest in cruelties is scant. There is a paucity of suggested reforms. The thoughts of most of us pant along after events. It takes a cataclysm of some sort or a situation which seems likely to become cataclysmic to attract continued interest to the problems bound up in the relationships of rulers and ruled.

For the last twenty years catastrophes have followed each other rapidly. Situations have been unprecedentedly abnormal. Hence there is now a tremendous literature of revolt and of dissent much of which attacks the democratic principle and this from quarters which have hitherto been sympathetic. What Mr. F. S. Oliver has described² as the “endless adventure of governing men” again appears to be an endless tragedy. The eighteenth century, in which he was interested, was in some respects not measurably behind the twentieth century. The tragedy simply suggests what might have been, but history deals only with what was. At the moment, however, prophecies are made that states with extraordinary regimes will consent to regimes that are even more extraordinary. A wing of the British Labor party talks of dictatorship. Sir Oswald Mosley was able to collect only a handful of Fascists but that they ventured to call themselves by that name is of ominous significance. Mr. Lawrence Dennis is about to publish a book entitled “The Coming Fascism.” In the United States! That for us would be crisis government of an, at present, incredibly fantastic character.

But over much of Europe there is now such a regime

¹ “Essay on Nationality,” *The History of Freedom and other Essays*, p. 270.

² *The Endless Adventure*, Vol. 1. 1710-1727 (London, 1930).

—inaugurated by terroristic methods and established on a despotic basis; with the despots, strikingly enough and not without reason, claiming to have popular backing. Elsewhere parliaments have empowered executives to deal with critical situations. In Washington, stalwart measures were long postponed but since March 4, 1933, Presidential government has been stronger than at any previous time—even during the War. The powers granted to President Roosevelt are considerably in excess of those which Congress allowed President Wilson to exercise and the popular support at present manifest is immeasurably greater. In Geneva, international organs which were never as effective instruments of government as their architects desired them to be, are alleged to have broken down; but no one proposes to abandon them. Overshadowing these phenomena, there is the question of the seriousness of the challenge which is presented, in theory as well as in reality, to the ideal of democratic institutions. Will representative government give way to a form of government which will be less dilatory, less compromising, and less tolerant? Internationally the pressing issue is the age old problem of whether there can be any effective control of international anarchy. That problem has its national repercussions for international anarchy encourages dictatorships; and, completing the vicious circle, the dictators, stressing order within their states, care little about order between states.

To be sure, current phenomena of crisis government are no more than a few threads which have lately been woven into the vast and illimitable web of political institutions. But such threads, even though lately woven, are of no mean importance. They may suggest a reappraisal of the kind of thread which had already been woven into the web. They indicate the sort of threads that may be woven into it in coming years. There is an important kernel of truth in Buffon's remark that "to

understand what has happened and even what will happen, it is only necessary to examine what is happening." And this—what is happening—is, as I have said, far from encouraging. Who can maintain that today there is less appropriateness than there was three hundred years ago in the supplication of the litany: "From famine, from battle and murder and from sudden death; from all sedition, privy conspiracy and rebellion, Good Lord deliver us." Three centuries have made little difference. We now crave deliverance from the same evils. They simply have different settings and, ironically enough, the famine now being suffered results in part from the ability of the world to provide an unneeded plenty.

During the three centuries, nevertheless, there have been some changes. For the second part of the period, the principle of democracy has gained wider and wider acceptance. But now democracy is "under a cloud." From many different quarters the charge is made that parliamentary government has broken down and that representative institutions have been tried and have "failed." Much of this has a familiar sound. It has been heard ever since democratic government began to be attempted and that, as has been said, was not so long ago. One easy answer to the sceptics who maintain that popular government is *démodé* may be that popular government has not had a long enough trial to warrant a definite conclusion that it has failed. Some two thousand years have shown the inadequacy or danger of various other methods of carrying on the business of the state.

Democracy may have accomplished the feat of enthroning the incompetent many in the place of the corrupt few but there have been some advances. Who will deny that it is better for statesmen to cajole fickle electorates than to bribe royal mistresses as they did barely

more than a century ago? There is now more reality and less mysticism. The happy accident of despots being benevolent and honest will hardly be more frequent than the happy accident of prime ministers or presidents being courageous and intelligent. There is less reverence for place. Eighty years ago, in his lectures on "The Four Georges," Thackeray recorded that "when George III spoke a few kind words to him, Lord Chatham burst into tears of reverential joy and gratitude; so awful was the attitude of the monarch and so great the distinction of rank." Thackeray added that it would be difficult to imagine Lord John Russell or Lord Palmerston on his knees when the sovereign was reading a dispatch or crying because Prince Albert was civil. It is quite impossible to believe that even Mr. MacDonald would become lachrymose because he was the worthy recipient of marks of royal favor. Or to take another English illustration, there is an index of advance in the changed uses of the Tower of London, which now stores the Crown Jewels and is visited by tourists.³ In England, at least, critics are no longer put to death simply because they are critics. Dissent is severely penalized under some of the dictatorships but not, happily, without arousing widespread criticism and causing keen regret.

The comparative merits of government by the one, by the few, and by the many have intrigued many thinkers, but is the discussion of the subject really much farther advanced than it was five centuries before Christ when it was dealt with by the seven Persian noblemen

³ "The extraordinary low level of the past in humanity and decency is often forgotten by controversialists who judge it as if it were a struggle under modern conditions between the well-behaved sects and parties of today. In the last year of Henry VIII's reign Wriothesley, the Lord Chancellor, and Rich, the Solicitor-General, with their own hands turned the screws of the Tower rack while torturing the Protestant lady, Anne Askewe, in hope of extorting confessions. Her shattered body was afterwards tied to the stake at Smithfield and burnt." Tieveyan, *History of England*, p. 314 (New York, 1926).

whose views are reported by Herodotus? ⁴ We have had democracy—government by the many—for no more than one hundred and fifty years, and the ideal of democracy is still an ideal. It has not yet been realized. What is democracy? As was said of the camel, it is hard to define but you know it when you see it. Perhaps it is truer to say of democracy that you know it when you do

⁴ III. 80 "Otanés advised that they should commit the government to the Persians at large, speaking as follows: 'It appears that no one of us should henceforward be a monarch, for it is neither agreeable nor good. . . . And indeed how can a monarchy be a well-constituted government, where one man is allowed to do whatever he pleases without control? for if even the best of men were placed in such power, he would depart from his wonted thoughts. For insolence is engendered in him by the advantages that surround him, and envy is implanted in man from his birth, and having these two, he has every vice; for puffed up by insolence he commits many nefarious actions, and others through envy. One would think that a man who holds sovereign power should be free from envy, since he possesses every advantage; but the contrary to this takes place in his conduct towards the citizens, for he envies the best who continue to live, and delights in the worst men of the nation; he very readily listens to calumny, and is the most inconsistent of all men; for if you show him respect in moderation he is offended because he is not sufficiently honoured; and if anyone honours him very much he is offended as with a flatterer. . . . But a popular government bears the fairest name of all, equality of rights, and secondly, is guilty of none of those excesses that a monarch is. *The magistrate* obtains his office by lot, and exercises it under responsibility, and refers all plans to the public. I therefore give my opinion, that we should do away with monarchy, and exalt the people, for in the many all things are found. . . .' 81. Megabyzus advised them to intrust the government to an oligarchy, and spoke as follows: 'I concur with what Otanes has said about abolishing tyranny; but in bidding us transfer the power to the people, he has erred from the best opinion; for nothing is more foolish and insolent than a useless crowd, therefore it is on no account to be endured, that men, who are endeavouring to avoid the insolence of a tyrant, should fall under the insolence of an unrestrained multitude. The former, when he does any thing, does it knowingly, but the latter have not the means of knowing, for how should they know who have neither been taught, nor are acquainted with any thing good or fitting; they who, rushing on without reflection, precipitate affairs like a winter torrent. Let those, then, who desire the ruin of the Persians adopt a democracy; but let us, having chosen an association of the best men, commit the sovereign power to them, for among them we ourselves shall be included, and it is reasonable to expect that the best counsels will proceed from the best men.' Megabyzus accordingly advanced this opinion. 82. Darius expressed

not see it. "The democrat maintains that the legitimacy and authority of governments must depend upon right, justice and reason, that the whole political system must be defensible metaphysically and ethically as well as legally, and that every political action is wrong unless it can be shown to be rational and communally expedient, just, and desirable." ⁵ We know, as I said, that demo-

his opinion the third, saying: 'In what Megabyzus has said concerning the people, he appears to me to have spoken rightly; but concerning an oligarchy, not so. For if three forms are proposed, and each of these which I allude to the best in its kind, the best democracy, and oligarchy, and monarchy, I affirm that the last is far superior. For nothing can be found better than one man who is the best; since acting upon equally wise plans, he would govern the people without blame, and would keep his designs most secret from the ill-affected. But in an oligarchy, whilst many are exerting their energies for the public good, strong private enmities commonly spring up; for each wishing to be chief, and to carry his own opinions, they come to deep animosities one against another, from whence seditions arise; and from seditions, murder; and from murder it results in monarchy; and thus it is proved how much this form of government is the best. But when the people rule, it is impossible but that evil should spring up; when, therefore, evil springs up, mutual enmities do not arise among the bad, but powerful combinations, for they who injure the commonwealth act in concert; and this lasts until some one of the people stands forward and puts them down; and on this account he is admired by the people, and being admired, he becomes a monarch; and in this he too shows that a monarchy is best. But to comprehend all in one word, whence came our freedom? and who gave it? was it from the people, or an oligarchy, or a monarch? My opinion therefore is, that as we were made free by one man, we should maintain the same kind of government; and moreover, that we should not subvert the institutions of our ancestors, seeing they are good; for that were not well.'" (Cary's translation: Bohn edition.)

Four of the seven Persians adhered to the last opinion. Otanes refused to enter the competition for the kingship. The other six determined that "he whose horse should first neigh in the suburbs at sunrise, while they were mounted, should have the kingdom." If the reader does not already know the passage, he will be amused by the artifices which the groom of Darius is alleged to have used in order to persuade his master's horse to be the first to neigh: and thus a king was made.

⁵ Woolf, *After the Deluge*, p. 177. "Democracy is primarily . . . an attitude of mind . . . which . . . determines in what way it shall regard the anonymous individual and the community. It is secondarily a judgment as to the best way of regulating the relations between the individual and the community." p. 260.

cratic government is not being attempted when the ideals of political liberty, legal equality and the advancement of individual happiness are not being regarded, and when important decisions are made without discussion. In those countries where the ideals are accepted and sincere attempts are made to work machineries which can implement the ideals, there is still failure in greater or less degree. Arguable it also is that under the representative institutions that we now have the only decision which masses of men can make is a peevish dismissal of persons from office. We cannot freely choose those who are to take their places. That is done for us by party organizations over which it is difficult to secure control. So far as representatives are concerned, the only real popular decision possible is a negative one. Where direct legislation is attempted, electorates can say Yes or No on certain occasions, but the vocabulary is limited to these two words and frequently the issue is such that neither word should be said. Nevertheless even this may be highly important, for it is the essence of democracy that it function through discussion, that it permit criticism, that it protect political and economic entrepreneurs, and that those at its head be subject to removal by methods which do not require violence to be effective.

This power of democracy is a great one, and I will refer to it later. Furthermore, as I have said, democratic government is a plant of recent growth. It may have grown too quickly. It started to grow before education was popular. The institutions through which it seeks to work were developed in an illiterate age before the Industrial Revolution and before the ease of communication and the transmission of intelligence had shortened distances and made the globe shrink in size. Naturally institutions set up under such conditions will now creak and falter. If it is not possible to patch them quickly enough, they may even break down and, pending reno-

vation, they may be supplanted by emergency machinery.

At least we now view the situation without an excess of sentimentality. We are much more sceptical today than men were in the age of the French Revolution when Wordsworth, for example, saw the Goddess of Democracy, resplendent and found Benevolence and Blessedness spread like a fragrance everywhere. When the World War "made the world safe for democracy" even the most sentimental democrat was more cynical. He remembered that the post-Napoleon experiment in international government—the Holy Alliance—was designed to make the monarchs secure on their thrones and to check the rise of self-government. He knew that a century later one important task was to erect safeguards against Bolshevism whether it spread from Russia or, in other forms, arose from intolerable conditions which popular governments were unable to correct. Given the economic aftermath of the War and the disappointments of the peace treaties, the question was, with the world theoretically safe for democracy, whether the democracies would be safe for each other or for the individuals constituting them. Tom Paine said that Burke, in fulminating against the French Revolution, had pitied the plumage but had forgotten the dying bird. In 1918 the plumage was admired. Now it has become tattered. In 1918, it was confidently anticipated that the bird would live. Now the ornithologists are doubtful.

When the nineteenth century began, truly representative institutions existed only in England and in America. In England, the monarch wore his crown with the permission of Parliament which was legally supreme. Actually the country was ruled by an oligarchy of the well-born. The half century before the outbreak of the World War saw representative institutions spread rather rapidly and rather widely. Manhood suffrage swept over

the continent of Europe. Even Russia, Turkey, Persia and Japan set up parliaments. But immediately they were careful to see that the parliaments were little more than debating societies and that debates were not too annoying. British possessions, save for India and Egypt, had self-governing institutions; but India and Egypt were in a continual state of ferment because they were denied privileges which Great Britain had elsewhere extended. In Latin and South America there was popular government in name but frequently not in reality.

In short, the progeny of the mother of parliaments was numerous. It included some ugly ducklings. The brood was all young. England had been able to develop her parliamentary institutions in a period of relative calm, undisturbed by serious foreign wars or internal disturbances. Continental states had not had the same advantage. Violence—internal or international—brought some systems of government to an untimely end or prematurely launched new institutions. It may be argued that representative governments to work successfully should have Topsy's genetic processes: they should just grow. Or, as Disraeli said, "We can only govern by tradition or by the sword." The difficulty is that frequently a tradition is delayed in developing.

When the War broke out in 1914, there were only five republics in Europe. Only two were of major importance: Switzerland and France. Andorra and San Marino were political curiosities and it was risky to class Portugal as a republic since almost any day the headlines might chronicle a successful coup d'état. So far as the democratic ideal was concerned, the question of a monarchy versus a republic was not important. Great Britain with a constitutional monarchy had institutions every whit as representative and as responsive to popular feeling as was possible in a state where the executive did not wear a crown. A governing class, but with waning power, still ruled the country. Universal suffrage, al-

though it had not yet been achieved, was inevitable. On the Continent, democracy did not greatly care about kings. Busy securing extensions of the suffrage and endeavoring to capture parliaments and give them greater authority, it had not bothered to assault crowns. Republicanism before the War seemed to be waning. Certainly it was not spreading.⁶

But the War gave democracy a great although transient victory. Almost overnight it became a political faith at least accepted in principle. Indeed the democracies had stood the test of the War far more successfully than had the autocracies. No one could deny that they had gained the victory. The political systems of France, England, and the United States had weathered a storm which had swept away the Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, and Romanov dynasties. A war had been fought, in President Wilson's phrase, to make the world safe for democracy, and hence democracy was the principle accepted in the constitutions which had to be drafted. Some states like Czechoslovakia, released from control by oppressive monarchies, generated a good deal of democratic fervor. That was not the case in other quarters. There the effective stimulus came in part from the outside. The War had been called one of democracy against autocracy. Hence the autocracies might get a better break if they became democracies. The fact that some of them have been guilty of apostasy, can hardly be accepted as convincing evidence of a collapse of the representative principle. At all events, as a result of the War, two emperor kings, five kings, five grand dukes, six dukes and seven princes—all reigning sovereigns under the old regime in Germany and Austria-Hungary—lost their royal jobs. The constitutions which were drafted set up republican institutions. Men of humble birth took the places of the

⁶ H. A. L. Fisher prophesied that it was waning. *The Republican Tradition in Europe* (New York, 1911). Cf. his essay on *Political Prophecies* (Oxford, 1919).

kings. But these changes were in the trappings of government. They were on the outside. There were no traditions on which the new institutions could rest. And Europe, carrying on the endless adventure or, perhaps, the endless tragedy of government, embarked on a variety of political experiments.

At the Paris conference populations had been transferred from one allegiance to another, but at least the transfers were effected after argument as to their desirability and they were decreed by popularly chosen persons who claimed to be acting in accordance with certain principles. That certainly was a gain. The allegiance of populations was not changed, as it formerly was, because an infant princess and prince were married to wait for the maturity that would permit them to mate. In July, 1914, there had been twenty-six different European states.⁷ From the union of the War and the Peace Conference, there were seven political offsprings. The number of European monies increased from thirteen to

⁷ In 1916 existing methods of government could be classified as follows: Europe—5 republics (Switzerland, Portugal, San Marino, France, Andorra); 14 constitutional monarchies (Austria, Bulgaria, Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, Italy, Spain, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Luxemburg), and 3 despotic monarchies (Russia, Germany, and Turkey). In Asia there were one republic (China); two limited monarchies (Japan and Siam), and five despotic monarchies (Persia, Afghanistan, Mepaul, Oman, and Bhutan). The inclusion of Japan as a "limited" monarchy and Germany as a "despotic" monarchy shows the influence of the war psychology. In Africa there were one republic (Liberia) and two despotic monarchies (Abyssinia and Morocco). On the American continent there were twenty-one republics. Of the fifty-four governments mentioned, 28 were republics (only seven outside of America); 16 limited and 10 despotic monarchies. A. E. Duchesne, *Democracy and Empire*, p. 109 (Oxford 1916). This enumeration does not include the self-governing British Dominions.

In Europe today there are fourteen monarchies: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Roumania, Sweden, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia. There are eighteen republics (or perhaps, more accurately, states without kings): Andorra, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Russia, San Marino, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey.

twenty-seven; and—let no one underestimate its importance—the 11,000 kilometres of new customs frontiers were a portent of what would happen to international trade.

Five of the new states had not existed in any form in 1914: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Two small states—Serbia and Roumania—had been greatly enlarged and the former had a new name which described the accession of new nationalities—the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croates, and Slovenes. Three states which had been parts of great powers were now independent—Austria, Hungary, and Finland. Three other states, one a creation of just before the War, had had their frontiers changed slightly: Albania, Greece, and Bulgaria. Barely more than one hundred million people began to live under thirteen different governmental systems. Two-thirds of the Continent consisted of states no one of which had more inhabitants than New York.

The architects of this new Europe—the draughtsmen of the peace treaties—could give the states political boundaries but in doing so they destroyed old economic and financial relationships and were unable to substitute new relationships. For economists the phenomena of the post-war period will long have great interest. On the whole, recovery from the collapse was strikingly speedy. The death and incapacitation of millions of workers; the demobilization of uninjured millions; the readjustment to peace-time purposes of industries which had been keyed to war purposes; the restoration of land and water communications; the successful famine relief measures in various countries; the replenishment of exhausted supplies of raw materials; the reform of currencies—these problems were for the most part quickly and to a large degree successfully surmounted, for the time being. After the armistice, the standard of living, throughout the greater part of Europe, gradually rose.

Recovery came; but the means by which it was possible during a decade were in considerable measure responsible for the devastating relapse which began in 1929. The causes of that collapse were various. Not the least important in a general sense, however, was the vast change in the distribution of financial obligations with no corresponding change in international trade. The United States contributed an influential and spectacular part of that change. Before the War America had been a debtor country. After the War she was a creditor country. Her loans made possible Europe's recovery but America refused to permit the repayment of the borrowings in goods. The Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act was no more than perhaps the most notorious restriction on international trade, for economic nationalism was running riot in every country. Occasionally European statesmen seemed clear-headed in viewing economic nationalism as harmful; but American Republican politicians declared it to be the foundation of prosperity and, when prosperity suddenly vanished, as the alchemy which would bring prosperity back. Now autarky is a drug which must be taken to stimulate a regulated national economy.

✓ To the internal changes which were forced on states by the upheaval of the War we have as yet paid insufficient attention. Much—although not enough—has been written about the redrawing of the map of Europe, of the application of the principle of self-determination in the creation of new political entities, and of the resulting difficulties in international affairs. Internal problems have been largely ignored. Even states whose boundaries and constitutions remained the same underwent internal metamorphoses. Aristocracies were no longer in the saddle. The backwash of the War, as (*Recent Social Trends* apart) many volumes have assured us, is having striking consequences in respect of freer social conduct, divorce, and crime. It has become trite to say that old standards have been profoundly

modified. In politics, the consequences have been tremendous. From this standpoint governmental forms have in many cases become irrelevant. Lord Morley once remarked that although three hundred different constitutions have been promulgated in Europe between 1800 and 1880, men had been very slow "in discovering that the forms of government are much less important than the forces behind them. Forms are only important as they leave liberty and law to awaken and control the energies of the individual man, while at the same time giving its best chance to the common good."⁸ It was with this common good and a different attitude toward it that post-war political institutions had to concern themselves, and common good was practically synonymous with common goods.

Thus a new task devolved on popular governments. They were forced to enter the economic sphere. Pre-war representative institutions had functioned almost entirely in the sphere of politics. The great parliamentary struggles of the nineteenth century had been over political issues—extension of the suffrage, religious and political liberty, free education, and the legal right of labor to combine. Even in dealing with these tasks, as I have said, representative government had had a relatively short experience. Those who were to work the new representative governments had had little or no political training. There was no fund of common experience elsewhere on which they could draw. Almost overnight it was necessary to create parliaments, cabinets, and bureaucracies. Adherents of the *anciens régimes* were suspect. And hence untried, inexperienced, and hastily recruited groups of rulers were called upon to deal with unprecedented problems. Treasuries were empty. Agrarian reforms had to be carried through. Polyglot populations had to be governed. There was no lamp of the past which could illumine the present. In

⁸ Morley, *Liberalism and Reaction* (Works, Vol. xv, p. 107).

respect of foreign policies fumbling was inevitable. When one considers the problems which confronted certain post-war European states, the amazing thing is that government was carried on at all.

Moreover, one important and frequently overlooked consideration must be kept in mind. For representative institutions to function successfully, there must be a considerable measure of agreement on fundamentals. The great advantage which the British government had during the nineteenth century was the absence of any fundamental difference of opinion between the two great political parties in the state. The differences which divided the two parties were on methods of action rather than on deep-seated principles. Whig and Tory, Liberal and Conservative agreed in their desire to preserve the monarchy, the established Church, and the main tenets of the economic system. Not until the Irish question came on the tapis of practical politics was there any difference which appeared irreconcilable and even here, as the event proved, reconciliation was not impossible.

This complete absence of fundamental differences between the great parties in the state may not have been indispensable. Such general agreement on fundamentals may have done no more than enable the British government to work with exceptional success. Certain it is, however, that differences of opinion within a state which become irreconcilable and passionate, impose well-nigh unbearable burdens on the machinery of representative government. Constitutional systems are assisted in weathering these storms if they are based on a strong national feeling as, say, in France; or on great democratic traditions as in Switzerland; or on an abundance of free land, exceptional natural resources, and a high standard of living as in the United States. Without such favorable circumstances the strain on representative institutions becomes much greater. And the plain fact now is that everywhere a certainly formidable, a

probably dangerous, and a possibly successful challenge to representative institutions arises from conflicting demands and wants which machineries of governments may be unable to reconcile. The cleavage now is between those who have and those who have not.

For constitutional government and representative institutions are nothing more nor less than the machinery which has been set up to work out compromises between competing interests within a state. In recent years much ink has been spilled on the concept of sovereignty—on what it is, and what it should be. Under a representative government there must be a legal order (call it sovereignty if you will) which endeavors to settle disputes impartially and to substitute certainty and justice for chance and force. The machinery of compromise which constitutional government provides may not satisfy the interests which have to lose, but at least it persuades them to consent to lose. Failures of justice may be frequent, but the state is always entitled to a presumption that its decision, which will avoid chaos, should prevail against the objections of an individual or even a group. When individuals or groups refuse peaceably to lose, constitutional government breaks down. The dominant interest in the state establishes control by force. It governs by coercion rather than by consent, by sudden decree instead of after mature discussion; and the electorate is no longer able to act in choosing those who will arbitrate between conflicting interests.

Herein is to be found an explanation of the breakdown of constitutional government in many places in Europe. The break has occurred in part because representative institutions are young plants and because their roots have not had time to go down deep. But the break has occurred also because the issues which have had to be reconciled are issues in respect of which certain parties or groups have been unwilling to yield, and because, as will be seen later, in the international sphere anarchy

has been insufficiently checked. This unwillingness has not been confined to states where dictatorships have been set up. Evidences of the unwillingness and of the preliminaries of a real struggle can be found even in the home of the mother of parliaments; but there they are as yet not ominous.

On the Continent, in those states with extraordinary regimes, there has been unwillingness to compromise. When that situation develops, as I have said, government by the sword supplants government by consent. These considerations are important not only in respect of national governments but in respect of international government as well. We have not in the world community today adequate agreement on standards or fundamentals. States are not willing to give way when their interests unfairly clash with the interests of other states. States and people have insufficient confidence in the rudimentary machinery of international adjustment which has already been set up. For the first decade after the War there were hopes that real progress was being made, but events from 1931 on have caused general pessimism.

Down to the outbreak of the War, however, internally there had been progress. Parliaments had been reasonably successful in adjusting conflicts of interest within their states. In some European countries, as I have said, the suffrage was universal, even though monarchs kept the parliaments in leading strings. Elsewhere the electorate was restricted but the monarchs were titular executives. True it was at least that from the middle of the nineteenth century down to the War a parliament elected on a geographical basis was not seriously challenged as the principal institution in a representative system. Of criticism there was little. Some defects were alleged but they were matters of detail and not of fundamental principle. Obvious accomplishments were so great that they obscured obvious failures. Inefficiency

was frequent but since the problems which had to be dealt with were relatively simple and only rarely required immediate action, a certain amount of inefficiency was the price that was willingly paid for liberty. What discussions there were of governmental forms went to the question of how the price paid for liberty could be lowered, or of how it could be made to purchase more of the desired article. So long as governmental structures were fumbling with political problems, improvement of machinery was not important. Indeed, the question of improvement interested primarily theorists whose principal concern was proportional representation, or the relations between the two branches of the legislature, or between the legislature as a whole and the executive. Of course, certain doctrinaires challenged the whole basis of the parliamentary system, but their voices cried in the wilderness. It may be said, therefore, that there was some intellectual unpreparedness for the situation which followed the War.

That conflict, to repeat, with its widespread political, economic, social, and intellectual dislocation raised problems with which parliaments were quite unfitted to deal. As soon as hostilities began this was recognized. Wars cannot be waged by debating societies. Responsibility has to be concentrated so that decisions can be made quickly. In much the same way the post-war problems required centralized authority. The mobilization of resources to control the economic life of a country is not vastly different from the mobilization of economic resources for the support of an army in the field. Few had questioned the necessity of a strong executive power during the War. The complaints that were then made went largely to the question of the extent to which individual liberties were being interfered with. Naturally the experiences of the War lessened the moral authority of parliament as a representative institution. All the belligerents resorted to expedients which ignored

elected assemblies. States of siege and martial law prevailed all over Europe. Even in England the much-prized rule of law had been temporarily put in abeyance. In the United States there was Presidential dictatorship. In short, the atmosphere of the War was naturally hospitable to various kinds of emergency regimes and there was no reason for surprise at the fact that the post-war atmosphere was equally hospitable.

Seeds of dictatorship had been widely sown. The soils were fertile and well watered by special problems. The group of would-be dictators was large, for many of them had served their apprenticeship during hostilities. So great were the emergencies that democratic institutions could not be permitted to function in a leisurely manner. Certain war expedients had to be resorted to. Democracy began to be called hard names. Parliaments were denounced as moribund. The winds of dictatorship began to whistle and they still do.

II

THE SPREAD OF DICTATORSHIP

DURING the decade after the end of the War, dictators assumed control in Albania, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Spain, Russia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Constitutional changes and the creation of new states had transferred 302,868,697 persons to republican rule. This meticulous estimate was made by Mr. George Bernard Shaw, who then went on to say that 257,303,952 people had been subsequently transferred from constitutional rule to dictatorships. All of them had tried the parliamentary system of government and it had broken down. "That," declared Mr. Shaw, "rubs a very great deal of gilt off the gingerbread" of democracy.¹

But has the gingerbread really been tarnished? The peoples of most of these states had had little or no experience of self-government. What was strange in their inability to make parliamentary systems function successfully in dealing with problems more serious than those which were trying even the most experienced electorates, legislatures, and executives? Spain and Italy were perhaps in a special class. Their parliaments had long been established. Their kings were constitutional

¹ One should not overlook the democratic ferment in Asia. Nearly half of the population of the world is there. I ignore in this discussion dictatorship in the southern half of the western world. That is a phenomenon *sui generis*.

monarchs. But even in Spain and Italy representative institutions had existed in form rather than in reality. Spain was quite undeveloped economically. The population was illiterate. Brigandage and the Moroccan adventure had impoverished and disorganized the country. The collusive rotation of offices among a governing group was not a system of representation at all; it was a system of personal aggrandizement. Primo de Rivera's coup d'état in 1923 did not reveal the moribund character of the Spanish Cortes. That elected chamber had long been moribund.

The Spanish dictatorship failed and on April 14, 1931, Alphonso joined the ranks of unemployed kings. Representative institutions under a republican constitution were attempted for the second time in Spanish history. In 1874, the First Republic had collapsed after a trial of less than a year. Four different presidents had proved too weak to lead the Cortes and to establish order in the country. The problems facing the Second Republic have been difficult; and not infrequently its fate has seemed to be in the balance. There have been indications that history might repeat itself. Serious strikes, martial law of an increasingly severe character, several thousand political prisoners in jail, a growing Fascist movement, splits within the Cabinet, the dissolution of the Cortes, elections (November, 1933) which marked a decided swing to the Right but not toward a return of the monarchy, a revolutionary strike in December—the fate of the Republic is still in the balance.

In Italy, democracy had been less of a pretense than in Spain, but Italian politics were excessively factional and personal. They were complicated by Catholic antagonism to the government and by the strength of an extreme socialist movement. There was in the country a cleavage which could not be bridged by the compromising machinery of parliamentary government. And it is worthy of note that in Italy, Fascism, which if not

derivatively at least teleologically may be defined as the maintenance of the capitalist system by force, was bolstered by the acquiescence if not the approval of the king. That was true also in the case of the Spanish dictatorship. In neither country was there national unity. For centuries the Catalan question had troubled Spain. Italian parliamentary institutions had not succeeded in fusing Central Italy, Lombardy, and Naples.

The Shavian capitulation included Lithuania, but there Valdemaras no longer dictates. Greece, temporarily under Pangalos, has returned to parliamentary government. Count Bethlen, who governed Hungary for ten years, went out of office in 1931; and although new names appeared on the roster of leaders, the mechanics of power were not materially modified. Russia and Turkey² are not exclusively European. Of the original list only two important names remain—Pilsudski and Mussolini. The chances are that the Pilsudski regime is largely personal.³ So, until the advent of Hitler, the philosophy as distinguished from the fact of dictatorship had to be discussed very largely in Italian terms. That, unhappily, no longer suffices. Even so, one can view the gingerbread of democracy with great complacency and can argue that parliamentary government has broken down in no country where it had had a fair trial under

² Mustapha Kemal's regime seems to have been no more repressive than the pre-war Turkish government. It should be noted that unlike its counterparts in Western Europe, the Turkish dictatorship does not seem to claim influence outside of its racial frontiers. Turkish patriotism has been kept within national boundaries. See Carlo Sforza, *European Dictatorships*, p. 220 (New York, 1931).

³ Many proposals have been made to amend the Polish Constitution so that the strong executive power would have a constitutional basis. The most recent draft (January, 1933) would give the President almost unlimited authority in respect of appointing and dismissing his Cabinet and all other high officials, and dissolving Parliament. After seven years in office he would be permitted to nominate his successor. Another candidate could be put up by a hand-picked electoral college. If the nominee is the same he becomes President. If two candidates are put up, a general election decides. So long as the Pilsudski group controls both houses it would select the President.

conditions which were other than highly unfavorable. Hitler's Germany is no exception. Considering the humiliations—territorial and legal—of the Treaty of Versailles, the collapse of the mark, and the economic servitude of reparations, who can hold that the Weimar Constitution was not tried under unfavorable conditions?

Generalizations are frequently thefts from the truth and one must be extremely careful therefore in suggesting general causes for the extraordinary regimes which became so familiar in Europe. What I have said about the loss of moral authority by parliaments during the War is true so far as it goes. But the French Parliament had lost moral authority and there was never any real possibility of a dictatorship in that country. Mr. Lloyd George almost overnight worked as many changes in the British Constitution as had come during the previous century, but normal parliamentary government was speedily returned to. A new state like Poland set up and then ignored its representative institutions. In the new state of Czechoslovakia democratic institutions functioned fairly well. As one looks at post-war Europe, therefore, one hesitates to account too glibly for post-war political phenomena. Generalizations are dangerous—because, well, they are too general and therefore meaningless. An example is an argument made by an eminent political scientist who was wise after the event. He declared that "any one familiar with the cyclic propensities of political evolution could have predicted the resurgence of autocracy."⁴ I do not know what the "cyclic propensities of political evolution" are and I doubt whether any one who does claim an acquaintance with these unknowns could tell in advance how they would be propelled by the dislocation of the War.

Nevertheless, propulsion was certainly there. It was

⁴ W. B. Munro, "The Resurgence of Autocracy," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1927.

the fashion to announce that parliaments were moribund and that democracy had failed. It was modish to outline the glories and benefits of dictatorship. These glories and benefits were not greatly stressed in the case of the Russian experiment. The objectives there were too alarming, for the institution of private property had been scrapped. Only Communists could glorify what was happening in Russia. In Italy the objectives were conservative and so the benefits and glories could be safely discussed. There were, however, some considerations which were not altogether flattering to the states with autocratic regimes.

In an interesting book published several years ago called *Les Deux Europes*, M. Francis Delaisi showed quite strikingly which parts of the Continent were industrial and which were agricultural. The zone of industrial Europe was confined to an area which ran from Stockholm through Danzig down to Budapest, then west through the northern end of Italy to Barcelona; from there to Bilbao, straight north to Belfast, across the southern part of Scotland to Bergen and from there to Stockholm. It is a significant fact that by shrinking this but slightly one could (before Hitler) eliminate all the extraordinary regimes in existence in Europe. Part of Poland—the most German part—and small segments of Hungary, Italy and Spain were the only non-parliamentary sectors which were included.

Can it be concluded, therefore, that dictatorships are more likely to be resorted to in countries which are predominantly agricultural? When one lists the states of Europe according to the relative proportion of a gainfully employed population engaged in agriculture, it appears that (again save for Hitler) the dictatorships are confined to states in which the percentage is more than fifty. Are peasants more likely to submit to tyranny than are industrial workers? Is a certain measure of freedom and toleration more insisted upon in the cities than in

the country? Do representative institutions work successfully only when society has reached a stage of evolution higher than that which is possible under a predominantly agricultural economy? ⁵ Of course, Germany must be excepted from such speculations. But, clearly, as I have said, the breakdown of parliamentary government in Germany was caused in considerable measure by the absence of any workable government in the international sphere. Brüning went out because the Junkers, the industrialists, and the generals were against him; but he could have triumphed again over their opposition if he had been able to point to any international success. He fell eleven months after the reparations moratorium because during nearly a year nothing had been done. The Rhine then became the boundary between representative institutions and other forms of government. That river has been a European dividing line before.

There are other interesting areas of inquiry which suggest themselves and they merit careful exploration. Is there any correlation between dictatorship and illiteracy? Or, to put the matter the other way, is a considerable measure of literacy essential for the successful working of popular government? Most of the countries under dictatorships have the highest birth and death rates in Europe. Is this fact of any significance? Would the countries in which dictators flourish show a low average of wealth or income per capita and less foreign trade proportionately than is enjoyed by countries which have successful parliamentary governments? There has been some discussion of such data but as yet by no means enough. One writer ⁶ has called attention to the fact that the countries under extraordinary regimes have the

⁵ It may be pointed out that there is a possible flaw in the logic here. I assume that an industrial society gives a higher standard of living and well being to its citizens. If the anti-democrat wishes to take a contrary view, let him.

⁶ F. Cambo, *Les dictatures* (Paris, 1930).

lowest figures in respect of pieces of mail matter per inhabitant circulated by post offices, and suggests that this may be a fair index of commercial and cultural development. It is noteworthy also that the dictatorships have been confined, for the most part, to states with authoritarian churches. The significance attaching to this perhaps is not lessened—it may even be increased—by the anti-Church programme of the Russian and Turkish governments. Mussolini made peace with the Church. Hitler deals with it in ways the outcome of which is not yet clear. He should remember that the Catholic Church, at least, can wait indefinitely for victory.

Here is a large and interesting field of inquiry, but few furrows have been turned up. Most of the blamers of parliamentary government and praisers of dictatorships have carefully eschewed such factual material. They have damned representative institutions and have glorified the achievements of the dictators. Statistics on the problems I have suggested would have to be used with great caution, and conclusions, if indeed they were possible, would have to be drawn with great care. But it seems clear that an investigation into the conditions which may have been favorable to dictatorships would be far more fruitful than the repetition of clichés about material achievements. Suppose, for example, it should appear that dictatorships spring up first in, or are largely confined to, countries which are predominantly agricultural, illiterate, and poor, and which have low standards of living, high birth rates, and high death rates. How then would the Democratic sceptic argue? He would undoubtedly asseverate the fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*.⁷

Such an analysis, I suggest, would rub a good deal of

⁷ Yet the apologist for dictatorship maintains that because after a dictatorship there are fiscal order and trains on time, the resulting happy state would not have been possible but for the dictatorship

gilt from the gingerbread of dictatorship. If it could be argued that as countries become less backward politically and economically they would slough off their dictatorial regimes and set up representative institutions, that would indicate that dictatorship is a temporary phenomenon. The apologists of dictatorship, on the contrary, assume that it is permanent; but how can it be?

Dictators are not immortal. Indeed, their occupation is peculiarly hazardous. Mussolini is not so good a risk for a life insurance company as is a parliamentary prime minister. Who is to follow the dictator? One merit of kingship was the fixed principle of hereditary succession, but no one proposes that principle for adoption in the case of a dictatorship. Manifestly a superman could not guarantee that his heir would be a superman. Mediocrity or even feeble-mindedness is not so important in the case of kingly succession, for cabinets and parliaments combine to give orders to monarchs and make them more and more puppet-like. After the dictator, what? The question has never been answered. The dictator himself cannot answer it for the very essence of his policy makes him fear to share his authority with other strong men. Thus for some years Signor Mussolini himself held half a dozen ministerial portfolios. It is only recently that he has permitted in his cabinet men who could be looked upon as partial collaborators rather than as minor subordinates. But a doubt as to the succession is a probability that the authoritarian regime is temporary.

There is another matter which the authoritarians must necessarily ignore. Their argument against democracy is that a conscious minority can know better than the electorate or its democratically chosen representatives what is best for a country. That may be true. But it by no means follows that the conscious minorities in control in countries know what is best for those countries. There may be minorities now suppressed with

much more intelligent programmes and greater executive ability. The authoritarians will not assume in the case of a democratic state that what is, is best. They therefore ought not to assume it in their own case. Consequently, uncertain of whether the conscious minority in control is the most intelligent minority, the believer in representative institutions is entitled to argue that in the long run the chosen representatives of the electorate have a chance of seeing as clearly as any minority what is in the long run best for the country. Nor is such a faith weakened by an argument like that which Mr. Bernard Shaw makes.

"Government by the people," he says, "is not and never can be a reality: it is only a cry by which demagogues humbug us into voting for them. If you doubt this—if you ask me 'Why should not the people make their own laws?'—I need only ask you, 'Why should not the people write their own plays?' They cannot. It is much easier to write a good play than to make a good law. And there are not one hundred men in the world able to write a play good enough to stand daily wear and tear as long as a law must."⁸

But in saying this, Mr. Shaw is doing his familiar stunt of putting up a straw man and then triumphantly knocking him down. The issue is not whether democracy should attempt to write its own laws. Clearly it cannot. There are not many of us who can write plays, but a good many of us have opinions as to whether Mr. Shaw, as he grows older, is writing better or worse plays. We can refuse to see his plays because they are too talky and too uninteresting. We can make his box office receipts fall off and can transfer our allegiance to other dramatists who, in our opinion, are better playwrights. So a democracy can throw its law makers out of office if it does not like the laws which are made, and can put a

⁸ Shaw, *The Apple Cart*, p. xiv.

new set of law makers in office in the hope that they will provide a better show. And the democratically chosen law makers can secure all the expert assistance they require.

Every dictatorship maintains that it is popularly supported—that the mass of people desire its continuance. Such an argument ignores a fundamental premise of the principle of dictatorship—that the people cannot know what is good for them. But the opinion of the incompetents is relied upon for moral support even though it is difficult to know what the opinion really is since intolerance is the only atmosphere in which a dictatorship can perdure. That in itself is an admission of transience. The autocrat claims that his rule has popular backing and that all important elements in the body politic support the “new conception of the state” and a regime which has set aside representative institutions. Now the fact is that many of the European dictatorships have been able to point to rather impressive elements which seem to support them. The good old rule “that they should take who have the power and they should keep who can” is buttressed by popular demand that the rule be invoked. Mussolini and Hitler are commanders of troops comprising a much larger percentage of the population than has hailed previous dictators; but they nevertheless fear to put their fortunes to the test of a verdict at polls that are unpoliced.

If, for example, Fascist achievements have been so great, why should they not be so pronounced by a test of public opinion? Why should not elections be free? Why are critics silenced by force instead of ignored or answered? Why are political opponents held in prison or kept out of the country? Why is there a censorship? Must one conclude that in the suppression of dissent there is fear of the opposition and a desire to make the regime less transient than it might otherwise be? A minority can rule by force, but only so long as it main-

tains its force. That kind of control is not durable. The only lasting basis of government is consent, and without liberty one cannot tell whether there is consent. In short, as General Smuts has well said, "Bolshevism and Fascism, which are the current alternatives to democratic liberty, may be defended as a way out of intolerable situations, but they are temporary expedients often tried and discarded before, and they will be discarded after the present trials." There is much in Bolshevik theory which does not challenge this judgment insofar as it relates to methods rather than to objectives. In this respect the Bolsheviks are realists.

There is, finally, one other aspect of the matter which is insufficiently discussed. This is the threat of dictatorship in international affairs. The running of railroad trains on time, the maintenance of order, the abolition of strikes—these are not achievements for which a populace will cheer. Yet a dictator must at regular intervals draw cheers from his people. He is inclined, therefore, to wave the flag more vigorously than the standard is ever waved by parliamentary prime ministers. Disraeli once defined parliamentary government as "*un gouvernement qui parle*." There was little bias in that bon mot, but critics of representative institutions have frequently inveighed against parties and legislatures because they mean government by stump speakers. Talk takes the place of action and the most successful demagogue becomes the most successful politician. The indictment is familiar. On the other hand, a dictatorship which suppresses parliamentary forms is held up as an institution which eliminates demagogy. The popular orator is pulled down from his stump. The dictator's actions speak so loudly that words are not necessary. At least this is the theory.

But if words are not necessary in theory, they are nevertheless resorted to in practice. On a good many occasions—of late they have been less frequent—Signor

Mussolini has used some strong words. The Fascist revolution "still has the courage to plunge the lead of its muskets into the backs of the enemies of Italy." "We are as young and as strong and as implacable as ever." "You have rifles, you have muskets, you have machine guns—all the weapons with which to fight great battles." This is rattling the sabre rather loudly. Doubtless Signor Mussolini would have been well content if these words had not been reported in the European and American press. He was waving the flag primarily for his own followers. But the cheers of his people were not without international cost. For when he waves the flag, a dictator is more of a demagogue than any one of the parliamentary prime ministers whose reliance on words has been so roundly condemned. They do not appeal to prejudice and passion and rely on catch phrases as do the dictators. In reality the dictators are the greatest demagogues. Is it possible to imagine any prime minister responsible to a parliament making some of the speeches that dictators make? Party government may be got rid of and party intriguing may be eliminated (in Italy) save among Fascists, but the Fascist regime has not suppressed demagoguery. On the contrary, the regime has simply monopolized it.

Since this is the rôle of a dictator, he can hardly take much part in efforts for a better ordering of international relations. Without weakening himself at home, a dictator cannot consort with parliamentary prime ministers at international conferences. He must take the line of intransigence rather than of conciliation. From this standpoint, despite their passions and irrational desires, democratic states are far more inclined to coöperate in the organization of international peace than are the extraordinary regimes. The exception of Signor Grandi in Geneva does not disprove the rule.

On the other hand, while dictators use war-like phrases there are important factors which deter them from carry-

ing out their threats. They must, in the first place, be certain of success. For a partial failure would mean such a loss of moral authority that their regimes would have difficulty in maintaining themselves, even through the continued use of force. Secondly, war would mean that weapons would be put into the possession of opponents of the regime and that a counter-revolution would be more possible than if the country remained at peace. So the menace of dictatorships in international affairs is at the moment not so much that war will be deliberately made as that the international atmosphere will be more hospitable to an outbreak of hostilities; and that the pyre of international differences will be piled higher and higher with materials more and more inflammable, ready to burst into blaze at the slightest spark of some unexpected international incident. A dictator, at the moment of such an international incident, will find it more difficult than would a parliamentary prime minister to join in trampling on the spark. For him to do so would seem to be a confession of weakness and not in keeping with the picture of himself that he has endeavored to get into the minds of his people. That picture, as has been said, must be quite different from the picture of one who holds power because electorates or freely chosen representatives wish him to.

Domestic achievements under a dictatorship are always ascribed to the extraordinary nature of the regime and the argument is implicit if it is not openly stated that there could have been no such achievements if there had been no dictatorship. Italy, for example, prides herself on being a country in which there are no parliamentary or industrial squabbles. There is no threat from the Communists and no menace from reactionaries more extreme than those who are in power. Labor troubles are suppressed. Dissent cannot be expressed openly. Efficiency in administration is the watchword. The observer is thus invited to conclude that such a

regime is infinitely better than democratic government with its vacillation, its political and industrial disorders, its cult of incompetence, and its demagoguery. To argue in this fashion, however, is to do no more than to stress things which are on the surface and to ignore matters which are not so obvious. If this reasoning persuades believers in representative institutions to become apostates they are a good deal like a doctor who would make a physical examination of a patient by listening to a story of his former pains and present pleasures, by watching him walk, and by ascertaining the amount of money which he has in the bank. Such a doctor would not think that pulse, temperature, blood pressure, and X-rays might be revealing indices of the patient's condition.

The analogy, of course, must not be carried too far but it is, I think, apposite in respect of many discussions of the merits of dictatorships. For there seems to be a tendency to diagnose the state as a body politic by precisely the same methods that my imaginary doctor used for his patient. Of course it is true that before the march on Rome, Italy was disorganized and Communism was a menace; that the proletariat was seizing the factories and that the peasants were seizing the land. There was unwillingness to let constitutional government act as the arbitrator between competing interests. Burke defined government as a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants; but government breaks down, as I have said, when elements in the community take matters in their own hands and attempt to satisfy their own wants in violation of governmental dictates. Fascism restored order and has been successful in maintaining it. Public finances have improved. And with the theorists panting along after the events, a political philosophy which has many attractive elements has been evolved to furnish an intellectual shroud for a regime that was set up in a spirit of opportunism.

But is it certain, for example, that the condition of

Italy at the present time is so immeasurably better than it would have been if parliamentary government had been retained? The experience of France—another Latin country—suggests that such an assumption is at least doubtful enough to warrant analysis. For France, with post-war problems every whit as acute as Italy's, muddled through the post-war decade without scrapping parliamentary institutions. France has had labor troubles; her Communist party is strong; her currency was not stabilized until after the stabilization of Italian currency was secured; and a rapid succession of ministries and continuous parliamentary bickerings created in extreme form the political conditions against which Fascism draws its strongest indictment. In 1926 Mr. Will Rogers could say that he had watched the change of the guard at St. James' Palace in London and had gone to France to watch another daily spectacle, the change of the Prime Minister. During that year when the franc steadily tobogganed, France survived six different cabinets and nearly twice as many finance ministers. Then matters were taken in hand. Again in 1934, the 1926 situation seemed to be repeated. If it is argued that the condition of Italy is now better than it would have been if parliamentary government had been retained, it should be argued that the condition of France would have been better under a dictator. The French are a little too logical to reach this conclusion.

Again, is it legitimate to assume, as defenders of dictatorships must do, that industrial peace is a *summum bonum*? No one can deny that strikes are costly and that their apparent economic waste is great. But does it follow that a body politic without strikes is healthier than a body politic with strikes? One must know what kind of strikes have been avoided and what have been the terms of the "peaceful" settlements. It may well be that an enforced settlement of an industrial dispute through the machinery of the state works more injustice and causes

in the long run greater economic waste than would have resulted from a strike. In other words, the mere absence of labor troubles within a state may mean little. One must know the terms on which trouble has been avoided.

But labor troubles can be prevented, or at least minimized, under a government which is non-dictatorial.⁹ Compulsory arbitration boards are not an invention of Fascism. Compulsory arbitration was introduced in New Zealand in 1894 and the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was set up in Australia ten years later. The Canadian Industrial Disputes Act (of limited effect) was adopted in Canada in 1907 but was emasculated by the courts in 1924. So the Kansas Industrial Court was made ineffective by Supreme Court decision. During the War, however, there was a good deal of compulsory arbitration of labor disputes in practically all the countries engaged in hostilities. Fascism, therefore, has no patent on the elimination of strikes. The point is, however, that in New Zealand and elsewhere the arbitration machinery was set up by governmental machinery which effected a compromise between employers' and employees' interests. That compromise was assented to by employees and they could, through political methods, urge its modification or abandonment. There was government by discussion. There could be an opposition to the government. There was not, as in Italy, a single party in which no dissent and real opposition were permitted.

Regimentation, it is hardly necessary to remark, is not an unmixed blessing. Under a dictatorial government, regimentation may be compared not unfairly with a prison regime. In a prison community orders are given from above and the ambit of discretion is rigorously lim-

⁹ This point has been ably made by Simeon Strunsky, "Behind the Mask of the Dictators," *The New York Times Magazine*, January 21, 1934. See A. Emil Davis, *The Collectivist State in the Making* (London, 1914).

ited. The sanitation may be excellent and no one goes hungry. Health is cared for. There are sports, educational facilities, and there may be music and plays. But who would propose a programme of bigger and better prisons on the theory that they could care for their inmates with greater efficiency than the inmates could care for themselves? Regimentation has some drawbacks. When it is put to us squarely in this form, we shy away from it.

Most of us could doubtless live more orderly lives, work harder, waste less time, be more healthy, and save more money if we were willing to appoint guardians for ourselves and follow their orders. Very soon, however, we would become doubtful about the efficiency of our guardians and following their orders would become irksome. The efficiency of dictators is taken for granted. The measure of what we call freedom is drastically reduced in the interests of this assumed efficiency, and it is dangerous to complain of the resulting irksomeness.

Comparisons and contrasts are always intriguing, whether of institutions, of methods, or of individuals. The Russian dictatorship may be described as based on a class. In Italy, national feeling is a principal cohesive force. The German movement seems to rely largely on pride of race. Elsewhere dictatorships have been more opportunistic and military—more of an emergency character—so that psychological basis and philosophical doctrine have been less important.

In respect of Russia, doctrine long antedated and led to the regime. Fascism evolved its philosophy after the march on Rome. When the regime took over, its programme consisted principally in a series of antagonisms. A philosophy came later—partly Hegelian, partly Nietzschean in character. Its formulation was hastened because a philosophy was necessary to rationalize what was being done and to give moral backing to certain measures that were being taken. Hitler's philosophy an-

tedated his becoming a formidable political factor; and is, as so many critics have pointed out, a hodge-podge of much nonsense and of some sense which is self-contradictory.¹⁰ Partly communist, partly socialist, and partly nationalist, the Hitler philosophy is an amalgam not unlike that which might be produced in the United States if the more intelligent members of the Ku Klux Klan, the Holy Rollers, the Board of Aldermen of New York City, and the Daughters of the American Revolution met to frame a platform with which they hoped to inflame large sections of the populace.

In a sense both Fascism and the National Socialist movement in Germany sought to annihilate the Left, or at least to draw its fangs. In neither country, however, was it the purpose of the new regime to put the old order back into power—that is, to reestablish the traditional Right. The Nazis were helped by the great industrialists but they promptly began to attempt to free themselves from this support. Both movements were hostile to Socialism and were willing to accept any allies in the fight against Socialism. Both movements drew strength from the middle classes—in Germany from the bourgeoisie of the great centers; in Italy from the bourgeoisie of the towns and country. That was natural because Germany is so much more highly industrialized.

Both movements derive directly from the War and its outcome. Mussolini could not have gained power in Italy if the country had not been prostrate economically and if the Italians had not believed that their share of war spoils was less than they were entitled to and had been promised. The Hitler movement in Germany could not have gained strength if the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles had been relaxed more quickly and if Ger-

¹⁰ Many sympathetic and many hostile writers have discussed Communism, Fascism, and Nazism at great length, so I do not consider the philosophies here. Nor do I deal with another much discussed subject—the mechanics of power of European dictatorships.

many had not always been made to feel that she was an inferior nation branded with war-guilt and still doing penance for her sins in bringing about the War in 1914.

In Italy, the transition was abrupt—almost a coup d'état. The German transition had, in a sense, been prepared for by the rigorous regime which prevailed under the Emergency Decrees of Brüning, von Papen, and von Schleicher. Hitlerism was more definitely on the horizon than was Fascism in Italy. Yet Hitler could not come to power without an election. He first put his strength to the test in the presidential election and Hindenburg won. It was not until the Mussolini regime had been in power for nearly two years that he submitted himself to the judgment of a popular referendum. Hitler had to submit himself again immediately after Hindenburg appointed him Chancellor in January, 1933.

The National Socialist candidates and the Nationalists polled 52% of the popular vote and elected a majority of the members of the Reichstag. Rarely, however, was any minority of 48% more strenuously opposed to the majority. Ordinarily in parliamentary systems those who fail to gain power are disappointed, and they announce for popular consumption that they view with alarm what the majority proposes to do, but in their hearts they know that the actions of the majority will differ only in speed and in extent from what they themselves would attempt to accomplish. That was not the case in Germany. From the outset Hitler dealt with political opponents far more drastically than Mussolini had ever ventured to do.

As early as February 2nd, the government forbade open-air communist meetings, and the police searched communist homes without search warrants. Communist papers were suppressed. The socialist newspaper *Vorwaerts* was forced to suspend publication for several days in the early part of February and before the election campaign was on, a series of measures sought to handicap

the propaganda not only of the Social Democrats but of the Catholic Center. During the campaign the communist press was almost entirely suppressed. The Prussian Diet was dissolved by von Papen who had complete ministerial powers. Elections were ordered for the same day as the Reichstag elections. Twenty-four provincial governors and police chiefs throughout Prussia were dismissed and replaced by National Socialists, and the Reichstag building fire on February 28th—which occurred as opportunely as the Zinovieff letter in the British electoral campaign of 1924—gave the cabinet an excuse for establishing what was practically martial law.

As soon as the elections were over, the Hitler government began to consolidate itself by extreme measures internally and by talk for external consumption. The extreme internal measures were most spectacular in respect of attacks on the Jews. That had been one of the planks in the Hitler platform but it came as a surprise to the world that the promises of the platform were to be implemented as promptly and as extensively as they were. The outside world began to think of atrocities in much the same fashion as the Allies had thought of atrocities in Belgium during the War. To an extent, of course, the extreme measures were so extreme because of the undisciplined character of Nazi enthusiasts or of officials of Nazi persuasion; but the dismissals of university professors; the refusals to permit Jewish musicians, artists, and writers to continue unmolested; the elimination of Jews from newspapers, trade unions, and banks showed clearly that the government was wholeheartedly behind the campaign. Foreign protests did little to restrain the government, but that was to be expected. When, by reason of a political upheaval, excesses become prevalent—whether they are authorized or unauthorized—foreign protests not only may have no beneficial effect but may have a harmful effect. That was the case, for example,

during the French Revolution. So in 1933 foreign protests did not serve to check the Jewish pogroms.

The Reichstag met late in March and adopted five laws which made a meeting unnecessary before 1937. The Cabinet was given complete legislative power. It had ample authority under Article 48 but the Reichstag could ask for the withdrawal of the Emergency Decrees and the Decrees could not violate the Constitution save in the respects stipulated in Article 48. Under the March laws the government could do whatever it pleased so long as it did not abolish the legislature and limit the prerogative of the President—the last being an empty gesture for it is doubtful now whether the President can dismiss the Chancellor. The President can no longer appeal by a referendum to the people nor is his signature required to validate laws promulgated by the Cabinet. No legislative ratification is necessary for treaties. The five laws were rushed through the Reichstag at one sitting by a vote of 444 to 94—a much larger majority than the two-thirds which constitutional amendments required.

The Nazification of the country proceeded. Political parties were dissolved. Political critics were taken into custody. Boy Scout organizations were merged with the Hitler Youth Movement. A decree provided that members of the Reichstag could be prosecuted without the consent of the Reichstag and its former Social Democratic President (Paul Loebe) was taken into custody. But why further details?

In November the German people were again summoned to the polls and asked to participate in solemn referendum. The occasion was the notice of Germany's intention to withdraw from the League of Nations. Hitler thought it shrewd tactics to show the rest of the world that the German people backed his policy. A heavy vote of confidence moreover would serve to quiet

any opposition which might argue that the March Reichstag balloting had given the National Socialists a bare majority.

The electorate had two ballots. On July 15, 1933, the Cabinet had promulgated a decree providing for a new kind of referendum. The Cabinet could submit to the people the question of whether or not they approved of a measure planned by the government and the answer would be given by a majority of the valid votes. The constitutional referendum, under the Weimar Constitution, had required a majority of the total registered votes so that electors could vote no simply by staying away from the polls. On November 12th the German electorate answered a question which was phrased in somewhat biblical language: "Do you, German man and you, German woman, agree to this policy of your National Cabinet, and are you ready to declare it to be the expression of your own opinion and your own will and to commit yourself solemnly to it?" Ninety-six and three-tenths percent of the qualified voters cast ballots and 95.10% were marked "Ja."

At the same time a new Reichstag was chosen. A law of July had prohibited all political parties save the "National Socialist German Worker's Party" so that there was a ballot containing no more than the names of the Hitler party and of ten of its leading candidates. If a voter wished to vote for Hitler candidates for the Reichstag he put a cross in the circle opposite the name of the party. If he did not wish to vote, he could deposit an unmarked ballot which was invalid. Ninety-five and two-tenths percent of the qualified voters cast ballots; 92.20% voted for the Hitler candidates. Seven and eight-tenths percent of the ballots were unmarked and therefore "invalid." Making every allowance for the fact that voters were afraid to stay at home and were fearful of being detected if they voted "Nein" on the referendum

ballot or deposited unmarked ballots, one must conclude that the result was a rather remarkable indication of the backing which the Hitler regime has in the country. Millions of Germans temporarily favor it *faute de mieux*—because there is no alternative and because they desire it to have an opportunity to fulfill impossible promises. If it should succeed in improving the condition of Germany, well and good; but if not, it should not be permitted to use the alibi of insufficient opportunity.

A year after Hitler was made Chancellor all the state Diets were formally abolished. The *de facto* status of the state governments being directed by the Reich government thus became *de jure*. To accomplish this the Reichstag passed a law through all its three readings in five minutes, and such extreme expedition was greeted with laughter. Germany was transformed from a federal to a unitary state and it remains to be seen whether the laughter accompanying the action will be regretted. It may be that due to the unnecessary extinction of historic rights of autonomy, Bavaria and the other German states have been irritated unnecessarily and that the irritation will later be manifest.

Compared with Hitler, Mussolini proceeded at a snail-like pace to consolidate his regime. Mussolini's first Cabinet included members of all the chief groups except the anti-national parties. He did not have a majority in the Chamber but he was supported by a great mass of opinion outside the Fascists, and this was reflected in the parliamentary attitude toward him. On November 16, 1922, he told the Chamber that he could have formed a purely Fascist administration but that he intended for the time being to use a coalition. The full ordinance-making powers which he demanded to carry out far-reaching reforms during the ensuing year were voted by the overwhelming majority of 275 to 90.

An electoral law designed to make a Fascist victory

certain was passed by the Chamber in July and by the Senate in November, 1923.¹¹ Parliament was dissolved in January, 1924, and elections were held on April 6th. Government candidates got 65% of the votes. Consequently, without the results being rigged, as the electoral law permitted, two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies were safe.

The parliamentary session began in May, 1924, with normal parliamentary conditions in prospect. In June, the Socialist deputy, Matteotti, disappeared, and a few days later it was discovered that he had been murdered. The affair naturally created a sensation. Charges were made that the government was involved. One of the under-secretaries was accused of complicity and resigned. The opposition sought to use the affair to mobilize opinion against the government, and the Aventine deputies withdrew from the Chamber in order to show their disapproval. A violent press campaign against the Fascists began, and Mussolini put into effect decrees suppressing seditious newspapers or suspending their publication for certain periods. A number of important newspapers were taken over by editors and managers more favorable to the government.

The government gradually got back some of the ground which the Matteotti affair had cost it, but the strength which the opposition had manifested was so great that a series of measures was resorted to consolidating the regime. In December, 1925, a law was passed to reduce the influence of Freemasonry. Secret societies were compelled to communicate their statutes and lists of members to the authorities, and civil servants were not permitted to join. Fascist control over local governments was extended. There were several plots against the

¹¹ The law provided that a party which secured the largest number of votes (if they amounted to at least twenty-five per cent of all the votes) should be given two-thirds of the seats in the new Chamber. The remaining one-third of the seats would be divided proportionately among the minority parties.

life of Mussolini, and in November, 1926, the Prime Minister brought forward a bill for the protection of the state. It provided for the dissolution of the anti-national parties—that is, the Socialists, Communists, and the Republicans—the suppression of seditious newspapers, deportation of persons convicted of seditious activities, special military tribunals for the trial of political crimes, and the death penalty for attempts on the life of the King and the Premier.

The regime was further consolidated by a new electoral law, passed in May, 1928. Each of the national confederations of syndicates submits lists of candidates for the Chamber. The Fascist Grand Council can modify these lists by excluding certain names or adding others. Representation on the lists is given to the confederations in fixed proportions. The final list is submitted to the electorate and if it secures a majority of votes, the candidates are elected. If, perchance, there should not be a majority cast for the lists, a new election is held with competing lists. This can hardly be called an election system. It simply gives the electorate an opportunity to express approval or disapproval of the government's policy. The first election under this electoral law was held in April, 1929, and not unexpectedly gave the government candidates an overwhelming majority.

Enough has been said to indicate that Hitler was far more in a hurry than was Mussolini. Future historians will speculate on the reasons, and on whether, even from his own point of view, Hitler's tactics have had any justification. Hitler, it should be noted, is a peculiar phenomenon among dictators. He was not a citizen of the country in which he sought power, and had to acquire his citizenship by legal legerdemain. He is curious also because he made several unsuccessful efforts to gain power. One was faintly ridiculous. Participating with von Ludendorff in the 1923 Putsch, he was forced to flee, was caught in the attic of a house in which he was hiding,

and served a year in prison. But he gradually built a political party which gained in Reichstag representation from 14 to 107 by the 1930 election and to 230 in 1932. He ran against Hindenburg for the presidency of the German Reich and was defeated. Two weeks later he could poll no more than 38% of the vote in the Prussian Diet elections and in the Reichstag elections of November 6, 1932, he lost 35 seats and more than 2,000,000 votes. In this campaign he defended parliamentary government and denounced von Papen's demand for arms equality on the ground that it might bring on a war. Two weeks later Hindenburg offered him the chancellorship. Such parliamentary tergiversations were somewhat less glorious than a military march on a capital.

Despite the fact that, as I have said, the dictatorships can boast of considerable popular backing, I adhere to the opinion that the phenomenon is a temporary one. The plain fact is that no workable better substitute for representative institutions has as yet been found. That is not to say that parliaments are the final form of the institutions which will be made to represent and govern men. It is easier to argue transience than to argue permanence. In one way, the spread of dictatorships over Europe will aid democratic government because it will force a reëxamination of the manner in which popular institutions can be improved and of the conditions under which they can best succeed. These institutions, even when working most smoothly, may have many defects. Criticism there will always be, but as yet no abandonment of the principle seems imminent. I do not say that a better substitute cannot be suggested but only point out that up until the present it has not been.

Clearly new forms of representative institutions must evolve. They seem to be evolving now in rather crude crisis form. Cabinet dictatorships like those set up in Belgium and France to stabilize currencies; a Presidential dictatorship like that in Washington may have to be

resorted to more and more frequently even in more normal times. As the business of government becomes more and more complex the task laid upon institutions becomes more and more unbearable. To a greater and greater extent parliaments must reconcile themselves to laying down general principles within the limits of which they will give executives free hands.

III

THE DEMOCRATIC COMPROMISE IN EUROPE

IT is clear that such regimes as those of Italy, Germany and Russia are the exact opposite of the ideal of representative institutions. They were thus in Russia under the Czar. If he and his entourage had suddenly turned communist and intelligent, the present experiment could have been carried out. The regime would have needed only to change its purposes, not to modify its methods or enlarge its powers. In other cases there may be some misunderstanding as to just how far what we call democratic government has broken down. All constitutional governments must sometimes adopt extraordinary measures to deal with the problems that face them. These measures consist in the transfer of power from persons who are numerous to persons who are few. It was Thomas H. Huxley who said that there is wisdom in a multitude of persons, but only in a few of them. That is not the explanation of the abdication of parliaments. For certainly when some executives speak, it is apparent that they have no monopoly of wisdom. The hard fact is that things must be got done and that a cabinet can do them more quickly if it does not have to cajole a parliament into giving prior approval to everything it proposes.

The Schoolmen posed the famous problem of an ass equally hungry and thirsty and at the same distance from

a bucket of oats and a bucket of water. Would he die because he was unable to make a choice? Politicians sometimes act so that one is reminded of Buridan's ass. Ministers are frequently as offending as are deputies, but at least responsibility for making a decision is more clearly fixed. Something can be done in situations where even an incorrect decision is preferable to inaction. Not infrequently, therefore, representative institutions find it necessary to resort to extraordinary measures which extend government control into fields which normally are not invaded; and even, for periods, to extinguish certain liberties which, during less parlous times, could be permitted to extend as far as license.

We saw all these tendencies at work during the War. I have said that when the democracies emerged from that conflict, their political structures had been permanently affected to an astonishingly small degree. Ferments there were among peoples, but the forms were pretty much the same. In England, Lloyd George's overnight changes permitted extra-governmental developments of great importance: the remodelling of the British Cabinet both in composition and responsibility; the decreased importance of Parliament; the growing influence of the press as a substitute for parliamentary opposition; the separation of executive and legislative authority to the extent that the Prime Minister did not lead the Commons; the extension of the suffrage; and the institution of an imperial War Cabinet which, as Sir Robert Borden said, marked the dawning of "a new era" and the writing of a "new page of history"—these were far-reaching transformations which could take place so promptly only in a governmental system as flexible as that of England. D. O. R. A.—the Defense of the Realm Act and the regulations thereunder gave the British executive authority few whitts less than that conferred by the decree of the Roman Senate authorizing the Consuls "to see that the republic took no harm." But with the

coming of peace, practically all of these innovations and extraordinary expedients vanished. Indeed, Sir Robert Borden's new page of history was writ quite differently, as the Statute of Westminster made clear. Independence, not coöperation, is the fact. Save for the Cabinet secretariat which Mr. Lloyd George set up, hardly a formal vestige of the War changes remained.

In the United States, the rigidity of a written constitution prevents formal political rearrangements as far-reaching as those which took place in Great Britain. Yet the American system of government during the War underwent substantial modifications in the direction of further federal aggrandizement at the expense of the states. It saw an increase in executive authority which made the President the most powerful elected ruler in the world. He was the free choice of a hundred million people and was their representative. Except by the cumbersome and almost impossible method of impeachment, he could not be turned out until his term of office had expired. It was no exaggeration to say that he possessed powers for good or ill greater than those of any man then living. Through the various special boards and commissions which were set up, he controlled the economic life of the American people. As Commander-in-Chief he directed the armed forces of the country, and in doing so he could determine how considerable a factor they were to be in the verdict that was to be reached in France. He was the irresponsible and, if he so desired, he could be the unadvised mouthpiece of American foreign policy. In the prosecution of the War and in the conclusion of the peace, his authority was such that he need brook no interference or control. Note that I say conclusion of the peace. Ratification of the Peace Treaty was a different matter. The fact that President Wilson considered himself the servant of the American people and the instrument for the expression of their desires makes this

description of his powers no less true but simply less alarming.

The United States took off its war harness very quickly. The ideal was a return to normalcy as soon as possible. "Government is a simple thing," President Harding had declared during his campaign. On the following March 4th he rode down Pennsylvania Avenue to take the oath of office. The appearance of the man at his side, so broken and feeble that he could live only for a short span to see his statesmanlike hopes trampled in the mire of partisan passion and international greed, gave the lie to that puerile judgment on the simplicity of government. Since March 4, 1933, as will be discussed later, a president in Washington has been exercising powers more far-reaching than those granted President Wilson and has been doing it with far more general and enthusiastic backing from the country. He has demonstrated that Mr. H. G. Wells erred in declaring that instead of meaning "a transfer of power from the few to the many," democracy has meant "a disappearance of power from the world."

Peace came in Europe but crises were recurrent. They were largely economic in character. Some of the states both new and old had been shaken to their foundations. Was it to be expected that in Austria and Hungary, whose territories and peoples had been distributed among seven different political entities, representative institutions could be set up and could function successfully? Hungary, indeed, since the Armistice, while it has preserved ancient parliamentary forms, has lived under what hostile critics would call a dictatorship. Friendly critics might be content with describing it as crisis government and not attempting further analysis. The most ardent believer in democracy, however, would hardly dare maintain that the hesitancy and indecision which are the anticipated and desired characteristics of popular

government can be preserved during a war emergency. It would be no less blind to maintain that an economic emergency may not justify an extraordinary regime, with parliamentary forms and political liberties temporarily in abeyance. The danger is, as I suggested in dealing with the principle of dictatorship, that those in seats of power are reluctant to say that the crisis is over, and that they will continue to disregard liberties and to dispense with parliaments after the emergency has passed.

In Central Europe political frontiers had been redrawn. Populations had been given new flags. Natural resources and national industries had been taken away or bestowed lavishly. Natural economic units were destroyed. Tariff walls rose higher and higher. Demobilization inevitably meant great unemployment. Currencies were constantly declining in value. Agrarian reforms had to be undertaken and land made available to the peasants. Add to this control by armies of occupation and communist agitations, and the result is hardly that absence of cleavage, that agreement on fundamentals, and that confidence in the impartiality of government as the machinery of adjustment, whose perdurance, as I have already suggested, makes self-rule possible.

So Count Bethlen's ten years of unchallenged authority in Hungary and the subsequent regime may be called a cabinet dictatorship, or it may be called a real dictatorship. Critics may say that the government "makes" the elections; that an electoral law providing for public oral voting in the country districts confines the opposition to the cities where the secret ballot protects it against reprisals; and that the Bethlen government which lasted until the summer of 1931 when it was displaced in order to placate France did not command the general approval which its parliamentary majorities might seem to indicate. But at least the cabinet and its successor governed. Hungary has gone through acute economic trials in relative calm and without drastic cur-

tailment of liberty of speech being necessary, or at least being resorted to.

The other half of the ancient Empire, Austria—not so badly dismantled by the peace treaties—had serious fiscal and political problems. Instead of protecting a new feudalism based on industry and banking in place of agriculture, as had been done in Hungary, Austria always interested and in some cases shocked the Western world by her socialistic experiments. The housing developments in Vienna were particularly notable. But while the new popular institutions were able to carry on, the country's financial structure collapsed. The League of Nations intervened. Austria (Hungary as well) for several years had a foreign financial administrator—never a palatable procedure for a proud people. Meanwhile, naturally, Parliament had to do the bidding of cabinets and cabinets took their instructions from the representatives of those who had granted the stabilization loans. Despite these unfavorable circumstances, representative institutions functioned. Despite a Fascist movement, drawing some of its inspiration from Germany, there was no serious threat of a successful Putsch. Then came several years of calm. With foreign control removed, cabinet government worked, in an aura of past glories, with the realization that standards of living were inexorably being lowered and with the conviction that Vienna's former uniqueness was doomed to become nondescript. By the spring of 1931, finances were again becoming desperate. The Kredit Anstalt für Handel und Gewerbe collapsed on May 11th. The fuse which was thus lighted is still burning and no one dares to guess how far it runs or how much explosive is still in the charge. In March came the despairing proposal of the Austro-German Customs Union. Immediately the suppressed jealousies, fears, and avarices of European states rose to the surface in all their ugliness, and a banking and diplomatic garrotte began. Executive authority was

gradually extended but with the sanction and criticism of parliament.

On May 20th, 1932, Dollfuss became Prime Minister and headed a coalition which had a majority of one in the Austrian Nationalrat. Twice in the following August he stayed in office with the aid of dramatic good fortune. On August 3rd, when he was about to combat a motion of censure, Monsignor Ignatz Seipel died, but Dollfuss had his successor in the Nationalrat sworn in and marshalled his majority, two of whom came from hospitals and one of whom had to be carried in by three associates. Confidence was voted by a majority of one. Two weeks later, ratification of the Lausanne loan was passed by a majority of one. The night before one member of the opposition, ex-Chancellor Dr. Schober, had died. Naturally such providential interventions did not fail to impress the Austrian electorate. When five months later, because of a dispute over whether a deputy had voted improperly, the speaker and the two deputy speakers resigned, the Nationalrat was without a chairman and thus faced a procedural impasse. Dollfuss resigned, knowing full well that *his* resignation would not be accepted; so he returned to office with emergency powers and executive government began: more exclusively executive and more governing than ever before. Dollfuss had to have something in Austria which could be called an alternative to Naziism. In September, following the example of Mussolini, who was his chief foreign friend, he reorganized his Cabinet and took five portfolios himself. Then he announced that there would be no more elections and gradually abandoned or alienated his Left support. In many respects he seemed to be an Austrian von Papen or von Schleicher. Was he a precursor of an Austrian Hitler at the moment when he was asking the powers to support him against a Nazi attempt to dominate his government? ¹ The situation is still uncertain.

¹ On September 11, 1933, Dollfuss said: "We will build up a Catholic

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In Germany the amazing thing was that the extraordinary government which was naturally necessary for the transition from monarchy, was so soon supplanted by constitutional government. The republican Constitution which was adopted at Weimar in 1919 worked admirably for a decade. It was a triumph for representative institutions that, given Germany's fiscal problems, the Constitution could work at all. Occasionally during the first ten years after its adoption, internal dissension or financial disaster made the executive govern the country. Article 48 of the Constitution, indeed, wisely contemplated such emergencies. That article provided that "if public safety and order be seriously disturbed or threatened within the German Reich, the president of the Reich may take the necessary measures to restore public safety and order; if necessary, with the aid of armed force. For this purpose he may temporarily suspend in whole or in part" certain fundamental rights which are enumerated in the Constitution. The measures taken had to be communicated to the Reichstag and on its demand were subject to abrogation. Under Article 48 crisis government was constitutional. One could thus avoid unreal discussions as to constitutionality and could concentrate on expediency.²

Article 48 was used, notably, during and after inflation to inaugurate the Dawes Plan, and continuously for a year and a half from 1931 on, because of the threat from the Hitlerites and because complete financial collapse could be staved off only by executive action. The regime under which Germany lived has its counterparts in older democracies. France can have a state of siege when war begins or when public order is seriously threatened.

German State which will be thoroughly Austrian upon a corporative (Fascist) basis. It will be an authoritarian State, based on corporations formed on occupational lines." He promised, however, that the new corporate state, which he outlined no more concretely than his predecessors, would not be sustained by Nazi methods of terrorism.

² But the German public lawyers did not.

Even in England where it has been the proud boast that the Constitution insured the rule of law, His Majesty may declare that a state of emergency exists if it appears to him—that is to say, his Cabinet—that “the community or any substantial portion of the community” are likely to be deprived “of the essentials of life” by reason of action by any person or body of persons. The emergency contemplated (1920) was manifestly the use of direct action by labor. When the existence of a state of emergency is proclaimed, the executive may take the necessary measures to deal with it. On several occasions England has resorted to such emergency measures—notably during the coal strike of 1921 and the general strike of 1926.

So the measures which were resorted to in Germany were not novel. They have their counterparts in other parliamentary systems. Constitutional guarantees can be put in abeyance. In order to maintain order, what would normally be permitted—public meetings, demonstrations—can be temporarily suppressed. One cannot say that a regime of this sort challenges the principle of parliamentary government. Indeed, parliamentary institutions show the wisdom of their fashioning and the strength of their functioning when they permit the setting up of agencies of control competent to deal with emergencies. The only questions which need be asked are as to the reality of the emergency which justifies the initiation of the measures and the readiness of the executive to abandon the temporary expedients so soon as the emergency passes. It is not without interest that many of President von Hindenburg’s decrees during the first months of his presidency were rescissions of emergency decrees which had been issued over the signatures of a socialist president—Ebert.

It should be remembered also that in Germany the Reichstag—the elected representatives of the people—sanctioned the emergency measures. In the elections of

September, 1930, the Hitlerites made phenomenal gains. But the Social Democrats wished a continuance of the Brüning cabinet which had taken office six months before. They preferred to support the Brüning financial policy rather than risk his withdrawal and the coming into office of a Fascist government. At any time during his tenure, the Reichstag could have put Brüning out. He faced the legislature frequently. Legislative criticism now and then persuaded him to change his ministerial team. Among the Center groups there were wavering deputies but the main lines of Chancellor Brüning's defense held until they gave way completely. He and his associates were the real governors of Germany but they were governors in considerable measure by sufferance and approval of the elected representatives of the people. The press was free. Criticism was permitted. In this there was, to repeat, no threat to, but rather a triumph of, parliamentary government.

Germany lived under such a regime until June, 1932, when Dr. Brüning was put out of office. Before the formation of the von Papen government the Reichstag was not ignored. There was no dictatorship—for the electorate voted freely—but public finance and the national economy were completely controlled by the Cabinet. The federal executive, indeed, could decree budgetary equilibrium for the German states and the states in turn exercised supervision over municipalities and groups of municipalities so that the latter did not live beyond their means. Taxation was levied by the Reich, the states, and the municipalities under regulations which the Cabinet prescribed. The federal government (on the executive's say so) loaned money to the states and the municipalities so that their immediate necessities might be met and their fiscal houses put in order. Brüning's so-called first emergency ordinance (December, 1930) made drastic amendments to the banking laws. The federal government directed the operation of the banks. A decree of

September, 1931, authorized the Cabinet to take the measures necessary for the execution of the stand-still agreement reached between groups of foreign creditor banks and domestic debtors. The Cabinet controlled all transactions in foreign exchange.³

Housing, corporate reorganization, debt moratoria, reduction of prices, control of interest rates, salaries and wages in private enterprises, public utility rates—all these matters were subject to the German executive. Such law-making by the executive did not mean that the representative principle had been abandoned. The Reichstag was still in existence and could withdraw its support from the Brüning Cabinet. Not until some weeks after the formation of the von Papen Cabinet was it clear that presidential government—in effect a dictatorship—had been substituted for the cabinet system which the Weimar Constitution set up. But by that time Germany's fiscal crisis was so severe—not to speak of the threat from

³ In an article dealing with some of these measures ("German Political Institutions, II," *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1932) I wrote as follows:

"In the United States the federal government, through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and similar agencies, has been bolstering up banks, railroads and other corporate enterprises. Support has been financial. There has been little or no compulsory reorganization of private business and the government has assumed no responsibility for preserving capital structures from complete collapse. Agricultural relief has been attempted in various forms and American legislation in respect of housing somewhat parallels the German measures. In Germany, however, the emergency decrees and the action taken under them enable the government to disregard all obligations of contracts. The Eighth Commandment does not stand in the way of an ordered control of the financial life of the country.

"So far as public finance is concerned the German government is all-powerful. In the United States, on the other hand, where municipal budgets are sadly unbalanced, where states are not free from financial troubles, and where the federal government is not as opulent as yesterday, constitutions and traditions of autonomy prevent a centrally directed attempt to prevent collapse. One may hope that the future course of American public finance will not be such as to cause regret that the Constitution of the United States does not contain an Article 48."

the Hitlerites and the growth of communism—that a foreign observer would hesitate to say that the then extreme situation did not justify such extreme action.

Emergency situations were not confined to the defeated powers or even the succession states. The victorious governments did not escape crises and crisis government. America and Britain, as has been said, returned to political normalcy. The United States quickly passed through an acute unemployment crisis and entered upon Coolidge prosperity and complete mental relaxation. Despite an apparently permanent army of workless, Great Britain early and none too wisely returned to the gold standard with the consequence that in August, 1931, the mother of parliaments had to take the toys away from her child. In Belgium and France public debts, inflation, taxes, and economies raised problems of immediate difficulty. Parliaments temporized. So in 1925 extensive ordinance-making authority had to be given to the Belgian Cabinet. The necessary decrees were issued, new taxes were imposed, rigid economy was the order of the day, and the Belgian franc was stabilized. France failed to act until a year later.

The French franc had been going down steadily. Parliament and the politicians fiddled while the franc fell. Even though much of the decline had occurred during Poincaré's premiership (1922-24) and because of the disastrous invasion of the Ruhr, he was the politician who was turned to in 1926 after a series of Left cabinets had demonstrated their impotence. The measures that M. Poincaré took to insure stabilization were not novel ones. They had been talked about frequently. Indeed, M. Poincaré did no more than implement the recommendations made by M. Caillaux's committee of experts. But the French Parliament had refused to give Caillaux the ordinance-making authority which he requested, and it gave that authority to M. Poincaré. The reasons for

this bouleversement were two: Parliament had more confidence in Poincaré, and both the fiscal emergency and the popular clamor had become greater.

But why the delay? It was obviously not due to the political system of France or its especially faulty functioning. The delay was due solely to the fact that, not unlike other politicians, French politicians preferred to delay. Groups of them were inclined to oppose various items in any taxation or retrenchment programme. Minorities representing the interests of the public functionaries, of agriculture, of the banks, of the small shopkeepers, were willing to have new taxes and economies only if their constituents were not adversely affected. These minorities were finally willing to join in a blanket grant of authority to the executive to do what every-one knew should be done. Avoiding responsibility in this fashion, the minorities did not need to go on record as favoring every item in the programme. They delayed yielding the necessary authority because the emergency was not sufficiently pressing to require action and because the country was not sufficiently unanimous in demanding that something be done.

Parliaments are more willing to grant war powers than they are to grant peace powers. The grant of power during a war seems to be accepted without question. Perhaps one reason is that the chief executives are usually commanders-in-chief of armies and navies. Even if they are only that in the titular sense the psychological effect is great. If the executive has power to send men into battle without consulting legislatures then it seems that the executive exercises lesser powers in controlling food supplies, fixing the prices of commodities, regulating international trade, and balancing budgets. Then, too, struggling against an enemy seems a good deal more glorious than battling against a depression, even though the latter emergency may be far more acute and devastating than the former. There is no prosperity flag. Victories

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cannot be described in terms of terrain which is overrun, or prisoners and material which are captured. Victories against a depression show themselves in index numbers which are not available until some time after the battle has ended. Consequently there is reluctance on the part of legislators to understand the fact that what are in effect war-time powers must be granted in times of peace and that their grant means simply that democracies are being efficient.

Fiscal emergencies such as those which had to be dealt with in extraordinary fashion by Belgium and France do not ordinarily involve the question of public order. Individual liberties, that is to say, need not be interfered with. The executive legislates because the legislators prefer that the executive legislate. What is done goes to the business side of government rather than to government as an agency of restraint. Crisis government in France therefore meant no more than that the executive had its way in respect of new taxes, economies in the public service, reductions of salaries, elimination of useless posts, and provisions for amortizing the public debt. The emergency was almost entirely one in public finance. Banking and private business were only slightly affected. Their ills were not so great that government control was necessary.

There was some criticism, but surely the inviolate separation of powers theory, so dear to public lawyers, could not be permitted to make the franc worthless. For a considerable period after the Poincare experiences, France steadily gained in financial strength. Her national economy, based so largely on peasant proprietorship and small scale industry, spared her severe unemployment. The stabilization of the franc at a point probably lower than necessary; the plea *in formâ pauperis* which in 1925 Caillaux whispered into the all-too-sympathetic ears of Winston Churchill who drastically scaled down the French debt to Great Britain; shrewd manipulation by

the Bank of France; the traditional niggardliness of national and local governments in respect of works of public importance (save for war); the historic reluctance to loan money abroad (save to political allies)—the result was that in 1931 France became the financial dictator of Europe. Even the United States was on occasion the unwilling but powerless exporter of gold to increase the French hoard.

After Poincaré retired in 1929, France again enjoyed the luxury of a rapid cabinet turnover. She had her normal form of government—frequent cabinet crises but no crisis government. Then in January, 1934, the situation seemed to resemble that of 1926. Cabinets of the Left were unable to command sufficient parliamentary support or to exercise sufficient moral authority in the country. The familiar pendulum of French politics was again swinging. In many quarters there were signs—they had been faintly noted months before—that the job of public housekeeping would have to be taken over by a cabinet of concentration or of national union. Poincaré was too old and ill to undertake the task. Doumergue, also an ex-president of the Republic, was summoned from his retirement. The Left, traditionally interested in the public heart, yielded dominance to groups more interested in the public pocket.

There are several aspects of the British crisis of August, 1931, and of the emergency measures then taken to which attention should be drawn. Analysis in the case of Great Britain is somewhat more important than analysis in the case of crisis government elsewhere. For the British parliamentary system is the model which is widely imitated, even though variation from the British forms may be clearly intended. British practices are a proper yardstick by which to measure developments elsewhere.

Certain aspects of the British situation suggest, although perhaps dimly, that constitutional government as a machinery for the adjustment of differences through

political methods and in accordance with constitutional forms may be facing a real challenge. What I mean is this: A Labor Cabinet, headed by Mr. MacDonald, was in power. A majority of that Cabinet wished to balance the budget without reducing unemployment insurance benefits. Notice was in effect served on the MacDonald Cabinet by the British bankers that unless unemployment insurance benefits were reduced, England would go off the gold standard. Notice was plainly served during the general election campaign that if the British electorate returned Labor members to the House of Commons in such numbers that a Labor Cabinet could be formed, financial chaos would result. That was equivalent to telling the British electorate that it must do what the bankers said must be done. It was tantamount to serving notice that the will of the electorate, reflected in the will of a majority of the House of Commons, could not prevail—that the interests of capital and of investors were such that these elements in the economic community would not let the political community have its way.

I realize, of course, that one must discount statements which are made during the heat of a campaign. It has been well said that otherwise truthful men lie before the wedding, after fishing, and during elections. But electoral lies apart, was not the situation ominous? It was a situation not without two recent parallels in British political history. In 1914 the Conservative party, then the minority party in Great Britain, was refusing to adhere to the assumption of the British parliamentary system that a parliamentary majority can translate its will into statute. The Conservative party was supporting Ulster in its refusal to accept the Irish Home Rule Act of that year. This issue was not definitely fought out because the outbreak of the European War adjourned the Irish crisis and the battle was not resumed in the same fashion. Again in 1926 a similar conflict emerged. British labor, unwilling to accept the opinion of the majority of the

House of Commons that the demands of the British coal miners could not be acceded to, resorted to a general strike—to direct action in support of the miners. That general strike failed; but its declaration challenged a fundamental assumption of constitutional government. Now by statute general strikes are illegal. The maxim "*Ce qui est bon à prendre est bon à rendre*" will not be applied to give the bankers gooseflesh, or, in other words, to make a strike by them illegal.

Here one's sympathies do not matter. If one sympathizes with the objectives of the general strike of 1926 one should nevertheless in all fairness agree that that direct action was of a piece with the bankers' direct action of October, 1931. If one approves of the bankers' insistence that Great Britain should have no government not prepared to balance a budget in accordance with the programme of the financiers, one should nevertheless admit that such insistence is fairly comparable to the insistence of the Trade Union Congress five years before. Do these recent incidents suggest that constitutional government in Great Britain may be moving toward a chasm which separates the political parties of the state and which is so wide that it cannot be bridged by political methods which are now being used? And will the aid of the King be invoked to prevent the chasm from being bridged?

Gladstone once described the changed position of the Crown (worn by Victoria) as the beneficial substitution of influence for power. It was clear during the crisis of 1931 that George V had ample opportunities to exert his influence. He was constantly consulted. The important question was whether power had not taken the place of influence. The King, that is to say, apparently decided to ask Mr. MacDonald to form a national government when the convention of the Constitution would have warranted him in turning to the leader of the opposition—Mr. Baldwin—upon the announcement by the Labor

Prime Minister that he could no longer carry on. In December, 1916, when Mr. Asquith's government broke up, George V asked Mr. Bonar Law to form a ministry; and upon his refusal and his recommendation of Mr. Lloyd George, commissioned the latter to form a cabinet. In 1931, however, the King took a different course. Does that mean that his discretion is not so severely limited by constitutional conventions?

Queries can be raised also as to the constitutional rôle of the Prime Minister in the crisis. The decisions that the seals of office shall be yielded up or that the King shall be asked for a dissolution of Parliament have not, generally speaking, been made by Prime Ministers personally.⁴ Parliamentary government in Great Britain has been Cabinet government—not government by a Prime Minister who associates ministers with himself. Mr. MacDonald, however, acted with some of his Cabinet in ignorance of some of the steps which he proposed to take. Does this show a trend toward Presidential government? Is the rôle of the Prime Minister in the future no longer to be that of first among equals but that of the first minister with subordinate ministers?

Mr. MacDonald's decision, moreover, was of tremendous importance in respect of the fortunes of the party which he had headed and which had made him Prime Minister. He was unable to carry with him more than a handful of the men who had made him their titular leader. Under these circumstances should he have accepted the decision of his party and have turned over the reins of government to a Conservative-Liberal combination? To ask this question does not mean that he was bound to approve the Labor plans for balancing the budget and to oppose the alternative Conservative-Liberal programme. The point is as to whether the

⁴ Mr. C. K. Wang has subjected this problem to a thorough examination in a recently published monograph, *The Dissolution of the British Parliament* (Columbia University Press, 1934).

traditions of the British Constitution and party government permit a Prime Minister to dish his party and overnight to become the titular leader of a coalition opposition which can form a government.⁵ Does not this suggest that personal government—by Prime Minister with approval of the King—may threaten to supplant government by party? The question loses no interest by reason of the fact that the British system, more easily than any other, permits a constitutional dictator—the Prime Minister—whenever he is wanted. The reader of the *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George* will see rather vividly what potentialities of power reside in the British Premiership—the keystone of the Cabinet arch. Such power can be transferred only with the assent of the Cabinet and the Commons, but the point is that it can be transferred by fewer formalities and less extraordinary procedure than are necessary in the case, say, of the aggrandizement of presidential power in the United States. After August, 1931, however, Mr. MacDonald was only *primus inter pares*. He was the façade of a Tory Government and he had nothing like the authority enjoyed by Mr. Lloyd George.⁶

⁵ "The head of the British government," Mr. Gladstone once wrote, "is not a Grand Vizier. He has no powers properly so called over his colleagues. On the rare occasions when a Cabinet determines its course by the votes of its members his vote counts only as one of them. But they are appointed and dismissed by the Sovereign on his advice. . . . He reports to the Sovereign the proceedings of the Cabinet, and he has also many audiences of the august occupant of the Throne. He is bound in these reports and audiences not to counterwork the Cabinet, not to divide it, not to undermine the position of any of his colleagues in Royal favour. If he departs in any degree from strict adherence to these rules and uses his great opportunities to increase his own influence or pursue views not shared by his colleagues . . . then, unless he is prepared to advise their dismissal, he not only departs from rule, but commits an act of treachery and baseness. As the Cabinet stands between the Sovereign and the Parliament and is bound to be loyal to both, so he stands between his colleagues and the Sovereign and is bound to be loyal to both."

⁶ A good many of Mr. Lloyd George's readers will wonder whether, if the potentialities of the Premiership had been realized sooner by a change of government, the War would not have ended before its disastrous last year.

Thus Britain's crisis government has again indicated the ease with which the British Constitution can be adapted to what are conceived to be the requirements of the moment. Note that I say "conceived to be" for it is arguable that only desire for place caused the scrapping of the principle that British cabinets are collectively responsible. On the issue of free trade versus protection the three free trade members of the MacDonald National Cabinet voted against their government's tariff bill in the House of Commons. Apparently the British Cabinet was collectively responsible for the administration of the country in all matters save tariffs. But if the principle of collective responsibility can be scrapped in respect of tariffs, why can it not be scrapped in respect of any other issue on which there is a difference of opinion? And, indeed, this tariff issue cuts far more deeply and widely than the mere imposition of duties on imports. It raises questions of imperial relations, and of Great Britain's attitude toward European economic arrangements and international relations in general. Why could not the British Cabinet retain office with dissentient members in respect of disarmament policy, reparations, or the British debt to the United States? If the principle on which the MacDonald government acted were accepted in full, the leaders of the Labor opposition in the House of Commons could be taken into the Cabinet because they approved some non-controversial bills which were part of the national government's programme. Differences of opinion within the state could then be confined to differences of opinion within a single party, as is the case with the Fascist party.

This probably presses the point too far. But even though the Liberal ministers later resigned, the temporary abandonment of the principle of collective responsibility is nevertheless worth remarking. For more than a century cabinet ministers always resigned when their consciences required them to speak openly or to

vote against the government. Resignations have not been many. But this has not meant that British cabinets have been like minded. In the early part of the nineteenth century successive cabinets were divided on Catholic emancipation and parliamentary reform. Cabinets have been divided on the economies that were necessary. Lord Palmerston once saw smoke pouring from the chimney of 10 Downing Street and suggested that perhaps Gladstone's letters of resignation were being burned. The gibe related to Gladstone's frequently threatened withdrawals from the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer in order to persuade his associates to be more economical. In 1877 Disraeli could tell the Queen that "in a cabinet of twelve there are seven parties or policies"—but the twelve accepted collective responsibility for the policies which were followed.

Since the War, British cabinets have not been wholly like minded on foreign policy. Whatever the party complexion the Cabinet always contained pro-French and anti-French members. That cleavage was partly responsible for the varying course of British foreign policy and for the wariness of her walking in Europe. At one moment the entente with France seemed to be in full vigor; at another moment there was coolness. So with the British attitude toward disarmament. But at least there was collective responsibility and the dissentients sharing in the responsibility did not advertise their dissent. That theory is quite different from the theory of several continental constitutions, which explicitly say that cabinet decisions shall be taken by a majority vote. They thus attenuate the principle of collective responsibility. Mr. MacDonald's innovation was a step in that direction.

The MacDonald national government obtained from the House of Commons authority to legislate by order in council in order to reduce expenditures. Now legislation by order in council is an ancient device. One of

the most important and constant tendencies of modern government has been to hand over to the executive more and more legislative authority. The tendency has been criticized but it has been inevitable. The subjects of legislation are so complex that parliaments cannot deal with details. The representatives of the people can do no more than lay down general principles and grant to government departments which have the specialized knowledge of details authority to implement the general principles legislatively established. Legislators are becoming conveyancers: instead of transferring land, they transfer legislative power, more simply and without the archaic phrases and qualifications which during the centuries came to encrust real property titles. The results of this tendency are described as the "new despotism" and as "bureaucracy triumphant." But the business of government control is now so vast and difficult that the hands of the clock cannot be turned back. One can hope for no more than that the clock will keep accurate time and strike the hours in the desired tone. That is a problem which can be dealt with in part by legislative committees supervising the issuance of executive ordinances in order to see that they do not go counter to legislative intentions; in part by a hierarchy of administrative courts; and in part by review of certain administrative determinations in the ordinary courts of the land. Executive power to issue decrees must be greater, naturally, in times of crisis—when there is war or when capitalist systems tremble and need governmental support. If proper supervision can be arranged for—and it is being more efficiently arranged for everywhere—representative institutions can be made to function successfully.

The British innovation extended, as I have said, the control of the Cabinet over expenditure; for the House of Commons abdicated from its historic rôle of custodian of the purse. Historically that rule has been of

tremendous importance. Because the British Parliament so early seized tight hold of the purse strings the House of Commons survived as an institution when even older representative assemblies, like the Cortes of Aragon and the Estates General in France were short-lived. Control of the purse by a legislature is beyond question the greatest safeguard against dictatorship. But I am unable to see that a temporary abandonment of the control of the purse to a cabinet which possesses the support of a large majority of a legislative assembly is much more than a precedent—that “entering wedge” which seems to be so much feared but which frequently does not enter. Of course the opposition in the House of Commons marshalled all its eloquence in opposing the innovation and it had a good case. In the House Mr. MacDonald had a large and docile majority which could pass emergency legislation much more easily than in most other law-making bodies. Party discipline and cabinet leadership combine in making parliamentary minorities representing particular interests far weaker than they are in other countries. Despite these advantages, however, the MacDonald Cabinet insisted on and received dictatorial powers in public finance.

One further aspect of the British crisis was not of great intrinsic significance. It was a symptom rather than a disease. When the MacDonald government came into office in 1929 there was some discussion of its prescience in setting up what was grandiosely described as an Economics General Staff but what was in reality an Economic Advisory Committee to the Cabinet. The committee was composed of economists and business men. Little or nothing was heard of its activities. In September, shortly before England went off the gold standard, the Prime Minister was asked in the House of Commons whether the Economic Advisory Committee was still in being; and, if not, whether it was proposed to revive it. Mr. MacDonald replied that “the

answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative; the second part, therefore, does not arise." Then the Prime Minister was asked whether the same personnel remained and whether the Cabinet would utilize it for advice on the emergency problems which Great Britain was facing. Mr. MacDonald answered that "the Council remained as it was but that he understood that one member had resigned. The Council would be utilized." Another member of the House proceeded to ask "whether the problem of the economic crisis was referred to the Economic Council for discussion." To this question Mr. MacDonald answered—and note it well—that "the immediate, urgent aspect of the crisis was a matter directly, entirely, and primarily for the government itself and they had full responsibility for it." My quotation, including the bad syntax, is from the Parliamentary Report in the *London Times* (September 10). This astonishing statement was greeted by "ministerial cheers."⁷ In this colloquy there is raised the whole issue as to the place of experts in a system of government.

There is, of course, a degree of unreality in what I have been saying about kings and presidents and ministers and parliaments. To a large extent, the business of government in every country is carried on by the permanent officials—by an able and secretive bureaucracy. It

⁷ At a later session of the House:

Mr. Wise (Leicester, E., Lab.) asked the Prime Minister on what date or dates the Economic Council or any committee or members of it were consulted concerning the measures to be adopted for dealing with the financial crisis.

Mr. MacDonald—The Proceedings of the Economic Advisory Council and of its committees are confidential; and I am not, therefore, prepared to add anything to the answer which I gave the hon. member in reply to a similar question on Monday last.

Mr. Wise—Would it not be better for the Prime Minister frankly to admit that the Economic Council was not consulted rather than continue to evade the question?

Mr. MacDonald—I cannot make any such statement because it would not be true.

is frequently said that the real rulers of a political society are undiscoverable, and the rule holds save for the simplest regimes. In Yugoslavia, in Russia, and in Italy, the rulers can be discovered. In democracies they cannot, save on rare occasions. The British Empire was for some years managed by a person named Rogers who was an under-secretary in the Colonial Office, and he did what he pleased unchecked and indeed largely unsupervised by his uninterested and uncomprehending political chiefs. When his regime ended he was no longer yclept Rogers. He had been elevated to the peerage and was Lord Blatchford.

In foreign affairs bureaucrats are frequently more powerful than ministers or parliaments: from the pre-war period I cite Baron von Holstein, the *éminence grise* of the Wilhelmstrasse, and from the post-war period Philippe Berthelot⁸ of the Quai d'Orsay. How and to what extent are tempering influences brought to bear by the amateurs who are ministers? Are the amateurs restrained from proposed courses of action because their lesser knowledge yields to the greater expertness of the permanent officials? Who controls the professionals and the amateurs—their wives, their social friends, their bankers, their political parties? Is executive action shaped to carry out parliamentary intention or to avoid parliamentary criticism? Such questions are difficult to answer.

But in emergencies the real rulers of a society are more discoverable. They must emerge. Poincaré was *the* man in France from 1926 to 1929. Brüning and von Hindenburg were unquestionably Germany's men from the spring of 1930 to the summer of 1932. Hindenburg? "*Il suffit de vivre pour voir tout et le contraire de tout,*"

⁸ "Philippe Berthelot, qui avait déjà, dans les conseils, cette puissance étendue et durable à laquelle atteignent ceux qui préfèrent les réalités du pouvoir à des triomphes éphémères." André Maurois, *Lyautey*, p. 268 (Paris, 1931).

said Montaigne. This profound remark applies to the antinomies that can be found within a state and to the alteration of conflicting policies. Here it is apposite in respect of the turn of the wheel in Germany. In 1925 the election to the Presidency of the hero of Tannenberg, of that German general who during the War symbolized for the embattled Allies the reaction against which a righteous struggle was being carried on, was well-nigh universally viewed as a portent. The Weimar Republic was threatened. In 1932 the world hailed the reelection of Hindenburg as a triumph of republicanism. And half of the German nation, sorely tried by financial collapse and hopelessly facing the immediate future, refused to listen to extremists but stayed in the middle of the road. That was a triumph of democracy which can be put in one balance of the scales when the other balance holds the achievements of dictatorship. And the triumph was only dimmed, not wiped out, nine months later when Hitler came to power.

Enough has been said to demonstrate the possibility of democracies being sufficiently efficient in crises. Resort to a dictatorship which restricts criticism is simply not necessary. No one can deny, however, that, by and large, legislative assemblies have suffered their prestige to dwindle. One reason has been the indifference of legislative bodies themselves. Set up to deal with issues which were largely political, they are now forced to deal with issues that are highly complicated and severely economic. The nineteenth century state could be a policeman or an arbiter and if at times it seemed weak and unintelligent this did not matter greatly. But now states are called upon not only for complex legislation but for plans which contemplate future legislation. The problem of efficient administration has become much more important and the task of control much more delicate.

Legislative assemblies have not greeted these develop-

ments with any changes of legislative method. Even as the grand forum of the nation where important questions can be ventilated, parliaments continue to demonstrate their incompetence. Various suggestions of reform are made—that certain powers be devolved on subordinate bodies; of economic sub-parliaments which will perfect economic legislation to carry out general principles which the legislature may have approved; of a division of labor among committees; or of handing over certain tasks to autonomous groups.

One interesting experiment in Great Britain has been in connection with ecclesiastical measures. There is an ecclesiastical committee composed of fifteen members of the House of Lords and fifteen members of the House of Commons. It exists for the life of the Parliament. To this committee are submitted ecclesiastical measures which are drafted by the Church of England Assembly. The ecclesiastical committee cannot amend these measures but in practice it can secure amendment by notifying the legislative committee of the Assembly that particular provisions will not be favorably reported. On the measures submitted the legislative committee makes careful reports to each House, and each House accepts or rejects. Most spectacular was the measure dealing with the Prayer Book which was rejected, but most of the legislation proposed has been accepted. The result of the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919, is that work has been taken away from Parliament and parliamentary time has been saved, but with no diminution whatever of parliamentary control. This device has doubtless made it possible for Parliament to pass some measures which otherwise would have had no chance of consideration, so great was the pressure on parliamentary time. It should be recognized, of course, that the Church occupies a rather special position. Parliament is reluctant to interfere. Again, public money is not involved. But despite the special position of Church

legislation, there would seem to be no reason why the principle could not be extended to other interests. There might, for example, be a railroad committee of Parliament or of the American Congress, to which railroad legislation, drafted by railroad owners, managers and workers (transport) would be submitted, and the parliamentary or congressional committee would report the bills to the House with its recommendations. The House would have to accept or reject, but acceptance or rejection would require far less time than amendments. There would, furthermore, be no danger that hasty, ill-considered amendments would destroy unintentionally the effectiveness of the measure proposed.

In some such fashion the machinery of representative government may be made a good deal more efficient. Apparently there is not much promise in the development of professional representation. After the War plans for economic councils were in the air and several of them were actually set up. The underlying idea was not new. It had been adumbrated in syndicalist and guild socialist circles. Indeed a Prussian Economic Council had been created by Bismarck in 1880, but because of legislative opposition it met only three times and was unimportant. The Weimar Constitution provided for a complicated hierarchy of local works councils, regional labor councils, and a national labor council and set up a National Economic Council as a sort of third branch of the legislature. The latter's composition was provisional and differences of opinion over the way in which seats would be allocated among different interests prevented a permanent organization. Hence the National Economic Council failed to leave its imprint on German legislation.

In France economic advice was through an agency which was an adjunct of the executive. The Conseil National Economique was created by presidential decree in 1925 and has been of some use in collecting

technical information. It cannot be said, however, that it has been of any real assistance to the executive. In England the Economic Advisory Council was ignored. There have been experiments in other countries but no one of them suggests that an economic council may be the philosopher's stone for which believers in the future of parliamentary government have been searching.

The anti-parliamentarians stress the paucity of plausible reforms and they point to some of the developments described above as showing that parliaments are bankrupt. This is insisting on eating your cake and having it too. Legislatures have been called futile and the demand is that something efficient be substituted for Carlyle's "talking shop."⁹ Yet when a parliament like the British, the French, or the American gives to a cabinet or president real powers and freedom from petty supervision, such action is hailed as another indication of the bankruptcy of representative government. As a matter of fact, the readiness of a parliament to admit that it must yield power in emergencies is evidence that it is virile and intelligent rather than vacillating and incompetent. Naturally enough it wishes to yield the authority only to someone in whom it has a measure of confidence.

⁹ "A Parliament with a mob pulling the strings" was described by Ruskin as the most contemptible "of all the puppet-shows in the Satanic Carnival of the earth."

IV

EXCURSUS ON THE ART OF STATESMANSHIP

DURING the winter of 1931-32 it was frequently said that elections would have to take place before certain problems could be dealt with. It would be necessary to wait for the French elections of May, 1932, before the French Cabinet could tell the people the truth about reparations and demand their consent to a new settlement with marked scaling down and perhaps complete extinguishment. So in the United States for many months we operated on the principle that the nominating conventions and the election in November, 1932, would have to pass before the news of the prolongation of the Hoover moratorium and the scaling down or cancellation of inter-allied debts could be broken to the American people. Domestic legislation had to be innocuous so that it would not create a campaign issue. After the elections there was an interregnum until March 4th. Then happily we began to have a government. Even yet, however, the debt news has not been fully disclosed.

The march of events in Great Britain (1931) was such that the British Cabinet was forced to take prompt action. One may not like the kind of action which was taken. One may even maintain that an election was held because Mr. MacDonald and his associates wanted to seize a favorable opportunity to obtain a longer lease

of power. One may regret the verdict of the electorate in so nearly wiping out Labor representation in the House of Commons and in returning national government candidates in such overwhelming numbers. But whether or no one likes what the British electorate did, one must in candor say that the electorate showed no resentment against executives who had sought to lead—and who had sought to lead most unpleasantly by paring expenditures drastically and by piling tax burdens higher and higher.

What happened in Great Britain, therefore, should have suggested to statesmen in other countries that they might be unduly timorous when they feared that intelligent action by them—action which they privately admitted to be inevitable—would be followed by repudiation at the polls. Parenthetically it may be remarked that in 1932 the German presidential elections showed that the German democracy still retained considerable sanity. Many of the votes which at the first election gave von Hindenburg almost a clear majority were cast in admiration of the courage which he and Brüning had displayed in the face of such extraordinary difficulties. And no commentator whom I have read suggested that any considerable measure of the Hitlerite strength was due to resentment against the leadership which Brüning and von Hindenburg had shown. Hitler was strong because Brüning and von Hindenburg had not been sufficiently strong. It may be added also that when, after the French elections, Herriot agreed to cancel reparations, there was no outcry. That decision, moreover, was one which could have gone either way. If Herriot had returned to Paris from Lausanne and had told the Chamber that he could not accept the German terms he would, in all probability, have been supported and the world would have said that French public opinion had restrained the Prime Minister. But

Herriot accepted, public opinion sustained him, and the world applauded.

Nevertheless, impending elections are hardly to be desired when intelligent and courageous action is necessary. During much of the time that there was a moratorium on reparations and debt payments there was a moratorium as well on statesmanship and intelligence. Politicians are, for the most part, a curious genus.¹ I do not underestimate the difficulties confronting them and I am not unmindful of the fact that they frequently are not absolutely free agents. Even if all the responsible statesmen of the world were intelligent, if they were in unanimous agreement as to the nature of the evils from which we suffer and the action which should be taken to eradicate them, they could not immediately set to work. For if they did proceed to be completely intelligent they would be discharged and other politicians would be put in their places. Those who hold office are, fortunately at some times and unfortunately at other times, the prisoners of their parliaments and peoples. They must take account of the wishes, prejudices, and passions of those who keep them in power. Their task is made difficult by the fact that there are within every political community marked cleavages on fundamental principles.

Take, for example, the question of armaments. There are in the community many who believe that adequate security must be sought for by methods other than great military and naval forces. But there are many in each community who believe that the only means of securing peace is to prepare for war. Many of us may think that belief fallacious but it is nevertheless widely held. Should our politicians do as you and I think wise?

¹ "I always hold that politicians are the men whom, as a rule, it is most difficult to comprehend. For my own part I have never understood, or thought I understood, above one or two." (Gladstone)

Should they do as the other (mistaken) ones desire? Or should they take first one attitude and then the other and be all things to all men?

A similar antinomy of principles exists in respect of many problems with which modern politicians have to deal in the national as well as the international sphere. Should our statesmen frankly and freely collaborate with statesmen of other nations? Or should we attempt as complete isolation as possible? In speech, politicians are inclined to carry water on both shoulders. Eloquent on the desirability of playing "a helpful" rôle in world affairs and offering "leadership," they are no less eloquent, even in the same speech, on the necessity of avoiding any entangling commitments, and of building a navy adequate to defend the legitimate interests of the country. Politicians, indeed, frequently seem to imitate cuttle-fishes. Instead of throwing up a cloud of ink, they exude a flow of words and hide behind them. Unfortunately applause sometimes follows their platitudes and they are encouraged to repetition. They parrot dogmas from statesmen who, were they alive now, would be far too intelligent to utter them. Some of our present political leaders seem to be eunuchs guarding harems which have long been empty of any political or economic truths.

Is intellectual honesty possible? Should a statesman do precisely what he thinks the electorate wishes him to do, even though he is convinced that the electorate is wrong? Should he do what he thinks the electorate would wish him to do if the electorate had at its disposal the special information which he has? Or should he act as his own knowledge and conscience suggest that he act—should he play for a favorable page in the history books, hoping that the electorate will support him, but prepared to pursue his course so long as he is not definitely checked by legislative veto or by popular criticism too strong and general to be resisted?

A public man probably acts at various times as if he were mindful of each of these three considerations and were ignoring the others. In respect of some issues he may move on the basis of a combination of two or of all three of the considerations. Some questions do not interest the public. On them he can determine his own course. Other issues stir up such passions that for the time being statesmanship may consist in following the popular will but in planning to modify the will. Selectivity is essential. The people may be willing to stand a number of things in succession but they may be unwilling to stand them all at once. The statesman must therefore pay a good deal of attention to the manner in which public support is to be secured and to the issues which it is desirable to put to the fore or which it is wise for the time being to subordinate. If a statesman wishes to lead he must educate so that the leadership will be understood and expected. He cannot step forth on one issue and expect to be followed when he has refused to commit himself on other issues. Leadership cannot be spasmodic.

He must keep in mind the fact that if he follows too closely the dictates of his intelligence, he may find that his parliament will not follow him. If he is a parliamentary prime minister he may be put out of office. If he holds office for a fixed term, he may smart under general and increasing criticism. But that will be all. The draughtsmen of the American Constitution permitted themselves only one joke: the provision for the president's resignation. Or he may think that he will risk his chances of reelection and fail to realize that his best chances of reelection lie in seeming not to think about reelection. Statesmen may sometimes justify themselves by arguing that their successors would be willing to talk ranker nonsense and to sanction greater unwisdom. It is rare indeed that a statesman leaves office voluntarily or cheerfully because he is not permitted to do the things

which he knows to be wise or is compelled to do the things he knows to be unwise. Compromises with conscience have to be frequent. Here is food for thought, and perhaps critical thought. One must frequently say of politics what the Oxford Don said of logic: that it is neither an art nor a science, but a dodge.

Certain it is that in the period which has followed the War, we have had more nonsense talked in public than during any similar number of previous years in the history of the world. The nonsense has been known to be nonsense by the politicians at the time they uttered it. Let me take only one illustration—reparations. British and French politicians knew very well that Germany could not possibly pay the bill for reparations which was first presented. Just after the Khaki election of 1918, one of the British experts told Mr. Lloyd George that the damages which it was sought to collect from Germany meant a demand of twelve thousand million pounds. "My dear fellow," replied Mr. Lloyd George, "if that election had gone on another fortnight the amount would have been fifty thousand millions"; and Mr. Lloyd George was one of the most clear-headed of war and post-war statesmen. Poincaré in 1923 and 1924 held out hope to the French Parliament and the French people that Germany would pay amounts which he knew were fantastic. Sunday after Sunday, in dedicating a war monument in some provincial town, he delivered a *Dorfpredigt* which was a hymn of continued hate. Then came the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan with marked scalings down. The problem was handed over to non-political experts. The politicians supported the experts' proposals, but their action in doing so was a frank admission that they had talked nonsense.

When statesmen talk nonsense, they must make it wholehearted. They cannot talk in neutral colors. They must preach that something is black or that it is white.

Take, for example, the question of the tariff in England. From one end of the country to another, the politicians preached the absolute necessity of a protective tariff. They did not discuss the extent to which the tariff was already partly in effect by reason of England's being off the gold standard. They did not say that tariff walls are a principal factor in preventing the world from regaining a reasonable measure of prosperity. They did not suggest—as they might have suggested with some justification—that because Europe and the United States were tariff crazy, England should in self defense become tariff crazy also; but that she became so reluctantly, fully conscious of the harm which had been done by the protective principle and regretful that instead of putting on duties she could not join with other states in reducing or eliminating duties. The problem could not be explained that way. Or to take an American illustration one may cite the policy of the last administration in underestimating the number of unemployed and in reiterating so continuously that the corner to prosperity was being turned. Since the War, unhappily there has been a striking difference between the private opinions of many statesmen and their public professions.

In saying this I do not overlook the difficulties of the tasks which, say, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Poincaré or President Hoover had to face. The prime business of a politician is to accomplish the practicable in public affairs. Of course it is easy to exhibit on paper or to outline in an academic lecture the desirability of a particular course of action. The problem of statesmanship is far more complex. For the statesman must deal with inconstant human beings. He must take account of their preconceptions and prejudices, of their hopes and fears, their loyalties and antipathies, their information and their ignorance. So the problem of the statesman is not to attempt the best, but to do no more than strive for

the closest approximation to the best which he thinks has any chance of being accepted in the market-place of public opinion. He must remember the truth of the French proverb that the best is the enemy of the good. He must endeavor to keep politics, too frequently a matter of the second best, from being a matter of the third best. But he must remember also that faint heart lost the fair lady and that political cowardice may be no less fatal than military cowardice to reputation and achievement.

That the people have as good a government as they deserve is a well-known political axiom which has an important corollary that is not so frequently stated: statesmen have as good an electorate as they deserve, for it is within their power to frame dishonest issues, to promise the impossible, to muddle the public mind and thus to make popular decisions unintelligent. Democracy then works in a vicious circle. One hopeful sign of the last two or three years is that some of the principal statesmen of the world—Laval, Tardieu, Brüning (before they fell), Mussolini and Roosevelt—have almost completely stopped talking nonsense in public. They talk as much sense as they dare to talk, and the rest of the time they are silent. Electorates can be made good electorates, as M. Herriot demonstrated when he presented to the French people the Lausanne agreement cancelling reparations. So President Roosevelt treated the banking crisis with great frankness, and explained the problem in the simplest terms to the whole electorate. Such tactics paid. The response to President Roosevelt was so tremendous that it probably exceeded even his own expectations. "No man," declared Socrates, "could hold office in Athens and tell the truth." It would be more nearly correct now to say that no man can fail to tell the truth and hold office long.

Complaints have been many, as I have said, that at

certain critical periods democracies have lacked leadership. Naturally there has been leadership in dictatorial regimes like the Russian, the Italian, and the German, for dictation is the essence of dictatorship. Internationally there has been little or no leadership since Stresemann and Briand labored to improve Franco-German relations. Nationally there has been little leadership in France. It could not be found in England where before the National Government was formed, MacDonald headed a minority Labor Cabinet. It was not found in the United States before the present administration took over, and made it possible for the economic life of the country to be directed as courageously as, to the south of the Alps, Il Duce directs the economic life of Italy. The all-important difference is that here things are done by assent, and in an atmosphere of free discussion and free criticism.

Two years ago, when the vacillation and timidity of statesmen seemed to be at their zenith, Mr. Nicholas Murray Butler posed this question: "Why are our mid-gets so often found in the seats of the mighty?" He compared the various "methods of finding guides and rulers for the government of men and for the conduct of their collective affairs" and drew some striking comparisons between the types of rulers which the different methods selected. Only two methods are now generally in use: popular election in one form or another, and the assumption of power by a dictator. "It is rather startling," said President Butler, "for convinced believers in democracy to observe that this latter system of choosing rulers, if it be a system, appears to bring into authority and power men of far greater intelligence, far stronger character and far more courage than does the system of election." The process of democratic election apparently did not function successfully. When the test of excellence is applied to prime ministers or presidents, com-

paratively few seem of lofty stature and of unquestioned capacity for public service.²

A moratorium on statesmanship was in effect when President Butler wrote. Were he writing now, he would doubtless not be so pessimistic. In Paris, Doumergue; in Washington, Roosevelt; and in Vienna, Dollfuss (who at least came to power by a quasi-elective process) have shown character and courage. It is in this respect that political leaders seem to be failures (and partly on account of the situations which confront them) rather than in respect of intelligence and knowledge. They too frequently seem to suffer from political paralysis. They know what should be done, but they wait for their publics to learn it independently and to demand that it be done. They let their electorates call the tunes to which they shall dance and hesitate to suggest that other tunes would permit them to achieve greater perpsichorean feats.

² On February 1, 1932, I wrote to President Butler as follows:

"Your remarks sent me back to Bagehot to recall what he had said about mediocrity and inefficiency in banking and business. I turned up this rather remarkable paragraph (in *Lombard Street*):

" 'A Prime Minister or a Chancellor of the Exchequer or a Secretary of State must explain his policy and defend his actions in Parliament; and the discriminating tact of a critical assembly, abounding in experience and guided by tradition, will soon discover what he is. But the Governor of the Bank would only perform quiet functions, which look like routine though they are not, in which there is no immediate risk of success or failure; which years hence may indeed issue in a crop of bad debts, but which any grave person may make at the time to look fair and plausible. A large bank is exactly the place where a vain and shallow person in authority, if he be a man of gravity and method, as such men often are, may do infinite evil in no long time and before he is detected; if he is lucky enough to begin at a time of expansion in trade, he is nearly sure not to be found out till the time of contraction has arrived, and then very large figures will be required to reckon the evil he has done.' "

"One may argue, I think, that the British bankers in borrowing short term credits at three per cent and giving long term credits at six per cent were no less midgets than the British politicians. And do our political midgets not compare favorably with the bankers who made the huge loans to Germany and Central European countries."

This was written long before any senatorial or other investigations of bankers.

On the famous occasion of the Eatonsville election Mr. Pickwick gave some advice to Mr. Snodgrass:

"Hush, don't ask any questions. It's always best on these occasions to do what the mob do."

"But suppose there are two mobs," suggested Mr. Snodgrass.

"Shout with the largest," replied Mr. Pickwick.

Too many prime ministers and presidents, instead of proposing measures, have waited to see which mob was largest. Thus too frequently things are not done until long after most people have been convinced that they should be done—so long convinced indeed that it is already time to do something else. But even if proposals were made, accomplishments might have to be delayed until public opinions were ready. Too frequently there is a time lag between the desires of statesmen and the emotions of their peoples; too frequently the defects we seem to see in statesmen are deficiencies in the forces behind them. Nevertheless, we can insist that they remember the proverb: "It is not necessary to hope in order to undertake nor to succeed in order to persevere."

Happily British statesmen seem to have been ablest when critical situations and public opinion demanded great ability at the head of the executive. Nevertheless we must frankly admit that elective processes are not designed to put at the top those with the most suitable training for their tasks. Every schoolboy knows that so far as the American presidency is concerned, the race is not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong. Even the parliamentary system can be criticized as attaching too much importance to efficiency in debate and the management of a party majority.³

³ Macaulay's remarks in his review of Gladstone's *Church and State* are well known:

"A politician must often talk and act before he has thought and read. He may be very ill-informed respecting a question; all his notions

"The practical working of a representative government," wrote Bagehot, "often tends to produce hurtful effects upon the minds of the statesmen who are eminent under it. And not only so: all free governments are to some extent unfavorable to much originality of mind in their influential statesmen. They necessitate an appeal to the people, and the mind of the people is almost by definition ordinary and commonplace; the opinions of the majority of mankind necessarily partake of these qualities, and those who have to please that majority must in all ages, to some extent, cultivate them."⁴

Admitting all this, Bagehot maintains nevertheless that a well-developed system of parliamentary government is the best method devised for securing excellence in the office of prime minister. The prime minister may not be a person capable of great original thought, but "must have a very great number of other great qualities. He must be a man of business long trained in great

about it may be vague and inaccurate; but speak he must; and if he is a man of talents, of tact, and of intrepidity, he soon finds that, even under such circumstances, it is possible to speak successfully. He finds that there is a great difference between the effect of written words, which are perused and reperused in the stillness of the closet, and the effect of spoken words, which, set off by the graces of utterance and gesture, vibrate for a single moment on the ear. He finds that he may blunder without much chance of being detected, that he may reason sophistically, and escape unrefuted. He finds that, even on knotty questions of trade and legislation, he can, without reading ten pages, or thinking ten minutes, draw forth long plaudits, and sit down with the credit of having made an excellent speech. . . . It is a fine and true saying of Bacon, that reading makes a full man, talking a ready man, and writing an exact man. The tendency of institutions like those of England is to encourage readiness in public men, at the expense both of fullness and of exactness. The keenest and most vigorous minds of every generation, minds often admirably fitted for the investigation of truth, are habitually employed in producing arguments, such as no man of sense would ever put into a treatise intended for publication, —arguments which are just good enough to be used once, when aided by fluent delivery and pointed language. The habit of discussing questions in this way necessarily reacts on the intelligence of our ablest men, particularly of those who are introduced into Parliament at a very early age, before their minds have expanded to full maturity."

⁴*History of the Unreformed Parliament*, p. 416.

affairs; he must be, if not a great orator, a great explainer—he must be able to expound with perspicuity to a mixed assembly, complicated measures and involved transactions; he must be a great party leader, and have the knowledge of men, the easy use of men, and the miscellaneous sagacity which such eminence necessarily implies; he must be a ready man, a managing man, and an intelligible man; and under no other system of government with which we are acquainted is there any security that all these or an equal number of other important qualities will constantly be found in the ruler of a nation. All these qualities the system of representation which existed in England during the last century secured to the utmost. We might easily run over the names of the eminent statesmen whom it produced, but it is needless: we know that they were eminent and we know that they were many.”

“Eminence” or “excellence” evidently is a matter which at various times can be variously viewed. It may be, as has been said, that the “excellence” is latent and that institutions or electorates have not permitted it to be manifest. Bagehot once declared that history does not blame a statesman for the same things that his contemporaries blame him for. That, to an extent, is true of institutions. It is easy to see the defects in the institutions under which we live, but they may not be the defects which future critics remark. It is not easy to know what to do about them and we are too inclined to think of institutions as a cause and not as an effect of the national temper and character.

“Excellence” can emerge and institutions triumph over their defects if the fancy of the electorate can be struck—if it has confidence in a leader. The fancy can be struck in different ways. Sometimes it is retained and sometimes it is lost as illustrations from recent politics in the United States and abroad will disclose. President Wilson, rightly interpreting the national thought and

boldly insisting on it, was for a considerable period an irresistible leader. But he was always confident of being right and expected the people to agree with him without question. The fancy became mixed with dislike, and repudiation followed. Harding, elevated into office largely because the country wished to put the Democrats out, attempted to wheedle and conciliate. Deficiencies in firmness and leadership were soon apparent. Hoover, known as a man of action and as an efficient administrator, did not act and too frequently seemed to be attempting to conceal facts and to withhold confidence. Franklin Roosevelt has shown a buoyancy and resilience which the people have adored. Indeed, both the Roosevelts have been appealing presidents because of the way they acted as well as because of the policies they proposed or of what they said of the policies; and in what they said they disclosed a capacity to put things in a way that the people could understand or better still, to put them in a way in which, if the people were equally gifted, they themselves would like to put them. That is a political talent of a rare order.

In France, Clemenceau appealed by reason of his intransigent personality—by reason of his positive views and his ferocity in combatting those who did not agree with him. Poincaré—not a man for whom peoples could cheer or because of whom hearts were moved—inspired quiet confidence because, at a critical time, he put his housekeeping abilities at the disposition of a government which had long needed a spring cleaning, a reduction of expense, and a reorganization of domestic service. The dictators themselves must strike the fancy of their peoples or gratify some deep desire. Political eminence may be possible because of widespread despair—*vide* Hitler. Eminence may seem unassailable because from its heights the leader appears partly a legendary, partly a homely figure, an amalgam of Clemenceau and Poincaré—*vide* Mussolini. From recent political history

as many illustrations as there are prominent politicians can be adduced to suggest, albeit vaguely, how success is attained and retained, and how failure is risked and suffered.

Moreover one striking lesson of recent elections both in Europe and in the United States is that millions of voters recognize no binding party allegiance. They are ready to turn against parties and candidates they have supported. The new successful candidates who benefit thereby should have moments of humility when they think that party organization and loyalty will not serve to save them from being driven from office at the next election if a sufficient percentage of the electorate, temporarily under this banner, becomes critical and resentful.

Throughout the world there is a growing agreement that many troubles have been due in considerable measure to lack of courage in statesmen. Too often they have known in their hearts what should be done but have failed to confess their beliefs publicly and have hesitated to press for their acceptance. But the conviction is spreading that such lack of courage does not pay even in respect of being permitted to remain in office a little longer. There are increasing signs that the taking of risks in the name of intelligence is the road not alone to the favorable verdict of history but also to the continued approval of parliaments and electorates.

What has been said contradicts in considerable measure certain dicta which have long been current and which have been blindly relied upon by politicians. Candor is said to be dangerous. Manipulation and compromise are to be preferred to leadership. The use of patronage, attentiveness of national leaders to the building up of local party organizations, and reliance on such support rather than on general approval of a courageous legislative or administrative programme; the outsmarting of the opposition, sometimes by presenting an issue

which will divide it and sometimes by presenting an issue which makes opposition difficult; the throwing of successive sopas to regions in a country or the placation of a series of factions or groups—all these methods of “politics” have caused the formulation of political maxims, the truth of which has been taken for granted until some politician acted in a contrary fashion. But even then the maxims were not deemed false. The fact was simply the exception to the general rule.

There is, unhappily, no modern manual of political tactics. Such a manual could be only tentative. It would have to deal not only with the art of cajoling electorates but also with the art of government, for the successful practitioner of the latter art is greatly advantaged in the former. Continental writers before the advent of democracy attempted such manuals. Machiavelli, Guicciardini and others told the statesmen how to act. In comparison, the modern Continental literature is trivial. Perhaps the least trivial is the somewhat cynical but frequently wise brochure of Louis Barthou, *Le Politique*. In England, Graham Wallas has been the only successor to Sir Henry Taylor. There are American manuals on the methods which municipal bosses have proved successful but little or nothing on the practice of less parochial politics.

To deal with a crisis like the present one, two methods are possible. Baron Munchausen got himself out of the swamp by taking a tight hold on his own whiskers and pulling hard. Perhaps by equally irrational maneuvers there will be recovery from some of the consequences of the present situation. The other method is to take the steps which intelligence seems to indicate as promising some help. The complexity of governmental tasks already referred to makes it inevitable that politicians will rely to a greater and greater extent on “experts.” One may paraphrase Byron’s *English Bards and Scotch Reviewers* and say that a man must

serve his time to any trade save politics, but that politicians are ready made. So long as the business of government was simple, amateurs in office were competent to do what was required of them. But now experts are playing a more and more important rôle, not in determining the proper methods of cajoling or humbugging electorates, but in suggesting how the politicians should use their offices. "It is the business of the politicians," said a well-known English statesman, "to prevent the civil servants from acting so there will be a revolution." The ideas of intelligent people always race along ahead of party programmes. The thoughts of parties and politicians lag badly; but so serious are the demands which modern government makes on intelligence and expertness that the gap is likely to be greatly narrowed. "Politics," wrote Gladstone in the year of his retirement (1894), "are like a labyrinth, from the inner intricacies of which it is even more difficult to find the way of escape, than it was to find the way into them." The intricacies need charts which at first will be rough but which can be perfected.

The problem of the expert in government is an ancient one. It was bitterly debated two thousand years ago and one sometimes wonders whether it is more intelligently debated now. Manifestly in certain matters experts have their way. Congress, for example, would hardly attempt to determine the detailed design of a battleship. If a thousand engineers declared a bridge to be unsafe, the government would not build it; but when a thousand economists urge that a tariff bill is dangerous, the president nevertheless affixes his signature and announces that prosperity is around the corner.

Between these extremes there is a wide area in which expert administrators as distinguished from politicians play greater or less rôles. When in the decisions of the experts there is discernible possible political gain or loss, interference may result. The fact and the degree of

the interference depend on the intelligence and courage of those who have to take responsibility for decisions, and on the interest which those affected by the decisions may disclose. Too infrequently is it realized that the shrewdest politics may consist in not playing politics.

Manifestly, as the area of governmental interference widens and as the problem of how to interfere becomes more technical, expert opinion takes on a new importance. The Secretary of the Treasury does not attempt to pit his ignorance as to the possible yield of an increase in income surtaxes against the knowledge of the permanent officials of the Treasury Department. But American politicians must discuss the problem of unemployment without any exact knowledge as to the extent of the unemployment that exists. There are too many subjects on which politicians think qualitatively rather than quantitatively. Immense advances have nevertheless been made. Exact knowledge is becoming more and more widespread. There is greater and greater reliance upon persons who really know the problems with which they deal and who serve either political party with equal fidelity and equal contempt. The politicians are realizing more and more that their efficiency depends on knowledge of the facts not only in respect of the effects of departmental policies and administration, but in respect of the consequences of alternative policies between which a choice has to be made.

More recently, as I have suggested, the discussion of this problem has been broadened. We now hear much about planning. The drop from the heights of four years ago to the depths of today leads men to say that similar oscillations should be avoided in the future: that a "planned" national economy can level off the peaks of the mountain tops of prosperity and can fill up the valleys of depression. Interest in planning was considerably stimulated by the Russian Five-Year Plan. In all coun-

tries of the world proposals are made to take a leaf out of the Russian book, but to write on it vastly different words.

As yet, however, are business, industry, and government really persuaded that control and direction are necessary? During the War we did have planning. Industrial and military programmes were coördinated. Finance and credit were made to serve national rather than private purposes. But during the War there was an objective that was loyally and enthusiastically approved. That objective was relatively simple. We now have a terrific deflation of business, a staggering amount of unemployment, and general impoverishment and distress. But have we an objective comparable to that of military victory? Have we indeed any agreement on the necessity of attempting to set up a controlled economy?

It must be realized also that capitalist systems consent to dictation only when no other course is open to them. They consent now to some dictation because they hope that their sorry lot may be improved. Will they not attempt to withdraw their consent as soon as their lot becomes measurably better? How popular was the man who in 1928 asserted that stock market prices were too high, that production was outstripping demand, and that deflation was inevitable? It may not be true, in Hegel's cynical phrase, that the only lesson of history is that men learn nothing from history. Men do learn but they learn slowly; and there are as yet few signs that their education has been sufficient to persuade them to consent to the restrictions and direction that even a mildly coördinated programme would require.

One should not lose sight of the fact, furthermore, that the execution of any plan is extraordinarily difficult save in an atmosphere which is intolerant of dissent and under a regime which can operate without bothering about the ordinary checks and balances of representative government. A five-year plan can be car-

ried out in Russia because the government has power to carry it out. A War plan could be carried out in the United States from 1917 to 1919 because there was enthusiasm for an objective and sufficient powers were given to responsible officials to make and execute decisions.

For the moment, however, in the countries of the Western world still under representative institutions, the most that seems possible is an *ad hoc*, uncoördinated tackling of special emergencies. The Brüning government, for example, was like the master of a ship in a violent storm. Its main job was to keep the ship from sinking. There was no time to plan the niceties of navigation in fair weather. In the United States, the banks and the railroads were to be saved from collapse and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was set up to do the job. Our millions of unemployed desired jobs and believed that their distress should be cared for by governmental action rather than by private charity—"the American plan"—but the arbitral machinery which adjusts disputes between conflicting interests within the state gave primacy to the claims of the banks and the railroads. The planning was confined to the alleviation of an evil rather than the preparation of a good. Who can be hopeful, as yet, that behind the latter purpose there will be an effective demand that private privilege be subordinated to the national good?

All this is simply to suggest the difficulty, not the impossibility of national plans. More and more planning seems to be inevitable, but progress will be slow. There will assuredly be far more discussion in the future than in the past by extra-governmental experts of what government should do and of what it should avoid. More and more attention will be paid to the views of those outsiders and those in office, if intelligent officials, will accept as much of this thinking as they dare to. Schemes will be prepared with the support of govern-

ments. The schemers may even be brought in some manner or other into the formal councils of the government. When times become less tense, intelligence and control will become less intense. The pendulum will oscillate many times before it stops at a proper or even a tolerable place in the arc.

Meanwhile, there is one aspect of the matter which is of high importance. Planning is being talked of in national terms. Yet any plans must be carried out in a world of states which are having more and more intimate economic relationships, and the plans must therefore have far-reaching international repercussions. Tariff preference for the British Empire has closed certain markets to other states. As plans are drawn up to advance the well-being of the populations of particular states, we will have economic nationalisms more effective nationally but more dangerous internationally, unless—and this seems more than possible—economic nationalisms can be restrained sufficiently to permit efforts for a new kind of international economic relationship. No longer is it true, as Bismarck once said, that “the task of a statesman consists only in listening carefully whether he can catch an echo of the strides of the Almighty through the events of this world and then to spring forward and seize the hem of his garment.”

FROM HOOVER TO ROOSEVELT

CRISIS government in the United States is considerably more difficult than it is in European countries. A rigid written constitution; the "separation of powers" to the end that, as the Massachusetts Constitution put it, with unconscious irony, we may have a government of laws and not of men; a federal system, and an oligarchy of the judicial robe with doubts as to whether Mr. Dooley was correct in saying that the oligarchy will follow the election returns, are factors which, happily or unhappily, do not limit European parliaments and cabinets. Because of these factors, and because of a highly complex industrial system and widely separated centers of power, crisis government on the Italian or German model is in the United States so difficult as to be, under present conditions, almost inconceivable.

At crucial moments in American history we have been fortunate in having at the head of affairs statesmen who by temperament and inclination were willing to give some leadership and to surmount constitutional and sectional difficulties. Even under such favorable circumstances, however, there have been many delays. The time required to set up the necessary machinery and to procure assent for extraordinary measures has been much longer than under parliamentary systems of government.

For the fact is that the American governmental machine which operates under traditions of excessive localism encourages political cowardice, vacillation, and delay. In the American situation there have been many problems which could be dealt with effectively only by the state governments. In Great Britain, France, or Germany such a division of authority does not exist. Nor are there in European parliaments members who hold strategic posts and who are able, representing their own localities and ideas, to checkmate moves of the national executive. How difficult, for example, is leadership in foreign affairs when well-intentioned, although muddle-headed, proposals of the State Department may be vetoed by the muddled views of the ranking members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

We see the handicap of sectionalism when appointments have to be made. For example, a Reconstruction Finance Corporation is set up. The question is not only: who are the best men to guide that corporation in dealing intelligently with a financial emergency which promises to be devastating? The question is also whether Oklahoma or some other state in that region must be represented on the corporation's directorate. The director may know nothing of finance but he qualifies for the post because he lives in Oklahoma.

Moreover, log-rolling tactics operate in the American Congress to lower morality and mentality with greater frankness and sureness than in most other national legislative assemblies. Sir Arthur Salter, indeed, has argued that one of the most fundamental causes of political impotence, of the inability of government to govern, is "the corrupting influence of a policy of changing tariffs."¹ Nowhere has that corrupting influence

¹ "Whatever the loss involved to the community as a whole by a new tariff, it usually carries a substantial financial advantage for the particular industry protected. The industry organizes pressure because it finds that pays. Collectively, members of a representative assembly are judges; individually they are advocates. Log rolling is the conse-

been more pervasive than in Washington, and hence the acceptance of President Roosevelt's proposal to pollard tariff-making would have far-reaching consequences. Necessary to permit trade bargains and reciprocity agreements, the relinquishment by Congress to the President of power to change tariffs would do much to raise the tone of congressional life. The Economy Bill, passed in the early weeks of the Roosevelt administration was a step in this direction. In declaring that "within the limits of appropriations made by Congress the following classes of persons may be paid a pension," the measure recognized the sound principle that to prevent back-scratching and the degradation of legislative assemblies, expenditures should be proposed and the necessary money should be asked for by the executive. Only this procedure prevents the representative from having to be an advocate as well as a judge. Adherence since 1706 to a similar procedure has protected the House of Commons against the fate which Congress has endured and, sometimes it would appear, cheerfully endured.²

quence, and the national tariff that emerges is not an expression of national policy, wise or foolish, but the sum of competitive—or corruptly concerted—pressures. The whole machine of government has its attention diverted from its proper tasks, and is made unfit for them. At the best the available resources of intelligence and honesty, in even the most fortunate of countries, are barely sufficient to enable it to deal with its essential problems on the basis of a representative system. With the added data of framing a discretionary and variable tariff, the task of making representative government compatible with honesty and efficiency becomes impossible. After many years of international negotiations on commercial policies, I came to the deliberate conclusion that the greatest and most fundamental difficulty was not an international one at all; it was the impotence of national governments. Just so far as one could penetrate the real minds and thoughts of the delegates one saw that what was determining their attitude was not a conception of national policy but a calculation of political pressures. If the national representatives had been masters in their own houses a settlement might have been possible, but on the prevailing basis nothing could be done."—"The Future of Economic Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1932.

² The rule was adopted in 1706 and in 1713 was made a Standing

To offset these deadening influences of the American political system, political courage and a severe emergency must synchronize. They did so synchronize through the War. They did not synchronize down to March 4, 1933. On the existence of an emergency before 1933 there was no dispute. In his political activities, Mr. Hoover seemed unable to avoid association with lean living. He fed the Belgians in 1915 and three years later he persuaded America to "Hooverize." If, on the question of his leadership during the lean months of 1931 and 1932, there was a difference of opinion down to the change of administration, the contrast between Mr. Hoover and Mr. Roosevelt has been such that no one will now maintain that there was leadership in 1932. Moreover, the response of the country during the first year of the Roosevelt administration is a clear indication that from the beginning of the depression the country would willingly have stood a good deal of leadership.

The conditions of political life and thought in the United States which are antagonistic to political leadership have never been analyzed as adequately as they should be. I have already mentioned a few outstanding matters. The astronomical nature of our government which gives executives and legislators offices for fixed terms is of high importance. If the United States had had a parliamentary system, for example, there would have been a change of administration as a result of the congressional elections of November, 1930. Indeed there might well have been a change by the independent action of the old Congress so that a more vigorous offensive could have been conducted in those elections. An interregnum of four months had to elapse between

Order (66):—"This House will receive no petition for any sum relating to public service, or proceed upon any motion for a grant or charge upon the public revenue, whether payable out of the Consolidated Fund or out of money to be provided by Parliament unless recommended from the Crown."

the presidential election of 1932 and the coming into power of the new administration. For these and other reasons, American politicians have proceeded on the theory that speaking out is dangerous; that leadership is risky. Parliamentary politicians like MacDonald, Brüning, and Poincaré must continually satisfy their parliaments and their cabinet associates. No matter what their temperament or their party situation, they are unable to be as inarticulate on policy as an American president can frequently be. This is not to say that pussyfooting is discoverable only in the United States. Far from it. But as we have achieved bigger and better businesses, bigger and better skyscrapers, and bigger and better unemployment, we have also achieved bigger and better pussyfooting.

Moreover, it may be argued that the American people, engrossed by sectional interests and concerns and influenced perhaps by the levelling effects of the democratic dogma, are somewhat more insensible to distinction than are European peoples. We may like it or not, but the plain fact is that frequently a man who stands out above his associates is viewed with suspicion. So long as prosperity was with us the country rode on the tidal wave of reaction against the leadership which we had during the War. When that conflict was over and when the country revolted against approving the treaty settlement, mental relaxation in politics was desired. The country did not want to think. It did not wish to be startled or led but only to be let alone. We had mental relaxation. From 1921 to, say, 1929, a specious kind of prosperity made the people suppose that there was some divine correlation between lack of thinking on public problems and material well-being. In economic theory, Gresham's Law declares that bad money drives good money out of circulation. There is a similar law in respect of non-economic matters. Bad newspapers, for example, drive good newspapers out of existence; and bad

politicians, who even though they are devoid of intelligence and courage can boast of transient successes, make it difficult, if not impossible, for a political leader to get a hearing.

The American political canvas has one other peculiarity. Not content with local sectional divisions, irresponsible political parties, and disparate economic interests, we have group alignments. These groups have to be placated. The Anti-Saloon League, for example, stretched its tentacles into congressional districts and terrorized representatives and senators. I select this organization as an example of what are called "pressure groups," not because of any leaning towards dampness or aridity, but because for a considerable period the Anti-Saloon League was the most spectacular and successful of the many similar organizations which function in American politics. For the most part European systems are free from these group Frankensteins. In the United States we must deal gently with them. Legislation must run the gauntlet of opposition of these groups; and a good deal of legislation is passed because it is desired by one of the groups and does not interfere materially with the interests of another group, even though it may be against the interests of the whole community.

Historically the function of a legislative assembly was to fight on behalf of the people against threatened dynastic or executive oppression. Now the function is two-fold—first, as argued above, to adjust interests; and second to collaborate with an executive who is responsive to public opinion, and who needs legislation in order to perform his overwhelming administrative tasks. The function of parliament—and the fact is inadequately realized—is performed well in almost direct proportion to the strength and ability of the executive.

When certain interests clash so sharply that reconciliation and arbitration are impossible, we have ex-

traordinary regimes which are based on force and which either discard parliamentary institutions or relegate them to the limbo of gesture instead of gestion. The other solution is for representative institutions to justify themselves by permitting the leadership which an emergency requires. In the United States, such a solution is impeded by the factors which I have enumerated. During the War we could have executive leadership, the mobilization of all the forces of the government, and the patriotic subordination of sectional interests and groups. For a considerable period we were reluctant to permit the government to take comparable measures against economic depression. We mobilized to put men on the Western Front but we were indifferent to mobilization when a far larger number of men were jobless. In a sense the American government has been in a hobbledehoy stage so far as constitutional crisis government in peace times is concerned. Fortunately the country was that on March 4, 1933, Mr. Roosevelt began to lead. The powers which Congress has granted to him are far more extended than those which were allowed President Wilson. "Presidential Dictatorship in the United States"³ is today far more of a reality than it was during the War.

There is one important atmospheric difference between crisis government to deal with war and crisis government to deal with an economic emergency, but it is a difference which, in the United States, has been largely obliterated. In time of war there is a companionate marriage of Capitalism and Labor. The necessity of a united front against the enemy is so universally admitted that group or individual interests are temporarily and willingly subordinated. National unity is the desideratum. Criticism and opposition become weak,

³ That is the title of an article which I published in *The Quarterly Review* (London) for January, 1919, describing Mr. Wilson's authority and the manner in which he used it.

and a government may have some justification in regarding opposition as factitious and, in Dr. Johnson's sense of the word, as unpatriotic. Few would deny, for example, that, given England's objectives, the Lloyd George coalition of 1916-18 was an excellent government. Few would maintain that the coalition from 1918-22 was as good a government as England should have had. Few now, not its beneficiaries, would deny that Mr. MacDonald's National Government has lowered the tone of public discussion and has sacrificed principle to compromise, or would maintain that it serves as much more than camouflage for a Tory administration.

In the United States there has been the interesting spectacle of a crisis government that could take more extreme measures than our War government or the British post-war coalitions. National unity has not been measurably less unified than during the War. The whole-hearted support of Labor has been secured because of the hope for re-employment and because of the exceptional aggrandizement in numbers and prestige which Labor organizations would enjoy if the recovery measures were implemented. Because capitalists realized that the foundations of their structure were crumbling and that only the government could attempt new shoring their support has been secured. The capitalists were in no position to demand that the shoring be of a particular character. They could hardly suggest, much less dictate terms.

The support of public opinion has been so general and even so passionate that while dissent has not been penalized, it has been unpopular. Undoubtedly many industrialists and business men chafe under their codes or other legislation applying to them; but no matter how painful the chafing, for the first year of the "New Deal" they suffered in almost complete silence. They hesitated to follow their past practice of going for relief to the Great Healer—the judiciary. It is by no means

certain that the healer would not give some measure of relief but the sufferers knew that such visits would be extremely unpopular. In England, the National Government sought to escape criticism by giving offices to Opposition party remnants. In the United States, the Opposition party for months did not dare to criticize—so manifest was the national unity; and at the turn of the first year most of the critical voices were raised from the extreme Right or the extreme Left.

I do not propose here to discuss in any detail the powers which have been given the President or the policies underlying the numerous alphabetically described agencies that have been set up.⁴ There is already a fairly extensive library explaining the New Deal and expounding the plans of the New Dealers. I am concerned only with certain aspects of the phenomenon.

⁴ A list to date appeared in the *New York Times*, Mar. 4, 1934. The more important are the following:

AAA—Agricultural Adjustment Administration—Plans curtailment of certain basic farm commodities, in order to cut down existing surplus, and makes compensatory payments to farmers who agree to reduce acreage.

CCC—Civilian Conservation Corps—Enrolls and employs personnel to carry on conservation tasks in national forests.

CCC—Commodity Credit Corporation—Buys and sells farm and other commodities, loans or borrows thereon; assists in crop reduction and marketing in connection with relief plans.

CSB—Central Statistical Board—Effects coordination of statistical services incident to purposes of NRA.

CWA—Civil Works Administration—Offshoot of Public Works Administration; provides emergency employment on local improvement projects as substitute for "dole."

DLB—Deposit Liquidation Board—Makes advances to liquidating agents against assets so as to release funds for distribution to depositors of closed banks.

EC—Executive Council—Organization of President's consultants created to prevent duplication of reconstruction activities.

EHC—Emergency Housing Corporation—Engages directly in slum clearance and erection of low-cost housing; assists public bodies and others in such projects.

EHFA—Electric Home and Farm Authority—Serves in connection with TVA in equipping Tennessee Valley for distribution of electricity.

FACA—Federal Alcohol Control Administration—Carries out provi-

Undeniably the most outstanding one is this: that the American government now functions with none of the vacillation and timidity which apologists for dictatorships maintain are inseparable from representative institutions. The phenomenon has been more warmly applauded than was Mr. Wilson's war government. Then the country followed him but without, I think, anything like the personal loyalty and affection which have been bestowed on Mr. Roosevelt.

In lectures which he delivered at Columbia University in 1907, and which were later published under the title *Constitutional Government in the United States*, Mr. Wilson set forth in general terms his philosophy of the

sions of approved codes and marketing agreements to control liquor traffic.

FCA—Farm Credit Administration—Makes advances to agricultural producers and to agricultural credit corporations

FCT—Federal Coordinator of Transportation—Proposes methods by which groups of steam and electric railways may avoid waste and unnecessary duplication of facilities.

FDIC—Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation—Purchases, holds and liquidates assets of national banks closed by Comptroller and insures up to \$2,500 each deposit in member banks of the Federal Reserve System and non-member participating banks.

FERA—Federal Emergency Relief Administration—Cooperates with and makes grants to individual states for relief; administers Federal Civil Works and Surplus Relief Corporation.

FESB—Federal Employment Stabilization Board—Coöperates in formulating methods of advance planning; advises on trend of employment and volume of construction.

FHLB—Federal Home Loan Bank Board—Includes as members building loan associations, savings banks and mortgage institutions which subscribed for stock; loans are made for building.

HOLC—Home Owners Loan Corporation—Designated to aid owners of mortgaged homes; exchanges its bonds for home mortgages of less than \$14,000.

JEB—Joint Economy Board—Suggests economies, composed of budget and planning branch chief, War Department budget advisors, and ten army and navy officers.

NEC—National Emergency Council—Composed of Attorney-General, Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Budget Director and other executives.

NLB—National Labor Board—Deals with labor controversies arising under codes.

NRA—National Recovery Administration—Arranges codes with pur-

Presidency, and it was on this philosophy that he acted.

"Leadership and control," he said, "must be lodged somewhere; the whole art of statesmanship is the art of bringing the several parts of government into effective coöperation for the accomplishment of particular common objects—and party objects at that." The President is "the political leader of the nation or has it in his choice to be. The nation as a whole has chosen him and is conscious that it has no other political spokesman. His is the only voice in national affairs. Let him once win the admiration and confidence of the country and no other single force can withstand him, no combination of forces will easily overpower him. . . . If he rightly interpret the national thought and boldly insist upon it he is irresistible; and the country never feels the zest of action so much as when its President is of such insight and calibre. Its instinct is for unified action and it craves a single leader. . . ."

"The President may also, if he will, stand within the party counsels and use the advantage of his power and

pose of eliminating unfair competition, lessening unemployment by shortening hours, and increasing minimum wages.

PAB—Petroleum Administration Board—Supervises production of crude and refined oil and inquires into violations.

PIA—Petroleum Industry Administration—Administers NRA oil code; sets price limits.

PSAC—Non-member Preferred Stock Advisory Committee—Functions in relation to RFC purchases of preferred stock, capital notes and debentures of banks.

PWA—Public Works Administration—Makes allotments from the \$3,300,000,000 fund authorized by Congress for public construction, conservation and slum clearance projects.

RFC—Reconstruction Finance Corporation—Aids in financing agriculture, commerce, industry; facilitates exports by loans to banks, railroads, etc.; buys bank preferred stock.

SAB—Science Advisory Board—Coördinates scientific activities of various government departments.

TVA—Tennessee Valley Authority—Controls development of Muscle Shoals and other water power resources in Tennessee Valley and plans to develop region as economic unit.

USES—United States Employment Service—Designed to develop a national system of employment offices.

personal force to control its actual programmes. He may be both the leader of his party and the leader of the nation or he may be one or the other. If he lead the nation his party can hardly resist him. His office is anything he has the sagacity and force to make it.

"The President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can. His capacity will set the limit, and if Congress be overborne by him it will be no fault of the makers of the Constitution—it will be through no lack of constitutional powers on its part, but only because the President has the nation behind him and Congress has not. He has no means of compelling Congress except through public opinion."

Mr. Wilson acted on that philosophy and demonstrated that it was sound. Mr. Roosevelt has redemonstrated its soundness. I select a few phases of the demonstration which are pertinent to a consideration of the American 1934 model of crisis government.

Not the least interesting phase of the recovery programme is that critics of the Left describe it as Fascism and critics of the Right describe it as Socialism—clashing verdicts which cancel each other. The country's willing acceptance of the programme is a striking indication of the change of popular temper which came about almost overnight. I do not mean only that there was gloom and pessimism before March, 1933, whereas since that month there has been cheerfulness and optimism. The change has been more fundamental than that. Under Mr. Hoover, American public opinion was hide-bound by clichés. It still seemed to maintain that despite the kaleidoscopic changes in the world, it was unnecessary to think in terms other than those of "rugged American individualism," whatever that meant, and in terms suitable to a new and different world which required more and more governmental interference. That attitude has been largely done away with. Under the aegis of the National Industrial Recovery Act, for ex-

ample, thousands of American business men went to Washington and participated in endeavors which a few months before they would have denounced as socialistic, paternalistic, radical, un-American, and as blasting at the Rock of Ages of American institutions. These gentlemen—and I saw a great many of them in action—were simply a concrete manifestation of the great change which came over American thinking. To put it in a word, the country began to realize that it was un-American to have ten or twelve millions of unemployed and that it was no criticism of methods of getting them back to work to say that those methods were unprecedented and, therefore, un-American.

Much of the change has come about because of the personality of the man who sits in the White House. In considerable measure the metamorphosis has been due to the fact that he seems to be gifted with a greater knowledge of political psychology than any other statesman of whom I have seen any public record. Irrespective of particular policies—of whether one regrets the emphasis on national action and the subordination of international policy; whether in money matters one is a Tory or willing boldly to experiment and seek a revised monetary system—in short, no matter what one's views may be on specific items of American policy, I suggest that critics and enemies, malevolent neutrals and candid friends may find common ground in believing that the President has been really amazing in his ability so to act that public confidence is overwhelming and that public dissent is minimized. The confidence is in him, but it is also in the future. In the progress of nations, confidence is a pearl of great price. Its possession by Italy is one of the fountains of Mussolini's strength; France, lacking it, is uncertain, domestically as well as internationally; and the severest critic of the purposes and acts of the Third Reich must grant that Hitler's Ger-

many has more self-confidence than had Brüning's Germany.

In bringing confidence about, President Roosevelt has, I suggest, been aided by his unwillingness to formulate any rigid doctrine. Politics and political action are now such a complicated business that more than ever before they need an open mind. Problems transform themselves almost overnight. Old formulas become obsolete. New formulas can only be accepted tentatively until it is discovered whether or not they will work.

On this premise one may hesitate to accept any programme which emanates from a prophet over whose doctrines and their interpretations the disciples of the prophet will have interminable arguments. This applies equally to Communism and Fascism. Of course it can be said that there has been in Russia some modification of the law as handed down by Marx and as re-announced by the makers of the Revolution; and that in Italy there has been some experimentation with the forms of the corporate state which has been liberally advertised even though it has not been actually realized.

The plain truth, however, is that the nature of the times in which we live and of the problems confronting us warns against blind adherence to a body of doctrine formulated in other times and in the light of other problems. This is true whether the doctrines emanate from Jefferson or Karl Marx: whether they are put in phrases such as "less government in business" and "the sacred right of private property" or in the more complicated language of economic determinism. Fortunately the American situation has been tackled without blind adherence to any dogmas or doctrines and under a leadership that is intellectually unafraid, and the universal hope will be that it has not been intellectually rash. Renan declared that "you cannot chain the mind of man. Tie it to a text and it will escape in the commentary"; and he

might have added, what Mr. Roosevelt has seemed to realize, that, when it escapes in the commentary, it is distracted from an examination of the measures that are being tried. Energies are frittered away in dialectics.

It is sometimes said that one of the obstacles to strong government in the United States is the size of the electorate. Whatever basis such an argument once had has now been weakened. By an ancient standard, 120,000,000 people are not too many. Indeed hardly any number would be too many. In a much quoted dictum, Aristotle defined the size a state could reach and continue to have efficient government. Its population, he declared, should not be too large for it to gather within the range of a statesman's voice. The President of the United States can now sit in his study at a desk on which there is a single microphone with a wire leading from it. His voice can carry to every home in the land.⁵ The entire electorate can be present at public meetings in the same way that the citizens of a New England township or of a Swiss canton can attend their town meeting or their *Landsgemeinde* in order to listen to a discussion of problems affecting them. Modern invention has made a contribution of such tremendous importance to the workings of the processes of democracy that many of its consequences are as yet by no means clear. Certain it is, however, that distance has been annihilated and that the whole nation can be in attendance when a public man speaks.

Perhaps the most important method of public discussion will henceforth be by the radio. Statesmen will more and more appeal to the ears rather than the eye, by the spoken word rather than the printed page. That method has the advantage of getting views before the people in a reasonably complete form if the people care to listen. Apart from the metropolitan press, too few

⁵ Although in a taxicab at the time, I was able to hear the President's (March 5, 1934) speech before the NRA Code Authorities.

newspapers find space to print in extenso the statements or speeches of public men. They must abbreviate and summarize. To be sure, the radio listener can abbreviate by shutting off; but that rarely happens if what is being said is genuine and worth while. To be sure, also, listeners may have incomplete or even incorrect ideas of the personality and sincerity behind the words. They may be unduly lured or repelled by the timbre of the voice or by pronunciation; but such distortion, while of a different character, is perhaps no more serious than that which results from the printed page.

Of course it is far more difficult nowadays than it was yesteryear for government to have good electorates. The sensational press and the radio mean that prejudice as well as intelligence is transmitted. The problems to be dealt with become more and more complicated. Theodore Roosevelt's battle for railroad legislation, for example, raised issues a good deal more comprehensible to the people than do the issues of agricultural relief, the reform of the banking system, and the formulation of new international economic policies. These complicated problems, when they are dealt with by any one other than the specialist speaking to other specialists, must be greatly simplified; and in the simplification there will come assertions and denials which cannot be the whole truth and which must frequently be untruths. But by reason of the fact that the problems with which governments have to deal are now so complicated, adequate explanations to the electorate are more necessary.

It may be true that only a tiny percentage of the population will ever understand the mechanics of the Domestic Allotment Plan, or the security which underlies the Federal Reserve notes, or the issues involved in an embargo on arms to the Far East. That, however, is no reason why an attempt should not be made to explain the problems. It is simply a reason why greater attention should be paid to the way in which the problems

are explained and why the explanation should be planned and continuous rather than thoughtless and sporadic. In recent years the charge has been more and more frequently made that political discussion is futile; that the technical character of the problems to be dealt with; the increasing power of party organizations, and the preoccupation of the people with business interests and the enjoyment of their leisure have combined to rob politics of its interest. To an extent that is true only when the politicians themselves are uninteresting and lack courage. They can inject vigor into democracy, but to do this they must remember that it is better to fight and risk losing than not to fight and thus seem to escape defeat. Only in the former case will the people stand by them. Politics, in short, need not be robbed of interest, and perhaps the radio, in the exquisitely expert use of which President Roosevelt enjoys unapproached primacy, will not be another thief but a returner of stolen goods.

These are some of the reasons why the American government is dealing with the economic crisis in an atmosphere different from that surrounding the government which made war. Congress had handed over the purse strings to the President: it has made him the dictator of the economic life of the country. What modern ruler was ever given greater power than to fix the gold content of the currency? For a comparison one must go back to the age of the royal despots.

The authority that Congress has granted to the President, it can withdraw. To be sure the President could veto the repealing bill and two-thirds' majorities in both houses of Congress would be necessary to override his veto. It is accurate, therefore, to say that powers which Congress could grant by bare majorities may be retained by the President if he can control one more than one-third of the members of either House. But who would believe that, save in an extreme case, the President would veto a repealing measure? Unless he

were clearly on the right side of the issue his moral authority would be gone. That kind of a struggle with Congress would be most foolhardy.

In sum, the American system of government—in normal times so leisurely and so checked and balanced—has evolved a crisis government as strong as is necessary. A few fearsome spirits profess to be shocked and alarmed. They should read the seventieth number of *The Federalist* and they would learn that the makers of that mine of political wisdom clearly saw that republican governments might be compelled to become energetic governments.

“Energy in the Executive,” wrote Hamilton, “is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman story knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the tyranny and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome. . . .

“The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first unity; secondly duration; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support; fourthly, competent powers.

“The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican sense are, first, a due dependence on the people; secondly, a due responsibility.”

The energy—let no one mistake it—is to a greater extent than was the case during the War the energy of the President himself. He has under him Cabinet members, various alphabetical boards, and chiefs of emergency administrations. But his own hands hold the reins very tightly. Innumerable decisions on matters, which in comparison with other major issues may be properly described as minor or even trivial, have been made in the White House.

Under other systems of government, normal administrative decisions to be legal must be made through machinery which enables those politically accountable for the decisions to understand what is proposed and to determine whether they wish to accept responsibility. The British executive, for example, acts through the King in Council; and the Privy Council includes those who are politically responsible. Unless they—the Cabinet—consent, the legal machinery does not work. Administrative decisions in France and in Germany are taken by presidential decrees with ministerial counter-signature. These countries have Cabinet government and this means, with varying gradations, that the executive power is exercised through a group rather than through an individual. It may be that a prime minister like Lloyd George or Poincaré will dominate a cabinet so that for a time there is something approaching the personal government we have in the United States. But the Prime Minister must consult, the Cabinet must approve, and the political responsibility is joint rather than individual.

In the United States, with respect to many of the normal functions of government, the President must act politically and personally rather than institutionally and legally. He is not really a Chief of the Executive. That he should not be was deliberately intended by Congress, which conferred a great deal of power on the secretaries and other officials. Yet because he appoints

to these offices, the President, even though he possesses no legal control over decisions, is held politically responsible for all acts of omission and commission. These he can influence only by influencing the persons who perform the acts. If the persons go counter to the President's wishes he can remove them from office.

Elsewhere executive power has not been so segregated legally as it has in the United States. Elsewhere, also, power is shared politically; here it is concentrated in a single person. Not the least noteworthy aspect of crisis government in the United States is that the crisis powers are legally concentrated and are, of course, politically concentrated as well. The result is what is described as the "tremendous burden" of the presidential office. That burden, to repeat, is far heavier than during the War. For the first year of the Roosevelt administration it was not shared to any appreciable degree with the Cabinet or with the Executive Council.

In addition to energy in the executive, Hamilton called for "safety in the republican sense" which he declared to mean "due dependence on the people" and "due responsibility." When some years from now the historian devotes his attention to the period in which we live, he will give much, if not chief, attention to the fact that dissent has been almost non-existent. It has not been penalized, although on occasion enthusiasm for policies has been so warm that criticism of dissenters has been heated. The press has been free, but some newspapers have hesitated to be outspoken because they did not wish to lose support from advertisers or readers. Certain editors might swear privately but in their editorial columns they used pleasant epithets. Stopping short of approval, editorially they pretended to understand while privately they maintained that they could not understand. Not until the first year ended did criticism come into the open.

There was, in the Autumn of 1933, a silly controversy

over the Freedom of the Press. It was alleged that the then pending Newspaper Code would limit the Freedom of the Press. Of course nothing was more remote from reality and certain of the allegers could more appropriately have been introspective on their intellectual integrity. Indeed, on one occasion, President Roosevelt said that he was unhappy because of the fact that criticism was so minor and faint. In lacking criticism, he risked being a victim of his own popularity which had been gained because of his human qualities and because of his legislative programme.

"An autocrat," said Mr. Dooley, "is a ruler that does what th' people wants an' takes th' blame f'r it. A constitootional ixicutive, Hinnissy, is a ruler that does as he dam pleases an' blames th' people." Both definitions must be considerably qualified and amplified before they are applicable to Franklin Roosevelt.

VI

THE WORLD: CRISIS WITHOUT GOVERNMENT

IN the international sphere there has been not only no dictator, but not even a constitutional executive. Effective governing organs have been lacking. The only machinery has been rudimentary. Nevertheless, the post-war international world has differed from the pre-war international world. The mere existence of what is described as the collective system for preserving peace distinguishes the two eras. The members of the League of Nations agreed to settle disputes by peaceable means; all nations limited their rights to make war (Kellogg Pact). The League states undertook to use joint action against a peace-breaker. They admitted that a collective body shall sit in judgment on whether a state is defending itself or is guilty of aggression. Those obligations are as important psychologically as they are practically; and in the latter sense there is a considerable amount of effective international machinery for the administration of matters of common concern—traffic in narcotics and in women and children, public health, communications, transport, etc.

It is natural that those interested in a better international order should stress spectacular failures rather than modest successes. Since the Peace Conference there has been a succession of international problems that

clamored to be dealt with, but no governmental machinery adequate to tackle them. Disarmament is a case in point. Since the Armistice, nations have moved toward disarmament as the pilgrims of the Middle Ages journeyed toward Compostella—by taking two steps forward and one to the rear. In 1931 it was encouraging that all the nations of the world were pledged to disarmament and were dealing with the problem not by framing pious wishes but by drawing up definite plans, by preparing technical studies, and by attempting the improvement of the peace machinery so that armed forces would be less necessary. But as the Disarmament Conference proceeded, it seemed to be arranging for the weapons that would be used in the next war, and to be indifferent to its real task—the limitation of the weapons now in existence on the theory that there would not be another war. It foundered on the rock of German equality; Germany left the League of Nations, and a general race of armaments began, with profligate American naval construction largely unchallenged because it was done in the name of public works and a re-employment programme. A half billion for cruisers at a time when the country's educational appropriations have been cut by that amount, when hundreds of thousands of children have no schools, and when tens of thousands of teachers are not paid even the pitiful amounts which are less than the NRA minima for unskilled labor! How the admirals must chortle!

At Genoa in 1922, at Geneva in 1927, and in London in 1933 full dress international conferences proved impotent to curb nascent economic nationalism. As Mark Twain once said of New England's weather: "Every one complains of it but no one does anything about it." So there were complaints of rising tariffs and more rigorous quotas but there was no international machinery that could do anything. The rudimentary international government at Geneva was unable to cope with the Man-

churian problem and Japan left the League. These are the spectacular failures.

Perhaps their avoidance was impossible without revolutionary changes in methods of thinking and in national attitudes. As has been truly said, every attempt to translate international interdependence "into institutional terms is met by the ghost of the sovereign state still seeking selfishly to retain in its hands the ruins of its empire." Unless this ghost is laid the outlook is dark for "the sovereignty of the state means anarchy." The only hope is for greater obedience to the legal imperatives which emanate from international bodies—the League Council or conferences. These agencies, however, are hampered by the rule of unanimity and it is the essence of political progress that such a rule leads only to disaster. The insistence on freedom from control which is made by sovereign states is comparable to the insistence on autonomy which is sometimes made by great groups within a state—by trade unions or by churches. But as I have argued above, in discussing the basis of constitutional government within a state, conflicting interests must have a measure of agreement on fundamentals and the losers must have sufficient confidence in the fairness of the arbitral machinery of government to consent peacefully to lose when the decisions go against them. There is no such agreement or confidence in the international sphere.

One can draw up an impressive list of limitations which, internationally, states have been willing to accept. The sovereign state, as able an architect of ruin as the world has known, is less sovereign than it has been but it is still so sovereign that the world has no government to deal with its crises. For the acceptance of such a government a revolutionary change in thinking and in acting would be necessary. "I do not see how," says Mr. Wells, "we can avoid the conclusion that the search for world peace, since it is a project to subordinate our

sovereign government to something larger, comes near to or passes the legal definition of treason. Moreover, the necessary conditions for world peace bring us into sharp conflict not simply with the ordinary patriot, but with much that is regarded by large sections of people as current morality. And, as a further obstacle, such views must necessarily antagonize big interests entrenched behind tariff walls and currency advantages. A real world peace movement must be a revolutionary movement in politics, finance, industrialism, and the daily life alike. It is not a proposed change in certain formal aspects of life; it is a proposal to change the whole of life.”¹ At various times one is pessimistic or optimistic about the future. This is according to one’s state of mind. It is also according to the news of the day. When the Locarno pacts were drawn up, when relations between France and Germany were universally declared to be improving; when M. Briand and Dr. Stresemann—the foreign ministers of states which not many months before had been at each other’s throats—held their love feast at Thoiry, hopes ran high. When there were marked changes in the international situation, hopes naturally became low.

Post-war efforts to curb international anarchy have faced one handicap which was of a special nature and which in part explains, even though it does not excuse, their failure. European and world relationships have been vastly different from pre-war relationships. In 1914, eight great powers had practically the entire surface of the world under their control and influence. Six of these powers were European states—Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia. Two were non-European states—the United States and Japan. China and South America were outside this group but in world politics their voices counted for little.

¹ H. G. Wells, *The Way the World is Going*.

After the Peace Conference, however, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia were no longer factors in influencing European policy. All three empires had crumbled in the sense that they were under new regimes and one of the empires had been carved up territorially. The other two had not suffered such dismemberment but Russia had withdrawn into Asia; and Germany, by reason of forced disarmament, crushing reparation bills, and excommunication from the society of states, did not have to be listened to. Great Britain's European position was uncertain because of the increasingly independent and differing interests of the dominions. The United States entered the War, profoundly influenced the Paris settlement, and then withdrew from Europe. In 1914 France and Italy were weaker than their neighbors, Germany and Austria-Hungary, but by reason of the War they gained vastly both in territory and strength. France's dominance on the Continent was tempered only by Great Britain's uncertain interferences in European politics. Italy was frequently indifferent. The new European states could not be ignored and had to be consulted. Their statesmen had to improvise foreign policies. There were no long standing ones which could be modified and carried on.

After all, the foreign policy of a country is little more than its traditional policies, sharpened to protect political and economic interests which are believed to need protection, or dulled because the interests are not at the moment worth protection or because temporary regard is had for Burke's magnificent and profoundly true dictum: "Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom." In the post-war milieu, the diplomatic policies of various states were likely to be extreme; and when they were not extreme they were likely to be vague and uncertain. In this milieu the first essays at international government were greatly handicapped. Is it to

be wondered that they were unable to surmount the handicap?

That milieu, unsatisfactory as it was, came to an end with the advent of Hitler, and Hitler—the point cannot be too heavily stressed, was in large measure the product of the international situation. Before him, French policy—sometimes retarded but never changed—had had one aim: to keep Germany in a state of nonage. France sought her objectives through a territorial weakening of Germany, the occupation of the Rhineland, disarmament of the Central Powers, the sanctions of the League of Nations, the encouragement of a hostile ring of satellite states, the collection of reparations, and even a reinsurance treaty—the abortive Anglo-American guarantee of France against a German attack. Some concessions were made to Germany, but they were always too late and too grudging to do any real good. With Hitler, Germany became resurgent and militant, which meant that French policy had failed. It has been rather cruelly said of England that no race is as generous in forgiving those whom it has wronged. I suggest that one reason why the European scene became so gloomy in 1933 is that the French were not sufficiently generous in forgiving those by whom they believed themselves to have been wronged.

In short, international anarchy is a powerful contributing factor not only to extreme and unintelligent measures by constitutional governments, but to the setting up of extraordinary regimes. That Germany is a case in point should be accepted without question. Parliamentary government in Germany had worked as well as it could have been expected to work. It was weakened because it was opposed by determined minorities both on the Right and on the Left. The National Socialists made capital out of this and out of the widespread and intense unemployment. But more important

was the fact that the National Socialists gained enormously by reason of the treatment which Germany received from the Great Powers. The economic and political servitudes of the Treaty of Versailles and the refusal of the signatories of that treaty to mitigate, with greater fullness and rapidity, the onerous conditions imposed on Germany were perhaps more responsible than any other cause for the rise in strength of the National Socialists. Who will say that greater statesmanship outside of Germany could not have prevented Hitler?

More than this: the spectacle of the League's ineptitude in dealing with Japan was an example which did much to encourage immoderate elements in Germany. Indeed, von Papen, in his notorious "cannon fodder" speech asked in effect by what right members of the League of Nations protested against Germany's demand for arms equality—against a purely moral claim—when at the moment they were not taking the measures which they were bound to take under the Covenant to restrain Japan's resort to force, if not to war, and her disregard of treaty obligations. Hence, to repeat, the international situation was in principal measure responsible for Hitler, and the advent of Hitler profoundly changed the international situation. The cleavage between France and her supporters and the Third Reich is sharper than ever before, and cannot be dealt with by the League, for Germany has withdrawn from that body. "Newer" diplomatic methods will be subordinated. The old diplomacy will be more heavily relied upon.

Down to the London Economic Conference, however, "newer" diplomatic methods were said to have supplanted "older" methods. There is high authority for the belief that the expressions "new diplomacy" and "old diplomacy" are of no real significance. M. Jules Cambon has argued that what changed was "the outside or the decorative aspect of diplomacy" and that

everything else was the same. This may be true; but the fact is that a change of the outward aspects of diplomacy is not without importance. The conduct of negotiations through ministers and ambassadors, accredited to particular countries, was after the war limited in considerable degree to preliminaries or to routine matters of little immediate importance. Entirely apart from their recollections of the maneuvers and dissimulations which were thought to be characteristic of diplomacy by correspondence, peoples had lost faith in career diplomats, and hence gave their approval to the conference method. Foreign ministers were unwilling to rely on their diplomatic representatives. They insisted on personal contacts with each other. The problems to be dealt with have been so complex, so important, and so immediate that foreign secretaries refused to leave them to envoys extraordinary or ministers plenipotentiary and relegated them to the rôles of ordinary persons with no powers at all.

Nor were prime ministers as willing as formerly to give their foreign ministers free hands. This has been true apart from certain special situations when the principal European prime ministers did not have complete confidence in their cabinet colleagues to whom international matters were nominally entrusted. For examples, in 1929, Mr. MacDonald looked suspiciously and jealously at Mr. Henderson; Dr. Brüning, even before the Anschluss, did not have complete confidence in Dr. Curtius; M. Briand's presence in the French cabinet did not lessen M. Laval's task of always having a safe majority in the Chamber of Deputies. This was a lack of confidence in individuals and a passing phenomenon; but generally speaking, prime ministers have frequently insisted on handling foreign policy. Thus was explained, at least in part, the vast amount of foreign travel which certain prime ministers enjoyed at government expense. We witnessed a new kind of diplo-

macy which was described as "*diplomatie itinérante*." There is no need to be too specific in respect to the itineraries. Only one President of the Council, Il Duce, stayed at home and he sent Signor Grandi to pay return calls. M. Laval visited Washington. Since the Congress of Berlin he has been the first French prime minister to visit the German capital. M. Briand attended the Washington Conference in 1921 but M. Laval was the first French prime minister to come to the United States simply to meet the American President and to discuss the possibilities of collaboration between their two countries.

For many of these political journeys there were special reasons. But, apart from special circumstances, modern science had made the methods of the old diplomacy completely obsolete. The invention of the telegraph was the first factor. Questions could be quickly referred to foreign offices for further instructions. That meant dwindling responsibility and discretion for the envoy. Before the War there was little disposition to use the telephone and in comparison with present day practices there was much leisureliness. President Hoover could, to all intents and purposes, be in Paris with Mr. Mellon for the discussion of the French reservations to the moratorium proposal. He could consult with the League Council concerning its attitude toward the Manchurian imbroglio. In both cases (as with the London Economic Conference) the dangers of two centers of discussions and decisions soon became apparent. But a world which permits telephonic communication and fast travel must have a new diplomacy. When Sir Robert Peel heard that William IV wished him to be Prime Minister he left Italy at once. Travelling post haste he arrived in London three weeks after the summons had been sent. That was a world in which the old diplomacy could function and that world has gone. In fourteen years the League Council held seventy-five sessions. An adding

machine would be necessary to total the other meetings of statesmen and government experts.

The number of conferences held since the conclusion of the Peace is as high as it is because of an insistent public demand that the politicians show some activity. Since the public had to be made to think that something was going to be done, the statesmen agreed to meet, recessed to meet again, and adjourned to meet yet again, knowing full well that the only possibility of agreement was as to the time and place of the new meeting. The places were chosen with regard for the *amour propre* of particular countries, the convenience of the attendants, and the climate in various seasons of the year. The schoolboy who studies history will now have to think of European capitals and watering places in terms of the conferences to which they were hospitable during the post-war period: Spā, Cannes, Geneva, Locarno, Lausanne, The Hague, London, etc. etc.

“ ‘Political Inventiveness’ in general falls far short of the originality displayed in other fields than politics by the citizens of progressive or civilized states. The immense importance attached by modern thinkers to representative government is partly accounted for by its being almost the sole constitutional discovery or invention unknown to the citizens of Athens or of Greece. In no part of English history is the tardy development of constitutional ideas more noteworthy or paradoxical than during the Victorian era. It was an age which added little to the world’s scanty store of political or constitutional ideas. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that there exist very few other modern political conceptions except the idea of representative government which were not criticised by the genius of Aristotle.” That was Professor Dicey’s considered opinion. Perhaps an exception should be made of the idea of the civil service which dates from the middle of the nine-

teenth century, but during recent years, when there has been a bewildering variety of inventions in business and economic forms, what comparable developments have come in the field of government? The devices of the new constitutions of Europe are almost precisely the devices of pre-war constitutions.

This opinion on the lack of political inventiveness must be qualified, however, when one examines the agencies which are used for the adjustment of relations between states and other states. Even though the only government which exists is extremely rudimentary, some of its cogs show imagination and can even be called inventions. The International Labor Office machinery, the administration of mandates, the methods of dealing with minority problems, the relations between Council and Assembly—adjustments here are not entirely traditional. Many of them are original. Diplomacy by conference is a venerable method of international negotiation. Before the War, it was used exceptionally. After the War it was used regularly, but with almost no attention to its technique.

In one respect post-war conferences offered a vivid contrast to the meetings of diplomats in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Then questions of etiquette and precedence had to be settled in the minutest detail before the delegates could get down to business. A mere enumeration of some of the difficulties which earlier congresses experienced serves as an excellent index of the tremendous changes which have come about. The Congress of Westphalia brought the Thirty Years War to an end. It was summoned to meet in 1642 but more than fifteen months were required for the discussion of questions of precedence and etiquette. How were the envoys to be addressed? Should those representing princes be called "Excellency" as were the envoys of the electors? What should be the contents of the "full powers" which the delegates brought with them? Who

should pay the first formal call on whom? Who should be President of the meetings? Who should speak first? The difficulty of answering these questions was so great that negotiations were carried on at two places—Münster and Osnabrück—which were separated by thirty miles. At one place the French plenipotentiaries had precedence; at the other place the Swedish representatives were honored.

At the Congress of Utrecht in 1712 rules of procedure had to be devised in order to prevent quarrels between the servants of the plenipotentiaries. There were instances during the seventeenth century of special doors being put in buildings where meetings were to be held so that delegations, each of which claimed precedence, might enter the conference room simultaneously. At the Utrecht Congress a large round table was constructed. The delegates seated themselves pellmell so that there was no question as to priority of place, but the representative of the Emperor, who had been refused election as President, arrogated to himself the privilege of speaking first on every occasion. It was little wonder that Rousseau could write of congresses which discussed public affairs in private; at which "one deliberates in common: whether the table should be round or square; whether the room shall have more or less doors; whether one plenipotentiary shall have his face or back turned toward the window; whether another shall advance two inches more or less in a visit; and on a thousand questions of equal importance uselessly agitated for three centuries and assuredly very worthy of occupying the politics of our own century."

In those days questions as to full powers were important. Were the delegates—in the quaint language of the form used by the British King—authorized "to sign for Us and in Our name everything so agreed upon and concluded and transact all such other matters as may appertain thereto in as ample a manner and form and

with equal force and efficacy as We Ourselves could do if personally present?" Modern science has made communication so easy that delegates are deprived of discretion; full powers are less important; instructions can be received instantly from home governments. That in many respects is a stumbling block as well as a stepping stone.

Which it is, prime ministers and presidents have had no time to consider. Yet without careful thought on methods, participation in direct negotiations inevitably means inexpertness and carelessness. On technical matters involving tariffs or the tonnage of tanks which is necessary for the tanks to be "offensive" weapons, they consult experts. But on the "simple" business of political negotiation they think that they are expert enough. Many post-war mistakes could be cited, of which the old style diplomats, no matter what their faults, would never have been guilty. For example, following the abortive Geneva Arms Conference of 1927, there was a secret Anglo-French agreement on military reserves and global tonnage for navies. That agreement, which almost immediately became public, greatly and properly excited the United States. Unmindful of this "boner," for which the Conservative government had been responsible, Mr. MacDonald, at the Lausanne Conference,² entered into a "gentleman's agreement" with

² "A novel should be written on the functioning of a congress of this kind [Lausanne]. Statesmen are poor men surrounded by a court of journalists who never get a step away from them. They are always about to take a train, they never have a second's solitude, they must think while speaking and speak while thinking of something else, and must settle the most important interests of peoples in an atmosphere of a country fair. If one adds to all this the difficulties inherent in a triangular negotiation, the misunderstandings created by the inference of an honest courtier who is not always disinterested, the interventions of the other great powers, and the recriminations of the small powers, one can form an idea of the time which is left for reflection. These men can think only if they do not sleep.

"Another difficulty is the preoccupations of internal politics. Statesmen are constantly obliged to take positions that they can defend before

France which pledged France and England to act together on measures which might be taken to implement the Lausanne formula on reparations. As soon as they heard of it, and this was immediately, Germany and Italy were so suspicious and resentful that they had to be admitted to the understanding. Then Poland and the other small powers had to be brought in, and the situation was such that the United States thought—and probably rightfully—that the agreement was directed against them. That agreement was in part responsible for the fall of Signor Grandi, who was certainly not the least sensible of the Great Power representatives at Geneva. Again the Four Power Pact was launched in a premature, almost impromptu fashion, and in blithe disregard of the probability that to be initialled at all the Pact would have to be so whittled down as to be meaningless. Great Britain, for example, agreed to the Four Power Pact, but apparently did so without determining whether she wished to scrap the League as a political instrument or whether she wished to continue to use it.

As yet, moreover, the states of the world have given little thought to the question of how far they should attempt prior agreements on principle before international meetings are summoned. Bismarck declared that international conferences should never be called unless there had been previous agreement between the principal parties on the major points in dispute. But the points which now have to be settled are so controversial and complicated that no international conference would ever be called if Bismarck's condition were insisted upon. At bottom the failures of the conference method since the War can be ascribed in large part to incomplete preparation and to terms of reference that

the journalists who are waiting for them in the corridors and which they can defend before their parliaments and their electors."—William Martin, "Ce qui s'est passé à Lausanne," *Journal de Genève*, 9 July, 1932.

are too vague. Conferences cannot succeed if they are expected to save the world. Their objectives must be limited. And preparation for them must be adequate. There must be research by experts. The principals must be familiar with the matters on the agenda and with alternative policies which may be suggested. But of even greater importance is preparation in respect of the education of public opinion to grant concessions which may be necessary.

It is elementary that if an international conference is to reach an agreement, some states must make concessions. If there were agreement in advance there would be no necessity for meeting. The implications of this simple fact are rarely taken account of. They are entirely disregarded during the period of preparation for a conference. They are ignored while the conference is in progress. To an extent, of course, this is natural, for each delegation hopes that it will not have to yield and that the concessions necessary for an agreement will be made by somebody else. As yet there is no general realization of the fact that precisely as in a legislative assembly some interests must always give way, so in an international conference some state or states must give way. Too little attention has been paid to the fact that it is desirable to avoid action or speech before a conference which will make concessions during the conference difficult if not impossible.

Of course representatives in a conference act under one handicap which does not ordinarily have to be surmounted by the members of a legislative assembly. The principals in a conference, who are representatives of states rather than of economic or party groups, are mandated by their governments. Their freedom of decision is rigorously circumscribed. Many modern constitutions seek to guard against deputies in a legislative assembly being "mandated"—that is, being under instructions from the interests they represent. Diplomacy by

conference cannot really work until there is less mandating; for the mandates tend to prevent an agreement or, if they are revised so as to permit an agreement, create a psychology of defeat and loss of prestige. On the positive side then, there must in advance of conferences be intellectual preparation: different publics must be educated to the inevitability of concessions by some and to the belief that those making the concessions do not thereby suffer a diplomatic set-back. On the negative side there must not be announcements in advance of different policies which conferences are expected to approve.

In this latter respect the United States has not been without sin. We are inclined, that is to say, to announce our policy in advance and by inference, if not in words, to look upon an international gathering as a formal meeting called for the purpose of putting its imprimatur of approval on our policy. Under such circumstances any concessions by American delegates during a conference seem a confession of error or an admission of weakness. The American Senate will be given something to talk about. Statesmen whose policy has been too definitely announced and who are unable to secure the acceptance of that policy either have to admit failure or lay themselves open to a charge of inconsistency. They are rarely big enough to admit that discussions have changed their point of view or that, in the interest of a general agreement, they are willing to yield. For some curious, never explained reason, consistency of opinion in a politician is prized above all other earthly considerations.

We must always remember, however, that behind those who confer are their peoples. Politicians must take account of the prejudices and passions of their electorates. Internationally their task is perplexing. At the Congress of Vienna Talleyrand declared that he was trying to be a good European as well as a good Frenchman.

The combination is difficult. In a speech which he delivered several years ago before the journalists in Geneva, Dr. Curtius, then German Foreign Minister, said that every statesman who came to the League played two rôles. In one rôle he represented the interests of his state and it was his duty to safeguard and advance those interests. In the other rôle he was the architect of a better international order. This states the problem. The difficulty is that in many cases the statesman cannot be an able architect without seeming to overlook the interests which he is supposed to protect. His attention to these interests is compelled by public opinion in his country. If he seems to be thinking too much of his international rôle he may get into trouble with his cabinet associates or with his parliament. It is possible, however, for statesmen to take long views and by effectively playing the international rôle to safeguard the interests of their countries more successfully than if they did no more than take short-sighted views. The problem is a large one and cannot be explored save in terms of specific incidents which are not pertinent here. Perhaps the most striking incidents would suggest that France had ignored the profound truth which underlay Talleyrand's endeavor.

The problem is difficult also because, as has been said, it would be a more manageable world if only there were no foreigners in it. We are interested in those foreigners only when they misbehave or when we fear that they are planning to do something to us or to prevent our doing something. And at the same time the foreigners may be thinking that the misbehavior is on our side and that we are planning to do something to them. Influences exerted on the conferring national representatives may neutralize each other. Over all is the spectre of modern propaganda which has been defined as inartistic lying, which nearly deceives our friends without quite deceiving our enemies.

Undoubtedly one gain has been that statesmen get to know each other personally but the gain is sometimes only on the surface. When the War broke out, Sir Edward Grey had not been in Europe more than once or twice and had a most limited knowledge of European personalities—a deficiency which was inadequately alleviated by the extensive knowledge of his expert associates in the British Foreign Office. Writing shortly after the Peace Conference, Sir Maurice Hankey stressed the advantages of diplomacy by conference because of the informality which it vouchsafed statesmen and because of the speed in negotiating which it permitted.³ Sir Maurice was thinking primarily of the War conferences and it is doubtful whether he would express the same opinions today. During the War the conferees at least had a common objective—victory over the enemy; and sooner or later—although it was frequently later—they were forced to subordinate their individual demands in order to have a common plan for achieving the victory. Since the Peace Conference there has been no such common objective.

Moreover, amiability, camaraderie, and the homeliness which Sir Maurice Hankey thought not unimportant may hurt rather than help. Harold Nicolson, whose penetrating judgments on diplomacy are made more striking by felicitous statement, has called it a mistake "for the student of diplomacy by conference to concentrate too exclusively upon those weaknesses of human nature which impede the intelligent conduct of discussion. The difficulties of precise negotiations arise with almost equal frequency from the more amiable qualities of the human heart. It would be interesting to analyze how many foolish decisions, how many fatal misunderstandings have arisen from such pleasant qualities as shyness, consideration, affability, or ordinary good manners. One of the most persistent disad-

³ "Diplomacy by Conference," *The Round Table*, March, 1921.

vantages of all diplomacy by conference is this human difficulty of remaining disagreeable to the same set of people for many days at a stretch." ⁴ The profound wisdom in these remarks will be generally appreciated. But the appreciation can be exquisite in the case of an NRA Deputy Administrator who has met for many days at a stretch with representatives of industries who, in their non-representative capacity, were much more affable than they were in their representative capacity.

The problems are vast ones and I can here do no more than comment on certain matters that lie on their peripheries. Disaster has resulted from the fact that insufficient thought is devoted to methods and to procedure. That is true as well of parliaments which fail to accomplish their expected tasks and lose in prestige because they refuse to pay adequate attention to technique. A revamping of legislative methods and a sloughing off of tasks for which a numerous assembly is unfitted would make it more fitted for its proper work. In the same way there must be a consideration of the methods of international conferring and a thorough-going understanding of technique.

The old style diplomats were much less reticent. They wrote manuals on the manner of negotiating with princes. There were guide books for ambassadors. Callières advised the negotiator to "let clean linen and appointments and delicacies reign at his table," to neglect no "opportunity of placing himself and his master in a favorable light in the eyes" of the ladies of the court, "for it is well known that the power of feminine charm often extends to cover the weightiest resolutions of state. The greatest events have sometimes followed the toss of a fan or the nod of a head." ⁵ That has an archaic sound now but it was shrewd advice for

⁴ *Peacemaking*, p. 67.

⁵ *De la Maniere de negocier avec les Souverains. De l'utilité des Negociations, du choix des Ambassadeurs et des Envoyez, et des qualitez necessaires pour réussir dans ces emplois.*

the times in which it was given. Any instructions for international actors drawn up as of 1934 would to future generations seem similarly archaic, but that is no reason why attempts should not be made to formulate the instructions. They should, of course, be pregnant with intimate details of the mistakes and successes of international conferences. At Geneva in 1927, for example, the British and the American representatives read detailed statements of their respective plans for naval disarmament. The plans were public announcements of what the two delegations wished the Conference to do and since the plans were in conflict, the success of the Conference, if not doomed, was made highly unlikely. If the proposals had been exchanged privately in advance of the assembling of the Conference, it might have been possible to modify or at least re-phrase them so that their publication would hold out hopes of a satisfactory compromise instead of making it clear that modification would be interpreted as a loss of national prestige. That is a rather notorious example of faulty method; but thoughtful conferees could doubtless furnish scores of even more striking illustrations which have not yet become notorious.

At the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference in 1923, Lord Curzon expressed the hope that the world was done with that kind of diplomacy. The hope was vain. Diplomacy by conference which had seemed to make sinecures of ambassadorial posts, showed no signs of slackening. The lessons of the 1933 Geneva and London Conferences are likely, for a time at least, to make ambassadors and ordinary diplomatic channels of greater importance. It may well be that the intense economic nationalism manifested by every state in the world can be more effectively tempered by correspondence than by conference. During the ill-fated meeting in London in June, 1933, the well known cartoonist Low had a drawing in the *Manchester Guardian* which explained

"the brilliant success of the conference so far." Mr. MacDonald with his hands raised to heaven and with his Scotch burr told the delegates that the "thowts of the wurruld were with them. They must coöperate." M. Daladier, then Prime Minister of France, "favored coöperation insofar as it gave other nations the opportunity to make sacrifices for France." To Mr. Neville Chamberlain coöperation appeared desirable "if it gave Great Britain an advantage over other nations." Signor Jung, of Italy, took the position that Italy must get "the thick end of the deal" and Baron Neurath of Germany insisted that "everybody must give Germany something." Litvinoff of Russia was pictured as suggesting that the capitalist system needed a stick of dynamite and Low's comment was that since Litvinoff "was trying to turn the occasion into an economic conference, he was voted no gentleman." After these speeches the Conference adjourned for the Americans to use the hall for a meeting of their delegation to decide "who has their policy, if any."

Intense economic nationalism has meant more intense political nationalism. The line is more sharply drawn than ever between European states which wish to preserve the status quo of the Versailles Treaty and states which wish to upset that status quo. It is freely said that the political tension is similar to that which existed in 1914. Dire prophecies are made that the agencies of international government which were set up at Paris will be quite incompetent to prevent a conflagration. To borrow a mixed metaphor, only a spark is required to unleash the dogs of war. A clergyman once prayed that if in his sermon any spark fell from his lips, Providence would water that spark. The threat now is, not only that international relations between, but that internal conditions in, various countries of the world will fan the sparks into flame rather than water them. Hence we have serious discussions in

the United States of what this country can do to maintain its neutrality when there comes the war which many declare to be inevitable. We face again the absurd dilemma which previous generations have faced: how can states obtain the things to which they are entitled? They cannot obtain justice save by war—but war always results in injustice. Old injustices may be eliminated but new injustices will take their place.

Yet there is no greater fallacy in international relations than the idea that the world is static. Every government recognizes that internal adjustments are necessary—that statutes must be repealed and revised and that constitutions must be amended. “The great cause of revolutions is this,” said Macaulay, “that while nations move onward, constitutions stand still”; and one great cause of wars has been that as the world moved onward treaty arrangements have stood still. If there had been no nineteenth century changes we would now have no Belgium, no separation of Sweden and Norway, no united Germany and no united Italy. It must be frankly recognized that, like national constitutions and legislation, international enactments cannot be made for all time. There may be wisdom in having change difficult and in setting up safeguards against the hasty translation of ignorant passion into the public law of nations; but there certainly should be no attempt to put international treaties in the same class with the multiplication table.

The peace treaties drawn up at Paris in 1919 impliedly admitted that their arrangements might not be permanent. That was a considerable advance. No previous set of peace treaties had conceded that the world might not be static and had admitted the unwisdom of attempting to put states into a straitjacket. It is true that no adequate machinery for treaty revision was provided—for Article XIX of the League Covenant does not seem to be workable—but the possibility, and

even the desirability, of revision were not denied. Europe is now divided into two camps—the status quo powers and the powers which wish to revise the status quo. That is the real menace. There seems no early prospect of revision but there is at least this gain: that even France and Czechoslovakia do not deny the existence of a case for revision in some particulars. They do no more than say that revision cannot be discussed now; that the dissatisfied powers would not be content with the concessions that might seem possible to the satiated powers; that revision of any kind would be an entering wedge which would open the door to uncertainty and instability.

But an advance has been made. It did not take place overnight for the problem has been long discussed. More than sixty years ago, John Stuart Mill, in an article in the *Fortnightly Review* on "Treaty Obligations," asked what means there were "of reconciling in the greatest practical degree the inviolability of treaties and the security of national faith with the undoubted fact that treaties are not always fit to be kept while those who have imposed them on others weaker than themselves are not likely, if they retain confidence in their own strength, to grant a release from them." To effect this reconciliation so far as it is capable of being effected, Mill declared that nations should be allowed to abide by two rules. They should abstain from imposing conditions which, on any just and reasonable view of human affairs, cannot be expected to be kept. They should conclude their treaties as commercial treaties are usually concluded—for a term of years. In one of the speeches which he delivered in England while the Peace Conference was in progress, President Wilson admitted his lack of faith that "the individual terms of the settlement we are about to attempt will be altogether satisfactory." But he added that "if we are to make unsatisfactory settlements we

must see to it that they are rendered more and more satisfactory by subsequent adjustments which are made possible. So we must provide the machinery of readjustment in order that we may have the machinery of good will and friendship." As yet the machinery of adjustment is not adequate. In the world there is a crisis without government. One principal reason is that the rule of unanimity is insisted upon. Until that rule is qualified international anarchy will continue.

Since the War, the United States has frequently seemed indifferent to the problems of the collective system to preserve peace and adjust international difficulties. We have ignored so far as we could the setting up and the functioning of the League of Nations—one of the greatest dramas in international history. It was a play which the United States helped to write—up to a point—and for which we furnished one of the chief actors, whose rôle, no matter how much it may be disputed, was at least not that of the villain. There is a familiar story of a French dramatic critic who fell asleep while the manuscript of a play was being read to him. In answer to a rebuke for not remaining awake so that he could pass judgment on the play, he replied "Sleep is also an opinion." America has passed similar judgment on the play in which we collaborated on European battlefields and in the Paris negotiations. On two historic occasions we fired shots heard around the world. On other occasions we have slept a sleep heard around the world.

We participated in the Disarmament Conference but steadfastly refused to recognize the plain fact that political arrangements must precede disarmament. The lesson of the Washington Conference we were unwilling to apply to Europe, and in refusing to see the conflict between our own armament programme and our advice to the conference we demonstrated the truth of Mr. Harold Nicholson's judgment: "The Anglo-Saxon

is gifted with a limitless capacity for excluding his own practical requirements from the application of the idealistic theories which he seeks to impose on others."

Germany's withdrawal from the League and the resulting situation make it highly probable that politically we will remain even more aloof from Europe than we have been. On the economic side there was a temporary burning of bridges at the London Economic Conference. International agreements could not be permitted to limit our programme of domestic recovery. There are signs that these bridges are to be rebuilt. Secretary Henry A. Wallace's pamphlet *America Must Choose* has cut into our thoughts more deeply than any international pronunciamento since President Wilson's voice was listened to. The tariff powers which President Roosevelt asks from Congress so that bilateral and regional tariff agreements can be made, appear to be the shortest road to freeing international trade from some of the restrictions which now limit or even annihilate it. Many Americans have regretted that after the London Conference we seemed economically to cut ourselves so aloof from the rest of the world and formulated certain of our policies in such complete disregard of the fact that we cannot live by ourselves alone but are part of an international economic community; that we must sell many products abroad and that we must buy there not only our comforts—tea, coffee, perfumes, silks—but a good many of our necessities as well—tin, rubber, etc. Happily a change of policy seems not improbable.

In respect of his emphasis on national matters, President Roosevelt may be a shrewd psychologist. There are grounds for believing that he is proceeding on the theory (and who will say that it is not a sound theory?) that the American people would not have rallied to his support on his domestic programme if at the same time he was diverting their attentions to adventures in inter-

national negotiations and relationships, to which our traditions and habits of mind have not accustomed us. His view may well be that he should not attempt to ride two horses at the same time. The international policy which our interests require may receive greater support if it can be argued for as necessary to preserve and even increase the fruits of national policy.

One real difficulty which has faced economic conferences is that states have not known exactly what they wanted. Agreement has been impossible not only because interests really clashed but because the conferees were not sure of what their interests actually were. If each state is certain of its national policy, if vagueness and inconsistency can be eliminated, then some measure of international agreement will be facilitated. Knowledge and precision will mitigate the clash of national interests. The old blunderbusses of tariffs, export bounties, and quotas can be counted, and the new, terrible weapon of depreciating the currency can be banned.

Finally, a world which recovers economically will be a world of less political tension. As tension wanes economic nationalism will cease to wax. In such a world, there may be no effective international government, but there will be fewer critical situations which demand governing institutions. The atmosphere will then be more hospitable for a calm consideration of some of the matters discussed above.

C O D A

SOMETHING more should be said. With apologies to the art from whose terminology I borrow and with perhaps undue optimism, I describe the following pages as a Coda which the Oxford Dictionary defines as "a passage added after the natural completion of a movement so as to form a more definite and satisfactory conclusion."

The content of the New Deal has been indicated only in the footnote which lists the alphabetically described agencies that have been set up. I have not been concerned with the question of whether the measures have been wise or unwise, whether they have been properly coördinated, whether they will succeed or fail, whether they differ from Mr. Hoover's programme basically or whether they are only more courageous in respect of method and socially more just in respect of objectives. My subject has been government—not monetary theory, public finance, or agricultural economics. And my chief point has been that democratic institutions (notably the American), while keeping the representative principle intact, are nevertheless able to govern with complete effectiveness and at the same time to avoid penalizing dissent and ruling by the sword.

In the United States, more men have been put to work than in Germany where the vast majority of the unemployed were, ironically enough, in the ranks of the

Social Democratic party which Hitler promptly destroyed. Mussolini may preach the idea of a corporative state but the United States has assisted and restrained industry to a far greater extent than has Italy. Indeed, without a dictatorship we have more of a totalitarian state than can be found anywhere save Russia; but our state has not abandoned egalitarian and libertarian ideals, and, if we so choose, we can without violence limit its range. Congress in November, 1934, and President Roosevelt in November, 1936, will submit themselves to the electorate. They will have opponents and voting will be free. The fixed terms are of high importance. Elsewhere certain legislators legislate or certain executives execute for so long as they control the army. In this respect there is a sharp differentiation between the status of President Roosevelt and the status of *Der Führer* and *Il Duce*.

The three men, however, have this in common: they are popular leaders who have captured the imaginations of their people. They have been successful in part because modern science has permitted them to appeal to the ear as well as to the eye—by the radio, the cinema, and the printed word. The two dictators have suppressed representative institutions which, as I have suggested above, took on their present forms in a stage-coach¹ and not in an aeroplane age; before the masses enjoyed the literacy in the absence of which Hitler and Mussolini would have been unable to make their propaganda successful. What of the future? I venture no prophecies but only a few generalizations, not unmindful that I have commented above on the risks of generalizing.

Dictators, to remain dictators, must do something for their people. Circuses have their importance but economics cannot long occupy last place in the Hitler pro-

¹ In 1931, Mr. Lloyd George compared the House of Commons to "an old wind-jammer which was equal to the traffic of a hundred years ago, but cannot cope with one one-hundredth part of the enormous trade of today."

gramme without dissent increasing rapidly. In Italy, real wages are below the 1914 level. The standard of living is not rising. It may not be long before the "streets and sewers" which Mussolini has said "man needs more than freedom" begin to pall and seem less attractive streets and sewers than they were when newly built. Menacing all dictatorial regimes is the growth of dissent and internal decay. Middle classes, warring against both organized capital and organized labor, may stay in the middle but can become less numerous and less powerful. What of the United States whose checked and balanced government has been able to do as much as have the dictators?

Many of the measures here have involved no new principle. For example, the Securities Act was preceded by plenty of "blue-sky" legislation. Federal intervention in this field to regulate stock exchanges was delayed so long largely because of doubts as to whether certain methods proposed would not create as many evils as they eradicated and it is not yet clear that the proper methods have been found. In putting restrictions on hours of labor and in prescribing minimum wages, the NRA codes have simply carried farther for all industries the principle of state legislation for certain industries and of federal legislation (the Adamson Act) for one industry. Assistance to agriculture has differed in method rather than in fundamental principle from assistance to manufacturing which Republican tariffs have made a leading article of conservative faith. So far as its spending and loaning programme is concerned, the government has not opened the Treasury for the first time but only wider than ever before; and the great question now is whether Santa Claus's pack may not turn out to be Pandora's box. In the whole programme there is one dissonant factor which is not yet as audible as it later will be: capitalists are expected to act as if they were not capitalists—that is, voluntarily to limit their profits for the general good.

Here I do no more than suggest questions which the

future must answer. Mr. Roosevelt has demonstrated that you can have all the advantages of a dictatorship and not abandon democracy. In order to get the advantages, few of the drawbacks have to be endured. Instead of storm troops he has public backing. Of course it will be said that Hitler and Mussolini have public backing also; and in free elections both could at the moment probably get good majorities of their voters. But they cannot take the chance. They must be impressive by getting overwhelming majorities. So the sanction of the dictator is force—the prohibition of opposition. The sanction of a strong government in a democracy is consent. If it should turn out that the consent is not sufficient and that the government must become less strong, that would be regrettable. But those who thereby suffered would, I suggest, suffer less than great groups in Germany and Italy have suffered.

Already, even before the effects of the Rooseveltian measures are clearly discernible, there are speculation and argument as to future measures. By some the decision not to ask for an extension of the licensing provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act is hailed as the first step in a withdrawal by the government from the experiments it has undertaken. Others argue that it is "impossible that a government which presumes to manage industry, agriculture, and commerce in a time of chaos, can quietly step out and allow the same events to occur again."² Improbable it may be but certainly not impossible; and this is particularly true in the United States where we are so prone to veer from one extreme to another, in measures as well as in thought. Few, for example, anticipated that the war harness would be taken off as quickly as it was, and few will now deny that such speedy removal was a mistake. Against Mr. Wilson's effective leadership the country reacted so completely and violently that large sections of it genuinely believed Mr. Harding

² William F. Russell, *Liberty and Learning: A Discussion of Education and the New Deal*, p. 8 (New York, 1934).

to be a statesman. In 1932 few would have believed it possible that a country which had not challenged Mr. Hoover's platitudes could, a year later, accept without serious question far-reaching interferences not only in corporate but in private financial matters. The acquiescence by the country in the administration's gold policy—not only in the reduction of the gold content of the dollar but in the penalizing of the continued possession of gold legally acquired—is, I venture to think, the most remarkable about-face of popular opinion that any constitutional government has ever witnessed. Who can reflect on the way in which the country blundered into prohibition with no idea of its consequences and on the way in which it blundered out of it without any plan for the future and not conclude that political prophecy is, in the United States, more hazardous than in many other countries?

As I have said, the Roosevelt administration has enjoyed the tremendous boon of the electorate's being mentally receptive in respect of far-reaching measures. It has deserved the boon because by courageous leadership it has shaken the electorate out of traditional habits of thought. It has well merited the applause that has greeted outstanding qualities of heart and mind. Such electoral mobility is ominous as well as encouraging, for it indicates that the electorate may be persuaded to go to an opposite extreme. But even if that should happen, the contrast between its 1932 and its 1933 attitude will always be before statesmen and will indicate an achievement which they can strive to duplicate.

The economic pendulum swings and the direction in which it goes will determine how recent legislation will be amended, improved, relaxed, tightened. Many, as I have said, hope that the harness will be taken off and many hope that it will be kept on. It is clear that in certain respects the only way to avoid a retreat is to advance further, but some maintain that the government

should interfere and control far more than it has: that fascism is not impossible. "Attempts to save economic life by inoculating it with virus from the corpse of nationalism result in blood-poisoning which bears the name fascism."

That is Trotsky's definition. The American brew would doubtless have some different ingredients. With a self-denying ordinance against prophecy, this Coda cannot explore the terrain. But one or two additional facts and questions are pertinent. It is worth while noting that what would be replaced in the United States was at its worst far better than what was replaced in Russia, Italy, or Germany. Even when it has worked most badly—say in 1922-23 or 1931-32—through the accident of men who occupied particular places or by reason of institutional defects which can be neutralized only by exceptional men—the American government did far better than was ever done by Tsarism or by the Italian Parliament and King. The German Parliament, as I have said, never had a fair chance. Germany had no middle class with a genuine liberal tradition, and the 1918 change was a collapse of the monarchy as much as a real revolution. Even when confidence in American institutions was at its lowest level, they were more highly regarded than were Russian, Italian, or German institutions.

Again, who would maintain that the American people are not more averse to militarization than the peoples whom Mussolini and Hitler have militarized? How could the numerous centres of power in the United States, with their different economic interests, cultures, racial groups, and political loyalties, be controlled by any one group to carry out its programme? And if control were effected, how could it be made effective? Is it not arguable that American public utilities are but little less complicated and little less baffling to government

supervisors than the whole of Italian or Russian economy? ³

That considerable revamping of the machinery of representative government will come quickly is greatly to be desired. One tendency may be to hand over power to certain autonomous groups or quasi-public corporations so that they may make decisions within the limits of the authority given them. But the government would determine these limits and remain the final arbiter. When the government directs in detail, mistakes are paid for by the whole community. Individual capitalists can plan and their mistakes to some extent cancel each other. If the planning is by great groups, there will be a considerable measure of cancellation. Anyone who has seen government and industry at close range should be convinced that attempts by the former to administer the latter would in the United States be accompanied by waste and suffering far greater than the waste and suffering of a rugged individualism which is neither rugged nor individualistic. "The purpose of fascism," in Mr. Strachey's definition, is "to defend by violence the private ownership of the means of production, even though our modern civilization has become incompatible with a social system based upon private ownership." But compatibility can be secured by gradually increasing governmental control and by the substitution in special cases of public ownership for private ownership with, it is to be hoped, experiments in administrative devices which will avoid the necessity of administration by bureaucratic departments. Thus it may be possible to escape the chief disasters of government ad-

³ In his *A Preface to Morals* (p. 254), Walter Lippmann declared that on this ground bolshevism and fascism are "un-American" and "no less un-Belgian, un-German, un-English. For they are unindustrial." (New York, 1929.) Despite the failure of the prophecy in the case of Germany, his remarks are most acute. And so far as Germany is concerned, to repeat, the fascism is emotional, not economic.

ministration of a bewilderingly complex industrial system. The government can stimulate and supplement. It need not supplant. In Sir Arthur Salter's phrase, it can "plan planning."

Meanwhile extremists will propagandize and prophesy. Those on the Right will display their penchant for shirts: black shirts, brown shirts, blue shirts. In the United States silver shirts have taken the place of the night shirts of Klan days. Fairy tales will be told and we will refuse to believe that they may turn into nightmares. We may be too innocent or we may not be.

In one of André Maurois' sketches there is a story of an Irish peasant who was told by a member of Parliament that Ireland was soon to have home rule.

"May the Good Lord have pity on us," was the reply, "don't do that."

"What?" asked the member of Parliament. "You don't want home rule?"

"Sir," replied the peasant, "I will tell you. You, sir, are a good Christian. Are you not? Like me, you want to go to heaven. But we don't wish to go there this evening."

